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I. INTRODUCTION

Recent years have witnessed a modest but expanding Supreme
Court effort to return the national government to its structural first
principles.' Foremost among these is that federal power, although
vast, is neither inherent nor unbounded, but consists only of that
granted by the Constitution.2 In 1998, the Court remained steadfast
1.
See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (opening its analysis by
declaring: "We start with first principles."); H. Jefferson Powell, The Province and Duty of the
PoliticalDepartments, 65 U. Cm. L. REV.365, 369 (1998) (book review) ("[The past few years
have seen a dramatic resurgence in the Supreme Court's interest in enforcing the limits on
Congress's powers that derive from their enumeration in Article I and from the federal
structure of the Republic."); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996
Term-Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54, 133 (1997) (noting this
trend with particular regard to federalism limitations).
2.
See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 1 (vesting in Congress only those "legislative Powers herein
granted"); id. art. VI, cl 2 (according supremacy only to "the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance" of the Constitution); id. amend. X (exhorting that the United
States possesses only those "powers... delegated to [it] by the Constitution"); Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803) ("The powers of the legislature are defined and
limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written.").
Recent restatements of this principle include Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552 ('The Constitution creates a
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to this precept, thwarting yet another attempt by a federal branch to
exceed its limited and enumerated constitutional powers. This time,
however, the perpetrator was none other than the Article IH judiciary
itself. In Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment,3 the Court
formally denounced the federal court practice of assuming the existence of subject-matter jurisdiction solely to reach the merits of, and
then rule against, manifestly unworthy claims.
Often labeled
"hypothetical jurisdiction," 4 the now-repudiated practice had gradually infiltrated the decision making of every circuit court of appeals, 5
7
becoming nothing less than "a familiar tenet"6 or "settled principle" of
federal appellate jurisprudence s

Federal Government of enumerated powers. As James Madison wrote, 'tihe powers delegated
by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and defined.'") (citation
omitted) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 292-93 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)), and City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2162 (1997) ("Under our Constitution, the
Federal Government is one of enumerated powers.").
3.
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 118 S. Ct. 1003 (1998). The
majority opinion was authored by Justice Scalia.
4.
This label apparently derives from a student article, see Comment, Assuming
JurisdictionArguendo: The Rationale and Limits of Hypothetical Jurisdiction, 127 U. PA. L.
REv. 712, 713 (1979) [hereinafter Assuming Jurisdiction Arguendo], and is by no means
universally employed. See, e.g., John R. Knight, The Requirement of Subject Matter Jurisdiction
on Appeal: A CardinalRule with a Twist, 44 FED. LAw., Jan. 1997, at 16 (referring to its
appellate manifestation as "assumed appellate jurisdiction" and "the Norton doctrine," after
Norton v. Mathews, 427 U.S. 524 (1976)). Nonetheless, the label, like the doctrine it describes,
has attained fairly broad usage and the Supreme Court took particular note of it. See Steel Co.,
118 S. Ct. at 1012 ("The Ninth Circuit has denominated this practice-which it characterizes as
'assuming' jurisdiction for the purpose of deciding the merits-the 'doctrine of hypothetical
jurisdiction.' ") (citing, for example, United States v. Troescher, 99 F.3d 933, 934 n.1 (1996)).
Accordingly, and for the sake of convenience, "hypothetical jurisdiction" will be employed here to
denote the practice described in the text, whether or not any given court invoking the practice
similarly employed the term.
5.
See, e.g., Crocco v. Xerox Corp., 137 F.3d 105, 108-09 (2d Cir. 1998); Ayes v. Shah, No.
96-3063, 1997 WL 589177, at *1 (10th Cir. Sept. 24, 1997); Sesler v. Pitzer, 110 F.3d 569, 572
n.5 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 197 (1997); Troescher, 99 F.3d at 934 n.1; House the
Homeless, Inc. v. Widnall, 94 F.3d 176, 179 n.7 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1434
(1997); Smith v. Avino, 91 F.3d 105, 108 (11th Cir. 1996); United States v. Stoller, 78 F.3d 710,
715 (1st Cir. 1996), cert. dismissed, 117 S. Ct. 378 (1996); Decker & Co. v. West, 76 F.3d 1573,
1584 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Isby v. Bayh, 75 F.3d 1191, 1196 (7th Cir. 1996); City of Charleston v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 57 F.3d 385, 390 n.5 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 974 (1995); J.C.
Wyckoff & Assocs. v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 936 F.2d 1474, 1490 (6th Cir. 1991); Cross-Sound
Ferry Servs., Inc. v. ICC, 934 F.2d 327, 333-34 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Switlik v. Hardwicke Co., 651
F.2d 852, 856 n.3 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1064 (1981).
6.
Stoller, 78 F.3d at 715; see also Rekhi v. Wildwood Indus., 61 F.3d 1313, 1316 (7th Cir.
1995) (noting that "it is well established in the courts of appeals"). Even two decades ago, one
writer observed that there was "an increasing number of cases in which federal courts,
confronted with difficult and far-reaching jurisdictional challenges, have assumed jurisdiction
arguendo and proceeded to deny relief on the merits." Assuming JurisdictionArguendo, supra
note 4, at 713. By the 1990s, judges became so comfortable with the practice that one scholar
could observe without qualification that "courts have retreated from the proposition that they
must always decide jurisdictional issues before reaching the merits."
Perry Dane,
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Notwithstanding its relative popularity among lower court
judges, the doctrine of hypothetical jurisdiction was so clearly deviant
from the constitutional mandate that federal judicial power may only
be exercised-and indeed only exists-with the presence of subjectmatter jurisdiction that its eventual invalidation by the Supreme
Court was all but inevitable. 9 The federal courts, after all, are simply
one branch of a tripartite government of limited and enumerated

Jurisdictionality,Time, and the Legal Imagination, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 118-19 & n.347
(1994).
7.
United States v. Eyer, 113 F.3d 470, 474 (3d Cir. 1997).
8.
The Ninth Circuit-singled out by the Steel Co. majority, see supranote 4-appears to
have led the pack in terms of invoking the doctrine, and frequently did so by way of analytically
cursory, unpublished opinions. See, e.g., NAACP v. Jones, 131 F.3d 1317, 1321 n.4 (9th Cir.
1997), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 48 (1998); Freeman v. Principal Fin. Group, No. 96-35947, 1997
WL 377084 (9th Cir. July 3, 1997); Jones v. Peterson, No. 96-35370, 1997 WL 75550 (9th Cir.
Feb. 20, 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 300 (1997); Adams v. INS, No. 96-70025, 1997 WL 75709
(9th Cir. Feb. 20, 1997); Contreras-Tarango v. INS, No. 95-70424, 1997 WL 43355 (9th Cir. Jan.
31, 1997); United States v. Stanley, No. 94-10113, 1996 WL 738700 (9th Cir. Dec. 24, 1996);
Troescher, 99 F.3d at 934 n.1; SEC v. American Capital Invs., Inc., 98 F.3d 1133, 1139-42 (9th
Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1468 (1997); Zavala-Zaragoza v. INS, No. 95-70104, 1996 WL
413669 (9th Cir. July 23, 1996); Navis v. Aeronaves de Mexico, S-k. (In re Air Crash Disaster
Near Cerritos), No. 94-56433, 1996 WL 413658 (9th Cir. July 23, 1996); Lewin v. INS, No. 9470867, 1996 WL 335359 (9th Cir. June 17, 1996); Medrano-Dominguez v. INS, No. 94-70367,
1995 WL 761690 (9th Cir. Dec. 21, 1995); Bennett v. Plenart, 63 F.3d 915, 922 (9th Cir. 1995),
rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 1154 (1997); Silva v. United States (In re Grand Jury Subpoena Issued to
Bailin), 51 F.3d 203, 206 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. dismissed, 515 U.S. 1189 (1995), and cert. denied,
516 U.S. 973 (1995); Craig v. United States, No. 92-35400, 1994 WL 408250 (9th Cir. Aug. 4,
1994); Sumitomo Bank v. Tokai Credit Corp. (In re Eve Marie, Inc.), No. 92-55972, 1993 WL
530457 (9th Cir. Dec. 21, 1993); Wong v. Ulchert, 998 F.2d 661, 662-63 (9th Cir. 1993); United
States v. IRC, No. 92-50673, 1993 WL 212524, at *1 n.2 (9th Cir. June 17, 1993); Clow v. HUD,
948 F.2d 614, 616-17 n.2 (9th Cir. 1991) (per curiam); Federal Ins. Co. v. Scarsella Bros., 931
F.2d 599, 602 (9th Cir. 1991); Forster v. County of Santa Barbara, 896 F.2d 1146, 1147 n.2 (9th
Cir. 1990) (per curiam); Sundance Land Corp. v. Community First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 840
F.2d 653, 666 n.15 (9th Cir. 1988); Wolder v. United States, 807 F.2d 1506, 1507 (9th Cir. 1987)
(per curiam); Lehner v. United States, 685 F.2d 1187, 1189-90 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v.
Walker, 575 F.2d 209, 212 (9th Cir. 1978). But cf Knight, supra note 4, at 16 (according this
honor to the First Circuit, though relying only on reported decisions).
9.
As the Steel Co. Court noted,
[Hypothetical jurisdiction] carries the courts beyond the bounds of authorized judicial
action and thus offends fimdamental principles of separation of powers. This conclusion
should come as no surprise, since it is reflected in a long and venerable line of our cases.
"Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause. Jurisdiction is power
to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court
is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause."
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 118 S. Ct. 1003, 1012 (1998) (quoting Ex
parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868)); see also Rekhi, 61 F.3d at 1316 (postulating,
correctly as it turns out, that hypothetical jurisdiction "may be out of keeping with the Supreme
Court's current thinking, which is more formalistic"); Cross-SoundFerry Servs., 934 F.2d at 345
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the denial of the petition for review)
(concluding that "[hiowever valid this circuit's cases [permitting hypothetical jurisdiction] once
might have been, in my view they do not survive the Supreme Court's most recent
pronouncements").
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powers, 10 and it has long been held that their jurisdiction cannot "be
expanded by judicial decree"" and should be "carefully guarded
against expansion by judicial interpretation." 12 To be sure, the federal
judiciary has itself not hesitated to strike down the actions of a coequal branch where that branch defended its exercise of seemingly
extraconstitutional power exclusively on hypothetical grounds. 3 In
this respect, Steel Co. is the judicial equivalent to the watershed 1995

10. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) ("Federal
courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power authorized by
Constitution and statute. . . ."); Stockman v. FEC, 138 F.3d 144, 151 (5th Cir. 1998) ("Federal
courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and absent jurisdiction conferred by statute, lack the
power to adjudicate claims. It is incumbent on all federal courts to dismiss an action whenever
it appears that subject matter jurisdiction is lacking.") (citation omitted); Jones v. Giles, 741
F.2d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1984) ("Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, whose constitutional or congressional limitations must be neither disregarded nor evaded.").
1L Kokkonen, 511U.S. at 377.
12. American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17 (1951); see also Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305
U.S. 165, 171 (1938) ("A court does not have the power, by judicial fiat, to extend its jurisdiction
over matters beyond the scope of the authority granted to it by its creators.").
13. The seminal case in this regard is, of course, Marbury v. Madison, which held that
Congress lacks the power to vest the Supreme Court with jurisdiction not granted in the
Constitution. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 173-76 (1803). The most recent cases
include United States v. Lopez, discussed infra notes 14-15 and accompanying text, as well as
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997) (holding that Congress lacks the
power under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment and in light of the separation of powers
to subject states, as it did in the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§
2000bb-bb4 (1994), to substantive requirements exceeding the Free Exercise Clause); Seminole
Tribe v. Florida,517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding that Congress lacks the power under the Indian
Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment
immunity by authorizing tribes to sue states in federal court for failure to negotiate in good
faith as provided by the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2710(dX3)(a), (d)(7)) (1994);
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 174-77 (1992) (holding that Congress either acted
"outside [its] enumerated powers, or... infringfed] upon the core of state sovereignty reserved
by the Tenth Amendment" by requiring states either to regulate low level radioactive waste
disposal or to take title to the waste within their borders, see 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d)(2)(C)) (1994).
Recent lower federal court decisions include: Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453, 463-65 (4th Cir.
1998) (holding that Congress lacks the power under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment
to prohibit states from disclosing certain information obtained in connection with a driver's
motor vehicle record, as provided by the Driver's Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2721);
Schlossberg v. Maryland Comptroller (In re Creative Goldsmiths), 119 F.3d 1140, 1144-47 (4th
Cir. 1997) (holding that Congress lacks the power under the Bankruptcy Clause, U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 4, and section five of the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate the states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 106 (1994)), cert. denied,
118 S. Ct. 1517 (1998); Mills v. Maine, 118 F.3d 37, 42-49 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding that Congress
lacks the power under the Interstate Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity by
authorizing federal court suits for damages for alleged violations of the Fair Labor Standards
Act pay provisions, see 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)) (1994); MacPherson v. University of Montevallo, 938
F. Supp. 785, 787-89 (N.D. Ala. 1996) (holding that Congress lacks the power under the
Interstate Commerce Clause to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity by
authorizing Age Discrimination in Employment Act actions against state employers in federal
court).
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case of United States v. Lopez,14 in which the Court struck down the
federal criminalization of gun possession within school zones, in no
small part because Congress's interstate commerce power was essentially being exercised on a hypothetical, and not an empirical, basis. 15
Despite the outward correctness of the Court's position in Steel
Co., the matter of hypothetical jurisdiction is substantially more complicated than it may first appear and the doctrine's demise may be
markedly less definitive than the Court's outright denunciation might
lead readers to believe. For one thing, the Justices were not fully
united in their treatment of the doctrine; of the five members of the
majority, for example, two expressed an unwillingness to go as far as
the others desired. For another thing, the repudiation was achieved
only by distinguishing several related doctrines, and this effort left
behind a host of unresolved issues. At the same time, the scope of the
repudiation itself was not clearly delineated by the Court, a fact that
has already generated substantial uncertainty and conflicting decisions among lower federal courts. These various deficiencies have, in
turn, created an atmosphere in which lower courts remain free to test
the bounds of Steel Co. and, in some instances, to continue to engage
in hypothetical jurisdiction through different guises and manifestations. "
This Article not only recounts the life and death of hypothetical
jurisdiction, from its emergence and corruption in the lower courts to
its demise in Steel Co., but also examines what these developments
reveal about the nature and character of the federal judiciary,
particularly the Supreme Court. Part II sets forth and critiques the
doctrine of hypothetical jurisdiction as developed by the lower federal
courts prior to its attempted interment by the Court. Part III then
describes the circumstances, merits, and scope of the doctrine's
repudiation, with particular emphasis on the substance and

14.

United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).

15. See id. at 562-64 (emphasizing the importance of factual findings and noting that "[tio
the extent that congressional findings would enable us to evaluate the legislative judgment that
the activity in question substantially affected interstate commerce, even though no such
substantial effect was visible to the naked eye, they are lacking here"). To be sure, the statutory
provision struck down, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1994), suffered from even more fundamental flaws.
See id. at 561 ("Section 922(q) is a criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do with

'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms"
and "is not an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory
scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated.") (footnote omitted); id.
("[Section] 922(q) contains no jurisdictional element which would ensure, through case-by-case

inquiry, that the firearm possession in question affects interstate commerce."). These shortcomings were clearly aggravated, however, by the lack of specific factual findings linking the mere
possession of guns in school in zones to interstate commerce.
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significance of various related doctrines which Steel Co. preserved.
Part IV then explains why the doctrine attracted the judicial following
that it did and why, despite the Court's efforts, the essence of
hypothetical jurisdiction will likely persist in the jurisdictional
decision making of the federal courts. In so doing, Part IV examines
five possible techniques by which these courts may attempt to
sidestep the repudiation. Finally, Part V explores the deeper significance of both the doctrine and its repudiation, particularly in terms of
the institutional responsibility and jurisprudential methodology of the
Supreme Court.
II. THE DOcTRINE OF HYPOTHETICAL JURISDICTION

The utility and significance of hypothetical jurisdiction can
only be fully appreciated relative to certain principles of federal judicial power as developed under Article III of the Constitution.6 As a
prelude to analyzing the doctrine, therefore, Subpart A will first present a concise overview of these principles. Subpart B will then trace
the doctrine's contours, offering critical commentary on each of its
elements and highlighting its inconsistencies with these basic tenets
of federal jurisdiction. Lastly, Subpart C will demonstrate that, apart
from such inherent inconsistencies, the doctrine of hypothetical jurisdiction also suffered from its excessive, even abusive, application by
courts.
A. The FederalJurisdictionalFramework
For both constitutional and institutional reasons, the subjectmatter jurisdiction of the federal courts is jealously guarded by its
Article III keepers. This judicial conservatism manifests itself
through a number of doctrines, all of which serve to restrict the power
and thereby maintain the institutional integrity of the federal bench.
First, as a general matter, Article III courts tend to construe their
conferred jurisdictional authority narrowly.
Even where the
Constitution has expressly granted them jurisdiction, or where
Congress has expressly affirmed a jurisdictional grant set forth in the
Constitution, the federal courts have often circumscribed these grants

16. These principles, set forth in Subpart A, may have shallower roots than one might
expect, see Assuming JurisdictionArguendo, supra note 4, at 715, but they have been more or
less fixed within the law of federal jurisdiction for at least the last century.
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and affirmations by judge-made, prudential limitations 1 or by narrowing statutory constructions, 8 respectively. Second, in any given
dispute the courts essentially adopt "a presumption against subject
matter jurisdiction that must be rebutted by the party bringing an action to federal court." 9 Thus, in apparent contrast to the political
branches, whose actions are generally presumed constitutional,0 the
17. The case-or-controversy doctrine of standing, for example, has been held to contain not
only constitutional requirements, but several prudential limitations as well. See, e.g., Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-62 (1992); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750-51 (1984).
So also have the doctrines of ripeness, see Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 57 n.18
(1993) ("[Rlipeness doctrine is drawn both from Article III limitations on judicial power and from
prudential reasons for refusing to exercise jurisdiction."), and mootness, see Southern Utah
Wilderness Alliance v. Smith, 110 F.3d 724, 727 (10th Cir. 1997) ("Closely related to Article M
mootness is the 'prudential mootness' arising from doctrines of remedial discretion. Prudential
mootness addresses 'not the power to grant relief but the court's discretion in the exercise of
that power.' ") (quoting Chamber of Commerce v. United States Dep't of Energy, 627 F.2d 289,
291 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
18. See, e.g., Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 693-703 (1992) (reaffirming the
domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction, under which federal courts will generally
not issue divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees, and maintaining that it is a limiting
construction of 28 U.S.C. § 1332); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530-31
(1967) (noting that the complete diversity requirement articulated in Strawbridge v. Curtis, 7
U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806), and today relevant under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, is a narrow judicial
construction of the congressional affirmation of diversity jurisdiction); Chair King, Inc. v.
Houston Cellular Corp., 131 F.3d 507, 510 (5th Cir. 1997) (noting that "[a]lthough th[e]
language [of 28 U.S.C. § 1331] suggests that Congress intended.., to confer upon federal courts
the full breadth of permissible 'federal question' jurisdiction [found in Article m, § 2], § 1331
has been construed more narrowly than its constitutional counterpart"); Medical Malpractice
Joint Underwriting Ass'n v. Pfeiffer, 832 F.2d 240, 242-43 (1st Cir. 1987) (noting that "[i]n spite
of th[e] explicit legislative directive [of 28 U.S.C. § 1331], and due to overriding principles of
federalism, comity and judicial economy, the United States Supreme Court has carved out
several limited exceptions to this mandated original jurisdiction").
19. Coury v. Prot, 85 F.3d 244, 248 (5th Cir. 1996); see also Kokkonen v. Guardian Life
Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) ("It is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this
limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting
jurisdiction.") (citations omitted); Casey v. Lewis, 4 F.3d 1516, 1519 (9th Cir. 1993) ("Federal
courts are presumed to lack jurisdiction, 'unless the contrary appears affirmatively from the
record.'") (quoting Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 546 (1986)); CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL CoURTs § 7, at 27-28 (5th ed. 1994) (same).
20. See, e.g., Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960) (noting the "presumption of
constitutionality" that attaches to congressional enactments); In re Air Crash Disaster Near
Roselawn, 96 F.3d 932, 944 (7th Cir. 1996) ("An Act of Congress bears a strong presumption of
constitutionality."); Littlewolfv. Lujan, 877 F.2d 1058, 1063 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ("[Flederal statutes
enjoy a presumption of constitutionality. .. ."). In cases where constitutional strict scrutiny is
applied, it is often said that the government action is presumed unconstitutional unless the
government can demonstrate that the action is necessary to achieve a compelling interest. See,
e.g., Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 702 (9th Cir. 1997) ("Any governmental
action that classifies persons by race is presumptively unconstitutional and subject to the most
exacting judicial scrutiny. To be constitutional, a racial classification, regardless of its
purported motivation, must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest,
an extraordinary justification.") (citation omitted), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 397 (1997). This
presumption arises, however, only after an initial showing by the plaintiff that strict scrutiny is
warranted because, for example, the government employs a suspect classification or burdens a
fundamental right. Prior to and absent that initial showing, the government action is presumed
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judiciary self-consciously begins with the premise that it lacks the
21
power to act.

Arising from this premise is yet a third principle, namely, that
"a court should first confirm the existence of... jurisdiction... before
tackling the merits of a controverted case."22 If a court finds subjectmatter jurisdiction, it may then proceed. If, however, the court
"determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it cannot decide
the case on the merits. It has no authority to do so."23 Indeed, should

it become evident on appeal that jurisdiction is absent, the customary
remedy is to vacate and order dismissal of all proceedings to that
point. 24 Finally, to the extent that there is ever any question about
constitutional. See, e.g., Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993) ("[A] classification neither
involving fundamental rights nor proceeding along suspect lines is accorded a strong
presumption of validity.").
21. That said, 'the plaintiffs burden to prove federal question subject matter jurisdiction
is not onerous. The plaintiff must show only that the complaint alleges a claim under federal
law, and that the claim is 'substantial.' A federal claim is substantial unless 'prior decisions
inescapably render [it] frivolous.'" Musson Theatrical, Inc. v. Federal Express Corp., 89 F.3d
1244, 1248 (6th Cir. 1996) (quoting Transcontinental Leasing, Inc. v. Michigan Nat'l Bank, 738
F.2d 163, 165 (6th Cir. 1984)); see also Turner/Ozanne v. Hyman/Power, 111 F.3d 1312, 1317
(7th Cir. 1997).
22. Berner v. Delahanty, 129 F.3d 20, 23 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1305
(1998); see also United States v. More, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 159, 172 (1805) ("[D]oubt has been
suggested, respecting the jurisdiction of this court... and this question is to be decided, before
the court can inquire into the merits of the case."); Telecommunications Research & Action Ctr.
v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 75 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (quoting Tuck v. Pan Am. Health Org., 668 F.2d 547,
549 (D.C. Cir. 1981)) ("Jurisdiction is, of necessity, the first issue for an Article III court."). As
noted in Steel Co., "[tihe requirement that jurisdiction be established as a threshold matter
'spring[s] from the nature and limits of the judicial power of the United States' and is 'inflexible
and without exception.'" Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 118 S. Ct. 1003,
1012 (1998) (quoting Mansfield, C. & L.M. Ry. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884)). But cf id.
at 1011 ("It is true ... that the issue of Article III standing which is addressed at the end of the
opinion [in Gwaltney of Smithfiekd Ltd. v. ChesapeakeBay Foundation,Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987)]
should... have been addressed at the outset if the statutory question was not jurisdictional.
But that.., did not really matter, since Article III standing was in any event found.").
23. Ray v. Eyster (In re Orthopedic "Bone Screw" Prods. Liab. Litig.), 132 F.3d 152, 155
(3d Cir. 1997); accord Memphis Am. Fed'n of Teachers, Local 2032 v. Board of Educ., 534 F.2d
699, 701 (6th Cir. 1976) ("It was inappropriate for the District Court to assume the existence of
jurisdiction and then to proceed to decide the merits of this case. Without a finding that there is
federal jurisdiction over a particular claim for relief the federal courts are without power to proceed."); see also Cross-Sound Ferry Servs., Inc. v. ICC, 934 F.2d 327, 339 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the denial of the petition for review) ("When
federal jurisdiction does not exist, federal judges have no authority to exercise it, even if everyone-judges, parties, members of the public-wants the dispute resolved.").
24. See, e.g., Taylor v. FDIC, 132 F.3d 753, 767 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("[A]fter finding no
standing, we may not affirm the district coures grant of summary judgment but must vacate
and remand with instructions to dismiss."); see also United States v. Corrick, 298 U.S. 435, 440
(1936) ("[If the record discloses that the lower court was without jurisdiction. . . we have
jurisdiction on appeal, not ofthe merits but merely for the purpose of correcting the error of the
lower court in entertaining the suit."); Smith v. McCullough, 270 U.S. 456, 459 (1926) (stating in
dictum that "if there was an absence of federal jurisdiction this Court could not consider the
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the subject-matter jurisdiction of a federal court, it can be raised by
any party at any time-and the court is obligated to raise it sua
sponte25-regardlessof whether it was previously raised,26 of whether
the parties stipulate or consent to jurisdiction,27 and of how far along
the litigation has proceeded. 28
merits, but would have to reverse the decrees of both courts below and remand the cause to the
District Court with a direction to dismiss the bill for want of jurisdiction."). This may be true
even if the jurisdictional defect, such as mootness, arises at the time of the appeal. See, e.g.,
Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 117 S. Ct. 1055, 1071 (1997) ("When a
civil case becomes moot pending appellate adjudication, '[tihe established practice ... in the
federal system... is to reverse or vacate the judgment below and remand with a direction to
dismiss.'") (quoting United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 39 (1950)); Remus Joint
Venture & Envtl. Disposal Sys., Inc. v. McAnally, 116 F.3d 180, 185 (6th Cir. 1997) ("[When a
case becomes moot on appeal, the proper procedure is for us to vacate the judgment below."); In
re Tax Refund Litig., 915 F.2d 58,59 (2d Cir. 1990) (same).
25. See FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990) ("[F]ederal courts are
under

an independent obligation to

examine their own jurisdiction

... .");

Bender v.

Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986) ("[E]very federal appellate court has a
special obligation to satisfy itself.., of its own jurisdiction .... '" (quoting Mitchell v. Maurer,
293 U.S. 237, 244 (1934))); Public Interest Research Group v. Magnesium Elektron, Inc., 123
F.3d 111, 117 (3d Cir. 1997) ("[Flederal appellate courts have a bedrock obligation to examine
both their own subject matter jurisdiction and that of the district courts."). A federal court's
obligation to assess its own jurisdiction sua sponte may even extend to the prudential
(nonconstitutional) counterparts to the case-or-controversy requirements, although this
proposition is somewhat disputed. Compare Thompson v. County of Franklin, 15 F.3d 245, 248
(2d Cir. 1994) ("Our obligation... extends 't the prudential rules of standing that, apart from
Art. is minimum requirements, serve to limit the role of the courts in resolving public
disputes,' and, thus, constitute 'self-imposed ... limitations on our jurisdiction.'" (alteration in
original) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975); National Wildlife Fed'n v. United
States, 626 F.2d 917, 924 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1980))), and Davis v. Blackburn, 803 F.2d 1371, 137273 & n.1 (5th Cir. 1986) (maintaining in dictum that an alleged defect in prudential standing
can be raised sua sponte), with MacLauchlan v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 970 F.2d 357,
359 n.1 (7th Cir. 1992) ("Wle may not raise prudential standing issues sua sponte."), and
NAACP v. California, 511 F. Supp. 1244, 1260 n.15 (E.D. Cal. 1981) ("In light of the fact that
prudential considerations are not constitutional limitations on the court's power, the court
chooses not to consider, sua sponte, the applicability of these considerations."), affd, 711 F.2d
121 (9th Cir. 1983).
26. See, e.g., Insurance Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S.
694, 702 (1982) ('Subject-matter jurisdiction... is an Art. I as well as a statutory
requirement .... [N]o action of the parties can confer subject-matter jurisdiction upon a federal
court. Thus, the consent of the parties is irrelevant, principles of estoppel do not apply, and a
party does not waive the requirement by failing to challenge jurisdiction early in the
proceedings.") (citations omitted); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438
U.S. 59, 68 (1978) ("As a threshold matter, we must address the question of whether the District
Court had subject-matter jurisdiction over appellees' claims, despite the fact that none of the
parties raised this issue and the District Court did not consider it."); see also SUP. CT. R. 15.1
(providing for waiver of any objection if not presented in brief in opposition, except jurisdictional
objections).
27. See, e.g., Bender, 475 U.S. at 541 (stating that a court's obligation to verify jurisdiction
obtains "even though the parties are prepared to concede it"); Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v.
Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 377 n.21 (1978) ("Federal judicial power does not depend upon 'prior
action or consent of the parties.'") (quoting American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17-18
(1951)); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 398 (1975) ("While the parties may be permitted to waive
nonjurisdictional defects, they may not by stipulation invoke the judicial power of the United
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B. The Substance and Scope of the Doctrine
Standing in sharp contrast to these bedrock tenets of federal
judicial power is-or at least was-the doctrine of hypothetical jurisdiction. In essence, this doctrine allowed a court to reach the merits of a dispute without first having to verify its subject-matter
jurisdiction, hence the notion that jurisdiction was "hypothetical" or
assumed. 29 Over its lifetime, the doctrine acquired a number of
formulations. The standard one, here expressed by the Fifth Circuit,
provided that "[w]hen the merits of the case are clearly against the
party seeking to invoke the court's jurisdiction, the jurisdictional
question is especially difficult and far-reaching, and the inadequacies
in the record make the case a poor vehicle for deciding the
jurisdictional question, we may rule on the merits without reaching
the jurisdictional contention." 3° Alternatively, the Supreme Court's
States in litigation which does not present an actual 'case or controversy.' "); People's Bank v.
Calhoun, 102 U.S. 256, 260-61 (1880) ("[Tjhe mere consent of parties cannot confer upon a court
of the United States the jurisdiction to hear and decide a case."); Cutler v. Rae, 48 U.S. (7 How.)
729, 731 (1849) ("[Tlhe consent of parties cannot give jurisdiction to the courts of the United
States, in cases where it has not been conferred by the Constitution and laws."); Rains v.
Criterion Sys., Inc., 80 F.3d 339, 342 (9th Cir. 1996) ('This court... must consider whether
federal jurisdiction exists ... even if both parties stipulate to federal jurisdiction.. . ." (citation
omitted)); Bolin v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 32 F.3d 449, 450 (10th Cir. 1994)
("Parties may not, by stipulation or other means, usurp our Article HI powers."); National
Wildlife Fed'n v. United States, 626 F.2d 917, 924 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("Appellee purported to
waive challenge to appellant's standing. Because standing implicates our jurisdiction under
Article HI... this 'waiver' is necessarily ineffective.") (citation omitted).
28. See, e.g., Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 896 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment) ("[A]n error [in federal subject matter jurisdiction] may be
raised by a party, and indeed must be noticed sua sponte by a court, at all points in the litigation."); United States v. Gotcher (In re Grand Jury), 604 F.2d 69, 72 (10th Cir. 1979) (The
question of ripeness affects our subject matter jurisdiction. Thus, we may raise the issue sua
sponte at any time."); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3) ("Whenever it appears by suggestion of the
parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall
dismiss the action."). Although the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure contain no similar
provision, several courts of appeals have adopted local rules to the same effect. See, e.g., 1ST
CIm. R. 27.1; 6TH CuI R. 8; 9TH Cm R. 3-6; 10TH CII R. 27.2.1.
29. See Assuming JurisdictionArguendo, supra note 4, at 713-14 (stating that the "thesis
of hypothetical jurisdiction" is "that a federal court may render a valid judgment on the merits
while expressly avoiding jurisdictional challenges to its power to hear the case").
30. House the Homeless, Inc. v. Widnall, 94 F.3d 176, 179 n.7 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied,
117 S. Ct. 1434 (1997); see also Smith v. Avino, 91 F.3d 105, 108 (11th Cir. 1996) ("[Ilt is
permissible for the Court to bypass jurisdictional questions and decide the case on the merits
when the jurisdictional issue is difficult, the law is not well-established, and a decision on the
merits favors the party who has raised the jurisdictional bar."); United States v. Stoller, 78 F.3d
710, 715 (1st Cir. 1996) ("[Wlhen an appeal presents a jurisdictional quandary, yet the merits of
the underlying issue, if reached, will in any event be resolved in favor of the party challenging
the court's jurisdiction, then the court may forsake the jurisdictional riddle and simply dispose
of the appeal on the merits."); Isby v. Bayh, 75 F.3d 1191, 1196 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding it
permissible to "proceed directly to the merits" where there are "potentially difficult juris-
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rendition in Steel Co., assertedly summarizing the "position embraced
by several Courts of Appeals," was that it is "proper to proceed
immediately to the merits question, despite jurisdictional objections,
at least where (1) the merits question is more readily resolved, and (2)
the prevailing party on the merits would be the same as the
prevailing party were jurisdiction denied."3' Finally, some courts,
perhaps finding these multifactorial tests too cumbersome, simply
reduced the inquiry to a two-factor comparative test. For these
courts, hypothetical jurisdiction was appropriate if the "difficulty of
resolving [the jurisdictional question] is far greater than the difficulty
of resolving [the merits of the suit]"2 or, condensed even further, if
dictional issues," where 'the merits ... are simple, straightforward, and easily resolved," and
where "there is no practical difference in the outcome"); Silva v. United States (In re Grand Jury
Subpoena Issued to Bailin), 51 F.3d 203, 206 (9th Cir. 1995) ('The doctrine has
several... elements: (1) the jurisdictional question must be difficult; (2) the merits of the
appeal must be insubstantial; (3) the appeal must be resolved against the party asserting
jurisdiction; and (4) undertaking a resolution on the merits as opposed to dismissing for lack of
jurisdiction must not affect the outcome."); Cross-Sound Ferry Servs., Inc. v. ICC, 934 F.2d 327,
333 (D.C. Cir. 1991) ("'[W]hen the merits of a case are... against the party seeking... the
court's jurisdiction, the jurisdictional question is... difficult and far-reaching, and the
inadequacies in the record... make the case a poor vehicle for deciding the jurisdictional
question, we may rule on the merits without reaching' the jurisdictional contention.") (quoting
Adams v. Vance, 570 F.2d 950, 954 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1978)); Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Muszynski,
899 F.2d 151, 159 (2d Cir. 1990) (stating that 'the assumption of jurisdiction should not do
injustice to the parties by determining the outcome of the case"; that "the merits should be
clearly in favor of one party"; that "the jurisdictional issues should be difficult and far-reaching";
and that "inadequacies in the record or briefs may be a factor persuading a court to assume
jurisdiction without deciding").
31. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 118 S. Ct. 1003, 1012 (1998).
Although, as Steel Co. suggests, the practice was substantially confined to federal courts of appeals, from time to time it made its way into the decisions of federal district courts as well. See,
e.g., Fraser v. New York City Bd. of Educ., No. 96 Civ. 0625, 1998 WL 55170, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 10, 1998); Franquiz v. INS, No. 96 Civ. 7924, 1997 WL 159626, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 3,
1997); Zheng v. INS, 933 F. Supp. 338, 339-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); United States v. Funds
Contained in Checking Account, 788 F. Supp. 664, 666 n.3 (D.P.R. 1992); Jones v. RCA Music
Serv., 530 F. Supp. 767, 768 & n.1 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Chatterjee v. Due, 511 F. Supp. 183, 188 &
n.5 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Chappelle v. Chase, 487 F. Supp. 843, 845 & n.1 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Crowley v.
Smithsonian Inst., 462 F. Supp. 725, 726 (D.D.C. 1978), affd, 636 F.2d 738 (D.C. Cir. 1980); see
also Lee v. City of Beaumont, 12 F.3d 933, 937-38 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing to cases involving the
assumption of subject-matter jurisdiction as a basis for approving the district court practice of
assuming personal jurisdiction even absent jurisdictional complexity). In some instances, district courts would engage in hypothetical jurisdiction with no apparent sense of their transgression. See, e.g., Zwerling v. Reagan, 576 F. Supp. 1373, 1375 (C.D. Cal. 1983) (remarking that
"[tihe pleadings and the declarations of the various plaintiffs leave this court without enough to
decisively answer the standing question" but then, instead of either dismissing the action or
soliciting additional pleadings and declarations, announcing that the defendant's motion on the
pleadings "can be resolved on a more fundamental consideration" and proceeding to address the
merits).
32. Wong v. lchert, 998 F.2d 661, 662 (9th Cir. 1993); see also Markgraf v. Storage Tech.
Corp., No. 97-1166, 1998 WL 31449, at *2 (10th Cir. Jan. 28, 1998) ("[B]ecause the merits of the
appeal are much easier to resolve against [the appellant] than the jurisdictional issue, we will
assume jurisdiction without deciding the matter and proceed to the merits."); Lawrence v. Board
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the merits of the suit "are substantially clearer than the jurisdictional
3
question.1
1. The Rationales for Its Existence
More often than not, the rationales articulated in defense of
hypothetical jurisdiction were judicial economy and (paradoxically)
judicial restraint.4 The first of these is more or less straightforward.
By reaching and disposing of the merits, the court effectively terminates the litigation. A district court's use of the doctrine, for example,
essentially precludes an appeal from what would purportedly have
been a difficult and thus appeal-worthy jurisdictional ruling, and
strongly discourages an appeal from a merits-based ruling (at least
s
where the court correctly finds the merits to be easily resolvable),
Likewise, a circuit court's use of the doctrine essentially precludes
certiorari review of the jurisdictional ruling, and, to the extent the jurisdictional issue might have been clarified by further fact-finding or
argument, obviates the need for either a remand or for supplemental
briefing. As Justice Breyer asks in his separate opinion in Steel Co.,
"[w]hom does it help to have appellate judges spend their time and
of Immigration Appeals, No. 97 Civ. 5669, 1997 WL 698140, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 1997)
(acknowledging applicability of the doctrine "where questions of subject-matter jurisdiction are
nettlesome but the decision on the merits is simple and straightforward").
33. Freeman v. Principal Fin. Group, No. 96-35947, 1997 WL 377084 (9th Cir. July 3,
1997); see also Zavala-Zaragoza v. INS, No. 95-70104, 1996 WL 413669 (9th Cir. July 23, 1996);
Lewin v. INS, No. 94-70867, 1996 WL 335359 (9th Cir. June 17, 1996). Other shorthand
comparative analyses can be found. For example, one district court, faced with both statute of
limitations and jurisdictional defenses, chose to assume jurisdiction because "[t~he time-bar
defenses, though more modest in implication than the jurisdictional defenses, are broader in
scope, since, if meritorious, they bar most of the claims made against all of the defendants."
Chappelle v. Chase, 487 F. Supp. 843, 845 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
34. See, e.g., RNR Enters., Inc. v. SEC, 122 F.3d 93, 96 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing 'judicial
efficiency and restraint"); House the Homeless, 94 F.3d at 180 n.7 ("Rather than remand the
cause to the district court to more fully develop the record, in the interest ofjudicial economy we
invoke the exception to the general rule that calls for reaching the standing issue and proceed to
the merits of this appeal."), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1434 (1997); Browning-Ferris,899 F.2d at
158 ( he rationales for avoiding difficult jurisdictional issues to reach the merits are those of
judicial efficiency and restraint."); Switlik v. Hardwicke Co., 651 F.2d 852, 856 n.3 (3d Cir. 1981)
(citing "reasons of policy and considerations of judicial economy"); Assuming Jurisdiction
Arguendo, supra note 4, at 730-31 (arguing that hypothetical jurisdiction furthers the policies of
"avoiding constitutional rulings unless they are absolutely or 'strictly' necessary to the
disposition of the case" and of "the conservation of judicial energies"); Dane, supra note 6, at 119
("The reasons offered center on some unsurprising considerations-such as judicial
efficiency-and some more ironic ones-such as 'restraint.' ").
35. See, e.g., Assuming JurisdictionArguendo, supra note 4, at 729 ("This was recognized
by the Supreme Court... observing that 'even the most diligent and zealous advocate could find
his ardor somewhat dampened in arguing a jurisdictional issue where the decision on the merits
is thus foreordained. ") (quoting Secretary of the Navy v. Avrech, 418 U.S. 676, 678 (1974)).
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energy puzzling over the correct answer to an intractable jurisdictional matter, when (assuming an easy answer on the substantive
merits) the same party would win or lose regardless?"36 Of course, not
every aspect of hypothetical jurisdiction breeds economy-most glaringly, the doctrine sustains uncertainty and encourages future litigation over the same jurisdictional issue" 7-but the essential connection
between the doctrine and the rationale of economy is more or less selfevident.
The restraint rationale, by comparison, is somewhat more
questionable, although the basic idea is also relatively simple.
Depending upon the particular jurisdictional issue, its avoidance by a
court may serve any number of constitutional values. First, to the extent that the jurisdictional question is constitutional in nature, its
avoidance can be seen as furthering the principle that constitutional
questions should not be unnecessarily addressed.38 Second, where the
jurisdictional question involves an issue of justiciability-either a
case-or-controversy doctrine, particularly standing, or the political
question doctrine-its avoidance may very well further the separation
of powers.39 The Supreme Court, after all, has made clear that "the
law of Article III standing is built on a single basic idea-the idea of
separation of powers,"4 and it goes without saying that the political

36. Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1021 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment). Such a practice, he argued, "in today's world of federal court caseloads that have
grown enormously over a generation means unnecessary delay and consequent added cost." Id.
37. See infra text accompanying notes 75-76.
38. See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 623 (3d Cir. 1996) (bypassing
various jurisdictional issues in part because "many of these issues implicate constitutional
questions"), affd, 521 U.S. 591 (1997); Browning-Ferris,899 F.2d at 158 (linking the restraint
rationale "to the doctrine that constitutional claims should not be decided unnecessarily") (citing
cases); Switlik, 651 F.2d at 856 n.3 (asserting that resolution of the jurisdictional
question-"whether the entry and enforcement of the state court judgment constituted 'state
action' for purposes of a collateralattack in the federal district court"-"poses a rather high risk
of committing constitutional error" and that assuming jurisdiction "permits a proper and lawful
resolution of the dispute without facing the dangers lurking in the murky waters surrounding
the state action question"); Assuming JurisdictionArguendo, supra note 4, at 730 & nn.106-07;
Dane, supra note 6, at 119 n.348 ("The restraint arguments center on the imperatives to avoid
difficult constitutional questions (when jurisdictional issues take that form) and to avoid
deciding difficult questions in the absence of hard-edged controversies."). On the principle itself,
see generally Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 568-74 (1947); Lisa A.
Kloppenberg, Avoiding Constitutional Questions, 35 B.C. L. REV. 1003 (1994); Brian C.
Murchison, Interpretation and Independence: How Judges Use the Avoidance Canon in
Separationof Powers Cases, 30 GA. L. REv. 85 (1995).
39. See Browning-Ferris, 899 F.2d at 158 ("One of the controlling rationales of judicial
restraint in these cases is the desire to minimize the intrusion of the federal judiciary into the
business of the... branches of the federal government.").
40. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984).
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question doctrine virtually always implicates this concern as well.41
Third, in cases where the jurisdictional question involves the potential immunity of states or state officials, such as Eleventh
Amendment immunity,42 its avoidance could further the values of federalism to the extent that such avoidance "minimize[s] the intrusion
of the federal judiciary into the business of the states."43 Fourth and
finally, at least one court has maintained that the doctrine manifests
restraint because its use is congruent with "the common-law tradition
of requiring hard edged, sharply defined real controversies as the
basis for shaping developing law."44
What makes the restraint rationale questionable is that it
tends to be significantly undermined by its own logic, by actual judicial implementation of the doctrine, or by both. Most obviously, it is
rather ironic to depict the assumption of jurisdiction as an act of
"restraint" precisely when there may be no jurisdiction at all,
regardless of what values might happen to be served. 45 It is one thing
to forego clear jurisdiction, as is the case under the abstention
doctrines; 46 it is quite another to fabricate or hypothesize jurisdiction
41. See Baker v. Car, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962) ("The nonjusticiability of a political
question is primarily a function of the separation of powers."). The Court in Baker V. Carr
further noted:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department... or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of
a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches
of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision
already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements
by various departments on one question.
Id- at 217.
42. See, e.g., Aves v. Shah, No. 96-3063, 1997 WL 589177, at *1 (10th Cir. Sept. 24, 1997)
(assuming jurisdiction by avoiding a question of Eleventh Amendment immunity).
43. Browning-Ferris,899 F.2d at 158; see also Curry v. Baker, 802 F.2d 1302, 1312-13 &
n.6 (11th Cir. 1986) (assuming standing in a challenge to a state electoral process because "[tihe
prudence of granting standing to voters in the present situation is highly questionable. The
ultimate thrust of the individual plaintiffs' contention is that any voter can invoke federal jurisdiction to review the resolution of any vote tabulation or election contest with which he is
dissatisfied.").
44. Browning-Ferris,899 F.2d at 158; see also Dane, supranote 6, at 119 n.348.
45. See Dane, supranote 6, at 119 (describing the restraint justification as "ironic").
46. The two most prominent abstention doctrines are Pullman abstention, pursuant to
which a federal court declines its jurisdiction if the necessity of deciding a federal question
hinges on the resolution of a difficult and unsettled question of state law, see Harman v.
Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 534-35 (1965); Railroad Comm'n. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501
(1941); Martha A. Field, Abstention in Constitutional Cases: The Scope of the Pullman
Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. PA. L. ItEv. 1071 (1974), and Younger abstention, pursuant to which
a federal court avoids interference with ongoing state proceedings implicating important state
interests, see Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 431-32
(1982); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
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where it may not exist in the first place. 47 The former is an act of
restraint; the latter an act of rationalized usurpation. In turn, one
could legitimately take the position that hypothetical jurisdiction
cannot seriously be justified as a matter of restraint, even if it might
appear to advance various constitutional principles.
The restraint rationale is further contradicted by the actual
application of hypothetical jurisdiction. It may be true, for example,
that the avoidance of jurisdictional questions with constitutional dimensions in general prevents courts from addressing unnecessary
constitutional issues. Yet in some cases the merits reached under the
method of assumed jurisdiction have themselves involved constitutional issues, albeit of an allegedly simpler nature. 8 It is difficult to
argue, moreover, that hypothetical jurisdiction is a mode of restraint
with regard to the separation of powers when the assumption of jurisdiction pushes the federal courts beyond the explicit jurisdictional
bounds that Congress, following the Constitution, has established for
them.49 After all, the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts does not
flow directly from Article III; 5o rather, the jurisdictional grants of
47. For a perspective that might not support such a stark contrast between the relative
validity or invalidity of the doctrines, see Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separationof Powers,
and the Limits of the Judicial Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71 (1984) (arguing that the abstention
doctrines, especially when they result in total abstention, violate the separation of powers where
Congress has not delegated the power to decline statutorily affirmed jurisdiction).
48. See, e.g., Ayes v. Shah, No. 96-3063, 1997 WL 589177, at *1 (10th Cir. Sept. 24, 1997)
(bypassing jurisdictional inquiry under the Eleventh Amendment and resolving challenges
based on the Contract, Due Process, and Equal Protection Clauses); Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d
1055, 1056-57 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (bypassing jurisdictional inquiry into standing and resolving a
challenge premised on the constitutional treaty power). In addition, the Court has indicated
that the principle of avoiding constitutional controversies should not be accorded undue
importance, and that there are definite limits to its application. See, e.g., City of Houston v.
Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 468 (1987) (noting that where a statute is facially challenged under the Free
Speech Clause and the court is asked to abstain under the Pullman doctrine, which seeks to
avoid unnecessary constitutional adjudications, "[i]f the statute is not obviously susceptible of a
limiting construction, then even if the statute has 'never [been] interpreted by a state
tribunal.., it is the duty of the federal court to exercise its properly invoked jurisdiction'"
(quoting Harman, 380 U.S. at 535)); United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 96 (1985) (noting that
a court should not "press statutory construction 'to the point of disingenuous evasion' even to
avoid a constitutional question") (quoting George Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, 289 U.S. 373,
379 (1933)).
49. As the Steel Co. majority noted, "the proposition that the court can reach a merits
question when there is no Article m jurisdiction opens the door to all sorts of 'generalized
grievances,' that the Constitution leaves for resolution through the political process." Steel Co.
v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 118 S. Ct. 1003, 1013 n.2 (1998) (quoting Schlesinger
v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 217 (1974)).
50. The most prominent exception is the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, which,
being susceptible to neither congressional expansion nor congressional diminishment, is operative even absent statutory affirmation. See California v. Arizona, 440 U.S. 59, 65 (1979) (Mhe
original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is conferred not by the Congress but by the
Constitution itself. This jurisdiction is self-executing, and needs no legislative implementa-
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Article III must be first affimed by statute. 51 This is not to mention
the fact that many invocations of hypothetical jurisdiction have involved statutory causes of action with specific jurisdictional provisions
and requirements set out by Congress,52 such that Congress-let alone
the separation of powers-might be doubly offended by the unauthorized exercise of judicial power. Even the principles of federalism are not always furthered by hypothetical jurisdiction, and in some
cases may be quite undermined. As the Fifth Circuit has noted,
"[w]here a federal court proceeds in a matter without first establishing that the dispute is within the province of controversies assigned to
it by the Constitution and statute, the federal tribunal poaches upon
s5
the territory of a coordinate judicial system."
Finally, the notion that hypothetical jurisdiction amounts to
judicial restraint because it preserves "the common-law tradition of
requiring hard edged, sharply defined real controversies as the basis
for shaping developing law"M is almost nonsensical. In disputes
where the bypassed jurisdictional issue is itself one of the case-orcontroversy requirements, such as standing,55 it is extraordinarily

tion."). Whether the Court's appellate jurisdiction is similarly self-executing is a matter of some
debate. See, e.g., Julian Velasco, Congressional Control Over Federal Court Jurisdiction: A
Defense of the TraditionalView, 46 CATH. U. L. REV. 671, 714 & nn.205-06 (1997).
5L See, e.g., Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 233-34 (1922) ("Only the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is derived directly from the Constitution. Every other court
created by the general government derives its jurisdiction wholly from the authority of
Congress. That body may give, withhold or restrict such jurisdiction at its discretion, [within]
the boundaries fixed by the Constitution."); Mayor v. Cooper, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 247, 252 (1868)
("As regards all courts of the United States inferior to this tribunal, two things are necessary to
create jurisdiction.... The Constitution must have given to the court the capacity to take it,
and an act of Congress must have supplied it. Their concurrence is necessary to vest it."); Chair
King, Inc. v. Houston Cellular Corp., 131 F.3d 507, 509-10 (5th Cir. 1997) ("Federal courts have
only the power authorized them by Congress pursuant to Article III of the Constitution ....The
enumeration in Section 2 of Article I of the cases and controversies to which the federal
judicial power extends is not self-executing in relation to the inferior federal courts."); cf. Carey
v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236, 245 (1845) ("[Tlhe judicial power of the United
States... is ...dependent for its distribution and organization, and for the modes of its
exercise, entirely upon the action of [C]ongress, who possess the sole power of creating the
tribunals (inferior to the Supreme Court) for the exercise of the judicial power, and of investing
them with jurisdiction either limited, concurrent, or exclusive, and of withholding jurisdiction
from them in the exact degrees and character which to Congress may seem proper for the public
good.").
52. See infra notes 96, 98, 103-06 and accompanying text.
53. B., Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 663 F.2d 545, 548 (5th Cir. 1981). As the Supreme
Court has admonished, "[dlue regard for the rightful independence of state governments, which
should actuate federal courts, requires that they scrupulously confine their own jurisdiction to
the precise limits which [a federal] statute has defined." Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 270
(1934).
54. Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Musynski, 899 F.2d 151, 158 (2d Cir.1990).
55. See infra note 89 and accompanying text.
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difficult to conceive of assumed jurisdiction as a show of restraint. No
doubt the court that fashioned this rationale must have had
something less contradictory in mind, and it did carefully refer to the
common law as opposed to the requirements of Article II.
Nevertheless, it stretches the imagination to think what that might
be, and in all events the actual, unrestrained practice of hypothetical
jurisdiction-recounted below in Subpart C-renders the utility of
this rationale questionable at best.
2. The Conditions for Its Invocation
In addition to assessing these rationales at a general level, it is
also important to examine to what extent they are congruent or incongruent with the specific conditions established by courts for the
exercise of hypothetical jurisdiction. In its most exhaustive and thus
doctrinally rigorous form, hypothetical jurisdiction contained five such
conditions, although courts periodically omitted one or more. 56 These
five are as follows: (1) the merits must be easily resolvable, or at least
substantially easier than the jurisdictional issue; (2) the resolution of
the merits must be against the party alleging jurisdiction; (3) the jurisdictional issue must be particularly difficult or complex; (4) the implications of deciding the jurisdictional issue must be far-reaching;
and (5) the record or briefing must be inadequate to decide the jurisdictional issue.57 In the following paragraphs, each of these conditions
will be examined and critiqued in depth.
The first and second conditions-that the merits be simple and
that they be resolved against the party asserting jurisdiction-relate
jointly to two considerations, judicial economy and fairness. The
linkage to judicial economy or efficiency, which is one of hypothetical
jurisdiction's primary rationales, is fairly straightforward.
Hypothetical jurisdiction makes most sense, and is most attractive, if
the outcome would be the same whether jurisdiction is found lacking
or whether the claim is found meritless. According to the logic of the
doctrine, why should the federal court dismiss and allow for refiling in
another federal or state court-or, if on appeal, why remand to the
district court-when the plaintiffs substantive claim could not possibly result in a favorable judgment? To allow for further proceedings

56. See infra notes 118-21 and accompanying text.
57. These five are drawn from the formulations set forth supra note 30 and accompanying
text. Although courts typically stated three or four requirements, they have been further subdivided here for purposes of analysis.
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under such circumstances would be "futile"58 and would simply "entail
expenditure of significant judicial resources to no avail."59 By
contrast, [if the case is close on the merits, the court may have to
expend as much energy deciding the merits as it would deciding the
jurisdictional issues,"60 and the case for assuming jurisdiction would
be substantially weaker.
Somewhat less straightforward are the logic and relevance of
the second consideration, that of fairness. The appropriate inquiry,
according to one court, is whether "[t]he assumption of jurisdiction... [would] do injustice to the parties."61 In turn, the basic idea is
apparently that (1) the plaintiff should not be put out of his or her
misery unnecessarily, and only terminal cases should warrant death
by assumed jurisdiction, and (2) the opposing party should not be
subjected to further proceedings, let alone an adverse judgment, if
jurisdiction is not entirely certain. Omitted from this calculus, however, are a few critical details. For example, to the extent that this
plaintiff then faces an adverse judgment on the merits and cannot
refile in any court, 62 it is hard to see how this does not "do injustice" to
the party seeking jurisdiction. This is especially true when one considers that a similarly situated plaintiff before a different panel of the
same court might very well end up with a simple jurisdictional dis58. Jones v. RCA Music Serv., 530 F. Supp. 767, 768 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (disallowing leave to
amend the pleadings to correct defective allegations of diversity because the case failed on the
merits).
59. Decker & Co. v. West, 76 F.3d 1573, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1996); see also Mitchell v. West
Feliciana Parish Sch. Bd., 507 F.2d 662, 667 n.9 (5th Cir. 1975) ("[Alny other course-given our
decision on the merits-is nonsense.").
60. Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Muszynski, 899 F.2d 151, 159 (2d Cir. 1990).
61. Crocco v. Xerox Corp., 137 F.3d 105, 108 (2d Cir. 1998); see also RNR Enters. v. SEC,
122 F.3d 93, 96 (2d Cir. 1997) (assuming jurisdiction in part because "assumption ofjurisdiction
here will not work any injustice to the parties"); Browning-Ferris,899 F.2d at 159 ("[The assumption of jurisdiction should not do injustice to the parties by determining the outcome of the
case. Usually this will mean that the merits be against the party invoking jurisdiction.").
62. See Cantor Fitzgerald, L.P. v. Peaslee, 88 F.3d 152, 155 n.2 (2d Cir. 1996) (noting that
"a judgment rendered by a court assuming subject-matter jurisdiction and sustained on direct
appeal is entitled to preclusive effect as long as the District Court did not 'plainly usurp jurisdiction' over the action") (quoting Nemaizer v. Baker, 793 F.2d 58, 65 (2d Cir. 1986)); Assuming
Jurisdiction Arguendo, supra note 4, at 730 n.110 (explaining why merits judgments in
hypothetical jurisdiction cases should have res judicata effect). Cases such as Furrerv. Brown,
62 F.3d 1092 (8th Cir. 1995), are not to the contrary. The Furrer Court held that circuit
precedents in which "the defendants did not raise the issue of subject matter jurisdiction and
neither the district courts nor this Court addressed it sua sponte... reflect no consideration of
the jurisdictional issue" but "instead ... simply assume subject matter jurisdiction sub silentio
and deal with the merits" and, as such, "are not staredecisis on the issue" decided on the merits.
Id. at 1101. The rule of Furrerpresumably had little relevance to the doctrine of hypothetical
jurisdiction because, under the doctrine, the merits-based ruling must be simple-that is,
clearly dictated by existing law-and hence a discussion of stare decisis would be beside the
point.
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missal and no adverse judgment on the merits where the other panel
chooses to reach the jurisdictional issue and finds jurisdiction lacking.
Moreover, the fairness consideration, though perhaps well-intentioned, is not obviously related to the two basic rationales of judicial
economy and restraint, at least as they are conceptualized above. To
be sure, fairness is normally not a consideration in the jurisdiction of
the federal courts. Rather, jurisdiction is fundamentally a question of
the power of the judiciary and not an individual's right of access to the
courts, 63 although it is true that a litigant, once properly in federal

court, may then have a personal interest in independent and impartial adjudication.

64

The third and fourth conditions-that the jurisdictional issue
be difficult or complex, and that the implications of its resolution be
far-reaching-are of course at the very heart of hypothetical jurisdiction.65 Most obviously, if the jurisdictional issue could be easily resolved, then there would presumably be no need to bypass it and assume that jurisdiction exists. 66 Concomitantly, if there were few or no
implications of its resolution, then restraint-related concerns, such as
the separation of powers and federalism, would likely be minimized.
Unfortunately from an analytical perspective, courts tended to conflate the matter of difficulty or complexity with the issue of whether

63. See, e.g., Nora Pomerantz, Note, Nonparty Witness Challenge to Federal Court's
Subject Matter Jurisdiction-Inre United States Catholic Conference and National Conference
of Catholic Bishops, 61 TEMP. L. REv. 213, 236 (1988) ("Subject matter jurisdiction... arises out
of concern for the appropriate scope of judicial power, not the protection of specific individual
rights.") (footnote omitted). This is certainly true as well for the abstention doctrines. See, e.g.,
Waldron v. McAtee, 723 F.2d 1348, 1351 (7th Cir. 1983) ("When a court abstains in order to
avoid unnecessary constitutional adjudication... it is not seeking to protect the rights of one of
the parties; it is seeking to promote a harmonious federal system by avoiding a collision between the federal courts and state (including local) legislatures.") (citation omitted). But cf
Palmer v. Hospital Auth., 22 F.3d 1559, 1569 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding that "fairness to the
parties" can be a consideration in district court decisions to exercise or not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, although actual jurisdiction must already exist before it is exercised or declined).
64. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848 (1986) (noting
that the Court's "prior discussions of Article III, [§ l's] guarantee of an independent and
impartial adjudication by the federal judiciary of matters within the judicial power of the United
States intimated that this guarantee serves to protect primarily personal,, rather than
structural, interests"). More generally, of course, the Constitution has been held to embody an
unenumerated right of access to the courts, see Monsky v. Moraghan, 127 F.3d 243, 246-47 (2d
Cir. 1997) (discussing the possible sources and scope of the right), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 66
(1998), but the existence of that right does not alter the structural limits on federal judicial
power.
65. See Browning-FerrisIndus., 899 F.2d at 159.
66. Cf. id. (commenting that "a case that does not present a claim of even colorable
jurisdiction is not appropriate for assuming jurisdiction arguendo").
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its resolution has far-reaching consequences. 67 Unraveling them as
best as possible, it appears as if a "difficult" or "complex" issue was
one that possessed some inherent level of intricacy, 68 including factual
uncertainty,69 and that had not already been decided by the Supreme
Court or by any court,7 0 or over which there was a split of authority.7 1
In addition, at least one court held that "U]urisdictional questions
72
may be considered difficult... if they are of constitutional stature,"
although it is hard to see how that aspect, standing alone, would render an issue difficult or complex. Correspondingly, it appears as if the
resolution of a jurisdictional issue is "far-reaching" if it "affect[s] large
numbers of potential litigants, implicate[s] separation of powers or
federalism concerns, or concern[s] the activities of administrative
agencies," 73 or if, combined with its complexity, it "poses a rather high
risk of committing constitutional error." 74
Whether any of these criteria, singularly or in synergy, is sufficient to justify avoiding resolution of a jurisdictional question, let
alone then assuming jurisdiction, is certainly debatable. This is especially true with regard to the matter of difficulty or complexity. With
some exceptions, virtually all questions of subject-matter jurisdiction
at some point in their existence are undecided and, depending upon
the circumstances and depth of inquiry, are likely to have difficult or
complex dimensions. What is more, the assumption of jurisdiction by

67. See, e.g., Crocco v. Xerox Corp., 137 F.3d 105, 109 (2d Cir. 1998) (considering the
jurisdictional issue "far-reaching" because "it is one of first impression in this circuit, it

'involve[s] the interpretation of a complex statutory scheme,' and it 'affect[s] large numbers of
potential litigants' "-even though the first two factors arguably relate to the difficulty or
complexity of the jurisdictional issue, not the degree to which its resolution is far-reaching)
(alterations in original) (quotingBrowning-Ferris,899 F.2d at 159).
68. See, e.g., Crocco, 137 F.3d at 109 (finding that the jurisdictional issue "involve[s] the
interpretation of a complex statutory scheme'") (alterations in original) (quoting BrowningFerris,899 F.2d at 159).
69. See, e.g., RNR Enters. v. SEC, 122 F.3d 93, 96 (2d Cir. 1997) (noting that a claim of
mootness was "rendered ... more dubious" due to a particular reservation by the party

challenging jurisdiction).
70.

See, e.g., Crocco, 137 F.3d at 109 (noting that the issue "is one of first impression in

this circuit"); RNR Enters., 122 F.3d at 96 (noting that the court itself had not previously
decided the issue); Browning-Ferris, 899 F.2d at 159 ("Jurisdictional questions may be
considered difficult if they are of first impression and involve the interpretation of a complex
statutory scheme .... ").

71
See, e.g., Crocco, 137 F.3d at 109 ("We have not yet decided whether a remand to a
plan administrator is immediately appealable, but ...the other circuits that have considered
the question are in disagreement."); RNR Enters., 122 F.3d at 96 ("The circuits that have
considered the ...question are not unanimous.").

72. Browning-Ferris,899 F.2d at 159; see also RNR Enters., 122 F.3d at 96.
73. Browning-Ferris,899 F.2d at 159; see also Crocco, 137 F.3d at 109; RNR Enters., 122
F.3d at 96.
74. Switlik v. Hardwicke Co., 651 F.2d 852,856 n.3 (3d Cir. 1981).
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one court as a means to avoid resolving such a question-to "leave [it]
for another day,"75 as it were-merely perpetuates the condition of
difficulty for the next court. In turn, not only does this fail to reduce
the extant uncertainty, but it also leaves available the option of
hypothetical jurisdiction for subsequent tribunals. Hypothetical jurisdiction, in other words, is a conveniently self-perpetuating doctrine
in that both the principal condition for its invocation and the necessary consequence of its use are one and the same.
As for the requirement that the jurisdictional issue's resolution
be "far-reaching," the pragmatic justifiability-and thus the linkage to
restraint-are substantially more evident. The specter of either
spawning or preempting novel suits or expanded intrusions on the
states or other federal branches, all because jurisdiction is or is not
found, should most certainly give a court pause and should evoke the
value of judicial restraint. 76 The proper bounds of jurisdiction, after
all, are defined not only by the separation of powers but also by the
intrinsic institutional capacity of the federal courts to process cases in
a meaningful and efficient manner. 77 That said, even this requirement

75. Crocco, 137 F.3d at 109; see also United States v. Stoller, 78 F.3d 710, 715 (1st Cir.
1996) (proceeding to the merits by assuming jurisdiction and "leaving for another day" the
jurisdictional dispute); Nance v. EPA, 645 F.2d 701, 716 (9th Cir. 1981) (concluding that the
"claim is so patently without merit that the standing question can be left for another day").
76. See, e.g., RIcHARD A POSNER, THE FEDERAL CoURTS CHALLENGE AND REFoRM 316-17
(1996) (discussing the importance of judicial and academic sensitivity to the potential negative
effects of expanding or recognizing rights).
77. See, e.g., Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703-04 (1992) (reaffirming the
domestic relations exception to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 in part because of'judicial economy"); Corlew
v. Denny's Restaurant, Inc., 983 F. Supp. 878, 879 (E.D. Mo. 1997) ("Federal courts are to
strictly construe the amount in controversy requirement of diversity jurisdiction, as the purpose
underlying the requirement is to limit the federal courts' diversity caseload."); ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JUISDICTION § 2.1, at 43 (2d ed. 1994) (noting that "the justiciability
doctrines conserve judicial resources, allowing the federal courts to focus their attention on the
matters most deserving of review"); POSNER, supra note 76, at 315 ("[Jludges legitimately may
consider caseload effects ... in areas such as jurisdiction and procedure where judicial economy
is an accepted factor in judicial decision-making."); see also Fleming v. Rhodes, 331 U.S. 100,
108 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("In considering the scope of our appellate jurisdiction,
great weight should be given to the strong policy of the Congress, ever since the Judiciary Act of
1891, to keep the docket of this Court within manageable proportions for the wise disposition of
causes by the ultimate judicial tribunal."). Having acknowledged the role of pragmatic or
prudential considerations in the delineation of jurisdiction, it should also be reiterated
that-contrary to the doctrine of hypothetical jurisdiction-courts are not free to sidestep
constitutional constraints on jurisdiction merely by invoking such considerations. See, e.g.,
Salei v. Boardwalk Regency Corp., 913 F. Supp. 993, 1009 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (noting that "[s]uch
salutary effects as judicial economy or convenience cannot save a statutory provision that defies
the jurisdictional limits set forth in Article III, § 2" and that "courts are not free to ignore the
restraints imposed upon them by the Constitution simply because a statute serves judicial
efficiency"). As the Court has remarked, the "separation of powers was adopted in the
Constitution 'not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power.' "
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is not free from either internal or external inconsistency. For one
thing, to the extent that jurisdiction (if fully addressed) turns out not
to exist, then it is the assumption of jurisdiction that is unrestrained.
This is so because such an assumption would not foreclose suits that
should in fact be foreclosed, thereby perpetuating judicial activity in
the absence of either necessity or authority. For another thing, there
may be some tension between the requirement that the issue's
resolution be far-reaching and the requirement that the issue itself be
difficult or complex. The mere fact that a question has remained
unanswered despite decades and thousands of federal jurisdictional
rulings could be evidence that it rarely surfaces and, in turn, that its
resolution will ultimately have limited legal significance.
The fifth and final condition is that the record or briefings be
inadequate to decide the jurisdictional issue.78 In one case of assumed
jurisdiction, for example, the Second Circuit found it important that,
"because the appellants' assertion of jurisdiction was not challenged
and the parties did not address the matter at oral argument, the record is not fully developed with respect to this issue."79 Needless to
say, this requirement is closely related to the rationale of judicial
economy. Hypothetical jurisdiction under such circumstances plainly
saves the parties and the court the time and resources that further
development of the record would inevitably entail. In particular, to
the extent the jurisdictional question is tied to unpleaded or undetermined facts, this requirement makes most sense at the appellate

Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 137 (1959) (quoting Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293
(1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
78. See Assuming JurisdictionArguendo, supra note 4, at 731 n.112 ("A factor commonly
cited by courts as contributing to the decision to avoid the jurisdictional issues is inadequacy in
the record, briefing, or argument.") (citing cases).
79. Crocco, 137 F.3d at 109; see also RNR Enters. v. SEC, 122 F.3d 93, 96 (2d Cir. 1997)
(noting that "the record is inadequate to resolve the jurisdictional issue: the issue was raised
shortly before oral argument; the [appelleel's briefing is incomplete; and the pro se appellant
has had insufficient opportunity to respond"); Contreras-Tarango v. INS, No. 95-70424, 1997 WL
43355, at *3 (9th Cir. Jan. 31, 1997) (noting that the jurisdictional issue "was first raised after
initial briefing on appeal, and the record is not as fully developed as it should be"); McCormack
v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338, 1343 (5th Cir. 1988) (deciding "not to resolve the issue whether the
[plaintiffs] are proper plaintiffs, but to assume for present purposes that they do have standing"
because "W[the issue is close, and we lack the benefit of full briefing of it by the parties"); Adams
v. Vance, 570 F.2d 950, 954 & n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (assuming jurisdiction in part because the
determination of whether the claim involved a political question was "difficult on this appeal in
view of the abbreviated record and compressed briefing necessitated by the upcoming deadline").
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level, where there is little capacity for fact-findingsO and resolution of
the jurisdictional issue would therefore require a remand.81
Having acknowledged its pragmatic value, a few peculiarities
about this final condition should be noted. It differs from the others,
first of all, in that the others focus largely if not exclusively on the
extant state of the law, while this condition focuses on the behavior of
the parties. Whether the jurisdictional issue is difficult and farreaching, and whether the merits are easily resolved adverse to the
party seeking jurisdiction-these are matters generally determinable
relative to preexisting legal doctrine, although obviously the pleadings
will have legal significance in this regard. That the record and the
briefs are inadequate, however, is solely a function of the parties' (and
perhaps the court's) omissions. Moreover, and as a consequence of its
nonlegal nature, the means of rectifying this condition-further development of the record or supplemental briefings-is both obvious
and, judicial economy notwithstanding, readily available. Lastly, and
perhaps because of these first two peculiarities, at least one court has
suggested that this final condition "is not a necessary factor, since
both parties may deeply desire to obtain a decision on the jurisdictional issue and their briefs may be exhaustive, yet the insubstantiality of the claim on the merits may make the jurisdictional issue unsuitable for decision at the moment."82 In other words, this condition
may have been essentially a makeweight-relevant only to the extent
80. See, e.g., Mitchell v. West Feliciana Parish Sch. Bd., 507 F.2d 662, 666-67 (5th Cir.
1975) ("[It was suggested that jurisdiction may be lacking.... The point... was not
considered by the court below... [and] no evidence... appears in the record. Nor was the
question briefed or seriously argued.... We would be unwilling to attempt such a difficult
issue .... having potential... farreaching consequences, without being fully advised."). On the
general propriety of a remand in fact-deficient situations, see McCurry v. Tesch, 824 F.2d 638,
640 (8th Cir. 1987) ("The trial court is the place for facts to be found. Appellate courts should
not find the facts, nor should they, in the ordinary situation, refer to facts outside the record.");
Brock v. TIC Inl Corp., 785 F.2d 168, 171 (7th Cir. 1986) ("[D]istrict judges are specialists in
finding facts, as we are not, and that our primary function, which is to maintain the uniformity
and coherence of the law, is not engaged by a judgment so dependent on the specific
circumstances of each case.").
81. See Icicle Seafoods, Inc. v. Worthington, 475 U.S. 709, 714 (1986) ("If the Court of
Appeals believed that the District Court had failed to make findings of fact essential to a proper
resolution of the legal question, it should have remanded to the District Court to make those
findings."); United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 919 v. CenterMark Props. Meriden
Square, Inc., 30 F.3d 298, 306 (2d Cir. 1994) (remanding in a removal case premised on diversity
of citizenship because "the record, at least as it has developed to this point in the proceedings, is
inconclusive and fails to establish to a reasonable probability that the amount in controversy
exceeds the statutory minimum in this case" and citing cases to like effect); Getty Oil Corp. v.
Insurance Co. of N. Am., 841 F.2d 1254, 1260 n.8 (5th Cir. 1988) (explaining that when subjectmatter jurisdiction is not clear from the district court's decision, "the better solution is to
remand the case to the district court for determination of the jurisdictional questions").
82. Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Muszynski, 899 F.2d 151, 159 (2d Cir. 1990).
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that it reinforced the judicial inefficiency of not assuming jurisdiction
in the face of easily resolved merits.
C. The Degenerationof the Doctrine
Thus far, two fundamental problems with hypothetical jurisdiction have been noted. First and most importantly, the doctrine is
simply contrary to our scheme of constitutional government, in effect
permitting the federal courts to act in excess of their limited, enumerated powers. As the Steel Co. Court pointedly remarked, "[flor a court
to pronounce upon the meaning or the constitutionality of a state or
federal law when it has no jurisdiction to do so is, by very definition,
for a court to act ultra vires."8 Second, as illustrated by the previous
section, even from a pragmatic or functional perspective, it is not
nearly as logically compelling as its proponents portrayed it. In particular, neither judicial economy nor judicial restraint turned out to
be watertight rationales, especially when the conditions for the
invocation of hypothetical jurisdiction are subjected to closer scrutiny.
This section will address yet a third set of problems that
plagued the doctrine prior to Steel Co. Specifically, the focus will be
on the doctrine's implementation and the manifest inability of courts
to keep it within manageable, even marginally principled, bounds.
This inability increased not only the doctrine's illegitimacy, but also
the likelihood that the Supreme Court would, as it ultimately did,
intercede and denounce the doctrine altogether. Two implementation
problems in particular will be examined. First, the courts failed to
contain the doctrine to one or two jurisdictional areas, or to one or two
types of circumstances. Second, as hinted earlier, the courts failed to
apply the doctrine rigorously, often omitting its requirements without
explanation, applying it without meaningful analysis, and, in some
instances, invoking it without any citation to authority.
1. The Doctrine's Overuse
One means of tempering the inherent illegitimacy of the doctrine would have been to confine it to a small number of well-defined
jurisdictional issues or circumstances. As an example, it could have
83.
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 118 S. Ct. 1003, 1016 (1998); see
also Clow v. HUD, 948 F.2d 614, 628 (9th Cir. 1991) (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting) ("Within the

context of our constitutional system, the concept of hypothetical jurisdiction simply has no
place. A court has no discretion where it has no power, and to suggest otherwise is to erode a
fundamental limitation on the exercise of judicial authority.").
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been limited to certain procedural or statutory elements of jurisdiction, as opposed to the Article III case-or-controversy requirements,
thereby in mzing its constitutional offensiveness. Or, if used in the
case-or-controversy context, it could have been limited to a single requirement, such as standing, and then applied only to certain aspects
of standing, such as redressability. These sorts of limitations, even if
artificial and mildly unprincipled, would have at least bolstered the
judiciary's claim that the doctrine itself was grounded in restraint. To
be sure, those courts invoking the doctrine were hardly oblivious to its
aberrant nature, and regularly advised that it be viewed as "an extremely narrow exception.., to our obligation to determine our jurisdiction."
In turn, they urged that it be used only infrequently,"
although such admonitions varied in their rhetorical force. While
some limited its application to "exceptional situations"6 or to the
"rare case,"87 others simply pointed out that the doctrine was appropriate "[o]n some occasions.""" Be that as it may, by categorically limiting the doctrine's applicability, the judiciary could at least have demonstrated that these admonitions were genuine.
As it turns out, expediency rather than exigency dictated the
range and frequency of the doctrine's use. Not only did the courts apply it to issues of standing, 89 which by all appearances was its para84. National Law Ctr. on Homelessness & Poverty v. Kantor, 91 F.3d 178, 180 (D.C. Cir.
1996). The D.C. Circuit also noted that it was "rather controversial at that." Id. (citing CrossSound Ferry Servs., Inc. v. ICC, 934 F.2d 327, 339-46 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Thomas, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the denial of the petition for review)).
85. See, e.g., Crocco v. Xerox Corp., 137 F.3d 105, 108 (2d Cir. 1998) (stating that "this
court does not depart... lightly" from the "normal rule" that jurisdiction be determined before
proceeding to the merits); Berner v. Delahanty, 129 F.3d 20, 23 (1st Cir. 1997) (cautioning that
the doctrine is necessarily "an exception, which, in light of the danger that an ensuing decision
on the merits might be rendered sterile by the tribunal's lack of authority to resolve the case,
should be used sparingly"), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1305 (1998); Browning-Ferris, 899 F.2d at
159 ("[W]e do not ... suggest that difficult jurisdictional issues should be avoided whenever
possible.... In applying the rule of judicial restraint and conservation of energy to avoid a
difficult jurisdictional issue, the following principles need to be observed in order to avoid
restraint becoming lethargy and efficiency mere avoidance."); see also Dane, supra note 6, at 119
n.348 ("Courts and commentators have emphasized that 'hypothetical jurisdiction' should only
be assumed rarely, when the jurisdictional questions are particularly difficult, the merits issue
particularly easy, and the consequences for the parties (of reaching the same conclusion on
merits rather than jurisdictional grounds) particularly minimal.").
86. Decker & Co. v. West, 76 F.3d 1573, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
87. Cross-SoundFerry Servs., Inc., 934 F.2d at 333.
88. Cantor Fitzgerald, L.P. v. Peaslee, 88 F.3d 152, 155 (2d Cir. 1996).
89. See, e.g., Cole v. USDA, 133 F.3d 803, 808 n.6 (11th Cir. 1998); NAACP v. Jones, 131
F.3d 1317, 1321 n.4 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 48 (1998); Rojas v. Fitch, 127 F.3d
184, 187 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 2341 (1998); House the Homeless, Inc. v.
Widnall, 94 F.3d 176, 179 n.7 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1434 (1997); United States
v. Coppola, No. 95-6030, 1995 WL 760573, at *1 (2d Cir. 1995); Bennett v. Plenert, 63 F.3d 915,
922 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd on other grounds, 117 S. Ct. 1154 (1997); United States v. Saccoccia, 58
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digmatic use, but they also extended it to the full gamut of
jurisdictional or quasi-jurisdictional issues.9 Among these were
mootness, 91 Eleventh Amendment immunity, 92 federal sovereign
immunity, 93 the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, 94 the political question
F.3d 754, 767 n.6 (1st Cir. 1995); City of Charleston v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 57 F.3d 385, 390
n.5 (4th Cir. 1995); J.C. Wyckoff & Assocs. v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 936 F.2d 1474, 1490 (6th
Cir. 1991); Huguley v. General Motors Corp., No. 89-2172, 1991 WL 22013, at *1 (6th Cir. Feb.
22, 1991); Henry v. Connolly, 910 F.2d 1000, 1004 (1st Cir. 1990); Glasgow, Inc. v. Federal Hwy.
Admin., 843 F.2d 130, 136 (3d Cir. 1988); Curry v. Baker, 802 F.2d 1302, 1312-13 (11th Cir.
1986); Richland Park Homeowners Ass'n v. Pierce, 671 F.2d 935, 941 n.3 (5th Cir. 1982); Nance
v. EPA, 645 F.2d 701, 716 (9th Cir. 1981); United Steelworkers v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1309
n.167 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Crowley v. Smithsonian Inst., 636 F.2d 738, 740 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1980);
United States v. Callabrass, 607 F.2d 559, 563 n.1 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Tonry, 605
F.2d 144, 148 n.12 (5th Cir. 1979); Association of Am. R.R. v. ICC, 600 F.2d 989, 999 n.34 (D.C.
Cir. 1979); Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d 1055, 1056-57 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Spinkellink v.
Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582, 609 n.31 (5th Cir. 1978); American Cylinder Mfrs. Comm. v.
Department of Transp., 578 F.2d 24, 26 (2d Cir. 1978); Chinese Am. Civic Council v. Attorney
Gen. of United States, 566 F.2d 321, 325 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Friedman v. Beame, 558 F.2d 1107,
1110 n.3 (2d Cir. 1977); Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Provident Life Ins. Co., 499 F.2d 715, 721 (8th
Cir. 1974); United States v. Marihart, 472 F.2d 809, 811-12 (8th Cir. 1972); National Ass'n of
Theatre Owners v. FCC, 420 F.2d 194,205 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Chatterjee v. Due, 511 F. Supp. 183,
188 & n.5 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
90. See In re DN Assocs., 3 F.3d 512, 515 (1st Cir. 1993) (noting that the doctrine can
apply to "a difficult jurisdictional or quasi-jurisdictional question"). The "quasi-jurisdictional"
category presumably exists to cover issues that are technically jurisdictional in nature, but
perhaps not as fundamental or inflexible as, say, the case-or-controversy requirements of Article
I. As then-Judge Thomas noted:
The term "jurisdiction".. .---"an all-purpose word denoting adjudicatory power"-bears
different meanings in different contexts. Sometimes, for example, characterizing a
provision as "jurisdictional" implies that a court cannot temper the application of the
provision through otherwise available equitable doctrines such as waiver, tolling, and
estoppel. Other times, characterizing a provision as bearing on an inferior tribunal's
"jurisdiction" might signify that on appeal, that tribunal's interpretation of the provision
is not entitled to deference.
Cross-Sound Ferry Servs., Inc., 934 F.2d at 340-41 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the denial of the petition for review) (citations omitted); see also Steel Co. v.
Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 118 S. Ct. 1003, 1010 (1998) (noting that
"'[j]urisdiction... is a word of many, too many, meanings.'" and explaining that, merely
because a statute employs the word "jurisdiction" in conjunction with the provision of cause of
action does not "mak[e] all the elements of the cause of action... jurisdictional") (quoting
United States v. Vanness, 85 F.3d 661, 663 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1986)).
91. See, e.g., RNR Enters. v. SEC, 122 F.3d 93, 96 (2d Cir. 1997); Wells v. SEC, No. 966237, 1997 WL 274270, at *1 (2d Cir. May 22, 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 386 (1997); SEC v.
American Capital Invs., Inc., 98 F.3d 1133, 1140-42 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1468
(1997); Sumitomo Bank v. Tokai Credit Corp. (In re Eve Marie, Inc.), No. 92-55972, 1993 WL
530457, at *1 n.1 (9th Cir. Dec. 21, 1993); Federal Ins. Co. v. Scarsella Bros., Inc., 931 F.2d 599,
602 (9th Cir. 1991).
92. See, e.g., Ayes v. Shah, No. 96-3063, 1997 WL 589177, at *1 (10th Cir. Sept. 24, 1997)
("Because we find the Plaintiffs' claims under the... Constitution to be without merit, we do
not reach the issue of whether the Eleventh Amendment bars their claims. We may assume
jurisdiction... where the jurisdictional issues are difficult and the merits clearly and obviously
run against the party seeking jurisdiction.").
93. See, e.g., Clow v. HUD, 948 F.2d 614,616 & n.2 (9th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (bypassing
"jurisdictional considerations of sovereign immunity" in a suit for money damages against the
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doctrine, 9s immediate appealability 96 or other questions of nonadministrative finality,97 removal from state to federal court,98
defective allegations of jurisdictional diversity, 99 jurisdictional
sufficiency of a complete preemption claim, 100 lack of in rem
jurisdiction in a civil forfeiture action,' 0' state action as a
jurisdictional element,102 administrative compliance as a jurisdictional
federal government under the Administrative Procedure Act); see also Can v. United States, 14
F.3d 160, 162 & n.1 (2d Cir. 1994) (bypassing question of federal sovereign immunity, as well as
alleged nonexhaustion of administrative remedies, and holding that the suit was barred by the
political question doctrine).
94. See, e.g., Rekhi v. Wildwood Indus., 61 F.3d 1313, 1316 (7th Cir. 1995); cf. Marquez v.
Aviles, 252 F.2d 715, 718 (1st Cir. 1958) (assuming jurisdiction in a Rooker-Feldman-type situation, "however much technical niceties might suggest that we ought not to make that assumption").
95. See, e.g., Adams v. Vance, 570 F.2d 950, 954 & n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
96. See, e.g., Crocco v. Xerox Corp., 137 F.3d 105, 109 (2d Cir. 1998) (assuming
"hypothetical jurisdiction" on appeal and thereby obviating the need to address "whether a
remand to a[n ERISA] plan administrator is immediately appealable"); American CapitalInus.,
Inc., 98 F.3d at 1139-40 (involving appealability of various orders), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1468
(1997); United States v. Stoller, 78 F.3d 710, 715 (1st Cir. 1996) (assuming the immediate
appealability of a double jeopardy claim alleging multiple punishments arising in two separate,
successive proceedings); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Berg, 61 F.3d 101, 105 (1st Cir. 1995)
("Whether or not the refusal to allow the set-off is an appealable issue, the refusal at this time
turns out not to be a legal error, so the jurisdictional issue need not be decided."); In re Villa
Marina Yacht Harbor, Inc., 984 F.2d 546, 548 n.2 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding in regard to the
appealability of a pay-into-court order that, "[bjecause the case is straightforward, and the party
in whose favor the jurisdictional issue would operate is entitled to prevail on the merits, we
elect to forgo unnecessary work and to bypass the question of appellate jurisdiction"); Rhode
Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank v. Howard Communications Corp., 980 F.2d 823, 829 (1st Cir.
1992) (assuming appealability of a civil contempt order because "the contempt finding and
sanctions were abundantly warranted"); Massachussetts v. Hale, 618 F.2d 143, 145 n.3 (1st Cir.
1980) (bypassing inquiry into the appealability of a denial of a party's motion for judgment on
the record, concerning nondischargeability in the bankruptcy context, because it was a "close
issue and "the merits compel affirmance"); Brick v. CPC Int'l, Inc., 547 F.2d 185, 187 (2d Cir.
1976) (declining to address validity and applicability of the then-controversial "death knell"
doctrine); Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Usery, 539 F.2d 386, 389 n.1 (5th Cir. 1976); see also
Jeffers v. Heavrin, 10 F.3d 380, 382 n.2 (6th Cir. 1993) (reaching the issue of qualified
immunity, even though it would not otherwise be immediately appealable in the company of
other unresolved claims, because "(1) the district court may have erroneously thought its qualified immunity ruling disposed of all claims, and (2) we endeavor to serve judicial economy by
resolving the qualified immunity issue"); cf. Anderson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 630 F.2d 677, 680-81
(9th Cir. 1980).
97. See, e.g., United States v. Correia, 531 F.2d 1095, 1097 (1st Cir. 1976) (bypassing
appealability of dismissal of an indictment where reindictment was still possible).
98. See, e.g., Menorah Ins. Co. v. INX Reinsurance Corp., 72 F.3d 218, 223 n.9 (1st Cir.
1995) (assuming that there was removal jurisdiction, a determination otherwise barred from
appellate review under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), because the party challenging jurisdiction "easily
wins an affirmance on the substantive issue of waiver").
99. See, e.g., Cantor Fitzgerald, L.P. v. Peaslee, 88 F.3d 152, 155 (2d Cir. 1996); Jones v.
RCA Music Serv., 530 F. Supp. 767, 768 & n.1 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
100. See, e.g., Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Jackson, 862 F.2d 491, 496 n.8 (5th Cir. 1988)
(en banc).
101. See, e.g., United States v. 5 Sylvan Rd., 928 F.2d 1, 4 (1stCir. 1991).
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prerequisite, 1 3 foreclosure of review under the Administrative
Procedure Act, 1° foreclosure of review of deportation orders under the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,105 foreclosure
of jurisdiction under the Tax Injunction Act, 106 alleged noncompliance
with appellate procedural rules,17 and claims that the exercise of

jurisdiction would violate equal protection. 08 From time to time,
hypothetical jurisdiction had even been extended to assumptions of

102. See, e.g., Switlik v. Hardwicke Co., 651 F.2d 852, 856 n.3 (3d Cir. 1981) (assuming
jurisdiction rather than deciding "whether the entry and enforcement of the state court
judgment constituted 'state action' for purposes of a collateral attack in the federal district
court").
103. See, e.g., Noovan v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs. (In re Ludlow Hosp. Soc'y,
Inc.), 124 F.3d 22, 25 n.7 (1st Cir. 1997); Craig v. United States, No. 92-35400, 1994 WL 408250,
at *1 (9th Cir. Aug. 4, 1994) (declining 'to reach the thorny jurisdictional issue of whether [a
plaintiff] may bring a quiet title action under 28 U.S.C. § 2410" without first filing a refund
claim with the IRS); Robinson v. Department of Pub. Utils., 835 F.2d 19, 21 (1st Cir. 1987) (per
curiam) (assuming that the court had jurisdiction over electric consumer's challenges to denial
of intervention); Bailey v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 722 F.2d 942, 944 (1st Cir. 1983) (assuming
jurisdiction over Title VII action for preliminary relief where the EEOC has not issued a final
disposition or a right-to-sue letter); Manning v. Trustees of Tufts College, 613 F.2d 1200, 1202
(1st Cir. 1980) (assuming jurisdiction over Title VII action); Hochstadt v. Worcester Found. for
Experimental Biology, 545 F.2d 222, 226 (1st Cir. 1976) (same); Fraser v. New York City Bd. of
Educ., No. 96 Civ. 0625, 1998 WL 55170, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 1998) (same); see also Can v.
United States, 14 F.3d 160, 162 & n.1 (2d Cir. 1994) (bypassing question of alleged
nonexhaustion of administrative remedies, as well as federal sovereign immunity, and holding
that the suit was barred by the political question doctrine).
104. See, e.g., Slocum v. United States, 515 F.2d 237, 238 n.2 (5th Cir. 1975).
105. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified as amended at scattered sections
of 8, 15, 18, 22, 28, 40, 42, 50 U.S.C.); see also Jorge v. Hart, No. 97 Civ. 1119, 1997 WL 531309,
at *1, *12, *14 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 1997) (assuming jurisdiction and citing cases); Anjali Parekh
Prakash, Note, Changing the Rules: Arguing Against Retroactive Application of Deportation
Statutes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1420, 1433 n.87 (1997) (citing additional cases).
106. See, e.g., Rojas v. Fitch, 127 F.3d 184, 187 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 2341
(1998); Safeco Life Ins. Co. v. Musser, 65 F.3d 647, 650 (7th Cir. 1995).
107. See, e.g., United States v. Scheckley, No. 96-1786, 1997 WL 701370, at *1 n.1 (2d Cir.
Nov. 10, 1997) (declining to address timeliness of notice of appeal under FED. R. APP. P. 4);
Brooks v. Toyotomi Co., 86 F.3d 582, 586-87 (6th Cir. 1996) (bypassing question over proper
substance of the notice of appeal); Knecht v. United States, No. 96-2265, 1996 WL 570242, at *1
(2d Cir. Oct. 4, 1996) (declining to address possible need for certificate of appealability under 28
U.S.C. § 2253 in light of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996); Caribbean
Transp. Sys. Inc. v. Autoridad De Las Navieras, 901 F.2d 196, 197 (1st Cir. 1990) (same); Kaiser
v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 872 F.2d 512, 514 (1st Cir. 1989) (bypassing dispute over
whether certain parties were properly specified in the notice of appeal); FDIC v. Caledonia Inv.
Corp., 862 F.2d 378, 381 (1st Cir. 1988) (bypassing question of FED. R. CIrv. P. 54(b)
certification); cf. Markgraf v. Storage Tech. Corp., No. 97-1166, 1998 WL 31449 (10th Cir. Jan.
28, 1998) (assuming jurisdiction despite possibility that appellant was not a real party in
interest); United States v. Connell, 6 F.3d 27, 29 n.3 (1st Cir. 1993) (assuming that the district
court, despite the expiration of the appeal period, had jurisdiction to entertain a party's motion
for reconsideration).
108. See, e.g., Contreras-Tarango v. INS, No. 95-70424, 1997 WL 43355 (9th Cir. Jan. 31,
1997) (addressing section 440 of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996); see
also Prakash, supra note 105, at 1433 n.87.
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personal jurisdiction,109 although the considerations in that context
generally differ from those of subject-matter jurisdiction.11
In short, the federal courts appear to have been quite unable to
control the spread of the doctrine."' To some extent, this is no doubt
attributable to its highly convenient nature and to the effective
unreviewability of its use, two aspects that will be addressed at
length in Part IV. In at least a few cases, it may also be attributable
to a predetermined desire to reach the merits despite potential
jurisdictional defects. As one author prophetically observed nearly
two decades ago, "[wlhen the substantive issues are of great import,
the temptation to decide them may be strong, and the glib abuse of
2
the hypothetical jurisdiction technique can satisfy that urge.""
Finally, the doctrine's uncontainability must in part be attributed to
the simple fact that principled limits were not necessarily available,
and the momentum of legal reasoning, such as it is, could apparently
not be meaningfully restrained by either the art or the artifice of
arbitrary line-drawing."1 The Second Circuit, for its part, attempted
109. See Republic of Pan. v. BCCI Holdings (Lux.) S.A., 119 F.3d 935, 941 (11th Cir. 1997)
(noting that "courts have held that it is permissible in some circumstances to bypass the issue of
personal jurisdiction if a decision on the merits would favor the party challenging jurisdiction
and the jurisdictional issue is difficult") (citing Lee v. City of Beaumont, 12 F.3d 933, 937-38
(9th Cir. 1993); Feinstein v. RTC, 942 F.2d 34, 40-41 (1st Cir. 1991)); Caribe BMW, Inc. v.
Bayerische Motoren Werke Aktiengesellschaft, 821 F. Supp. 802, 811 (D.P.R. 1993) (similarly
extending subject-matter-based doctrine of hypothetical jurisdiction to the personal jurisdiction
context), vacated on othergrounds, 19 F.3d 745 (1st Cir. 1994).
110. See Insurance Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694,
701 (1982) ("The concepts of subject-matter and personal jurisdiction... serve different purposes, and these different purposes affect the legal character of the two requirements."); Leroy
v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 180 (1979) ("[NMeither personal jurisdiction nor venue is
fundamentally preliminary in the sense that subject-matter jurisdiction is, for both are personal
privileges of the defendant, rather than absolute strictures on the court, and both may be
waived by the parties."); Marathon Oil Co. v. A-G. Ruhrgas, 145 F.3d 211, 217-18 (5th Cir. 1998)
(en banc) (elaborating on the differences), cert. granted,119 S. Ct. 589 (1998) (No. 98-470).
111. In some instances, in fact, the doctrine was invoked multiple times in the same
decision in regard to multiple jurisdictional disputes. See, e.g., SEC v. American Capital Invs.,
Inc., 98 F.3d 1133, 1139-42 (9th Cir. 1996) (assuming immediate appealability and assuming, on
multiple issues, a lack of mootness), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1468 (1997). This is not to say that
courts, when presented with the opportunity, invariably invoked the doctrine. See, e.g., Francis
v. Goodman, 81 F.3d 5, 8 n.2 (1st Cir. 1996) (giving "consideration to bypassing the jurisdictional
question entirely" but declining to do so and remanding to the district court); Silva v. United
States (In re Grand Jury Subpoena Issued to Bailin), 51 F.3d 203, 206 (9th Cir. 1995) (declining
to extend "hypothetical jurisdiction"); Tataranowicz v. Sullivan, 959 F.2d 268, 271-72 (D.C. Cir.
1992) (refusing to assume jurisdiction); Getty Oil Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 841 F.2d
1254, 1260 n.8 (5th Cir. 1988) (same).
112. Assuming JurisdictionArguendo, supra note 4, at 754. The author continued: "If...
the limits on [the technique's] exercise are not observed, hypothetical jurisdiction can be used to
assume restrictions on federal judicial power out of existence, and thereby to unravel the constitutional fabric, stitch by stitch." Id.
113. Cf. Patrick L. Baude, ConstitutionalReflections on Abortion Reform, 4 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 1, 1 (1970) (observing that "the attraction of consistency and the momentum of reform"
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to keep the doctrine in check by proposing that "a judgment rendered
by a court assuming subject-matter jurisdiction and sustained on
direct appeal is entitled to preclusive effect as long as the District
Court did not 'plainly usurp jurisdiction' over the action." 114 But this
limitation was arguably dead in the water from its inception, for the
simple reason that every exercise of hypothetical jurisdiction is, by its
very nature, a usurpation of jurisdiction." 5

As Judge Diarmuid

O'Scannlain observed in 1991,
[w]ithout a coherent rationale to justify its application or to limit its reach, the
concept of hypothetical jurisdiction threatens to swallow numerous statutory
restraints on the federal courts. In fact, the continued proliferation of this
notion could lead to a regime in which the only check on judicial power is a
court's own disinclination
to reach the merits. That, I would suggest, invites
1 16
judicial arrogance.

Whether arrogance or mere abandon is the proper descriptor can
obviously be debated, but there can be little doubt that the doctrine,
case-by-case and issue-by-issue, far exceeded its prudential bounds by
the time the Supreme Court finally confronted it in 1998.
2. The Doctrine's Misuse
Excess was not the only vice of the doctrine's implementation,
however. Nor was it the worst. Arguably more problematic than
overuse was the tendency of courts to apply the doctrine with virtually no rigor or integrity-as if no one were looking,17 or as if the
passage of time and the acquiescence of the legal community somehow
had absolved the doctrine of its illegitimacy and thus the bench of its

can lead the supporters of a legal rule to ultimately embrace extensions of the rule that were
"not only disowned but also denounced at the time" the original rule was proposed).
114. Cantor Fitzgerald, L.P. v. Peaslee, 88 F.3d 152, 155 n.2 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting
Nemaizer v. Baker, 793 F.2d 58, 65 (2d Cir. 1986)).
115. Perhaps the court was attempting to preclude uses of the doctrine where jurisdiction

was not difficult, but instead manifestly lacking. That, however, is uncomfortably reminiscent
of the mythical code of honor among criminals, distinguishing between honorable and
dishonorable forms of illegality.
116. Clow v. HUD, 948 F.2d 614,628 (9th Cir. 1991) (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting).
117. In the Ninth Circuit, at least, the correlation between use of the doctrine and
nonpublication of the opinion might, to a cynical mind, suggest indeed that some judges may
have been sweeping the problem of misuse under the judicial rug. See supra note 8; see also
National Classification Comm. v. United States, 765 F.2d 164, 173 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Wald, J.,
separate statement) (noting the arguments "that unpublished opinions: result in less carefully
prepared or soundly reasoned opinions; reduce judicial accountability; increase the risk of
nonuniformity; allow difficult issues to be swept under the carpet; and result in a body of 'secret
law' practically inaccessible to many lawyers").
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responsibility to justify the doctrine at every invocation. Three principal techniques of misuse will be addressed here: the omission of one
or more requirements for its application, the use of the doctrine in the
absence of meaningful analysis, and the use of the doctrine without a
single citation to authority.
The most glaring misuse of the doctrine was its application
when the conditions for its invocation were not fully satisfied. As
noted, one of the mitigating characteristics of the doctrine, given its
inherent illegitimacy, was that it would be used only sparingly. As
further noted, however, this limitation proved illusory, and the doctrine gradually became a regular feature of federal court jurisprudence. For the most part, this regularity was achieved by the omission of one or more of the required conditions for its application. No
longer, for example, did the merits have to be inherently easy or simple or straightforward; rather, they needed only be "substantially
clearer than the jurisdictional question."" 8 Likewise, although courts
generally honored the requirement of jurisdictional difficulty, they
frequently omitted the requirement that resolution of the jurisdictional question would be far-reaching. 9 In one case, a Sixth Circuit
panel even conceded that it found the jurisdictional issue resolvable,
indicating how it was "strongly inclined" to rule, but apparently found
the issue difficult only because its strong inclination conflicted with
an existing en banc precedent.120 Finally, relatively few courts even
discussed the adequacy or inadequacy of the record, although such an
omission is not inconsistent with the earlier analysis indicating that
this condition was essentially a makeweight in the hypothetical jurisdiction calculus.' 2 '
Misuse also took the form of applying the doctrine without
meaningful analysis. Not surprisingly, this second type of omission
tended to go hand-in-hand with the omission of one or more conditions
for the doctrine's application. In several instances, for example, one
finds only a single sentence containing both the reasoning and the
declaration of a court's decision to assume jurisdiction: "Because this
118. Freeman v. Principal Fin. Group, No. 96-35947, 1997 WL 377084, at *1 (9th Cir. July
3, 1997). For other cases and comparable tests, see supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
At least one court suggested that the relative clarity or simplicity of the merits was not even
relevant at all. See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 623 (3d Cir. 1996) ("[A] court
need not reach difficult questions of jurisdiction when the case can be resolved on some other
ground in favor of the same party."), affd, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
119. See, e.g., Craig v. United States, No. 92-35400, 1994 WL 408250, at *1 (9th Cir. Aug. 4,
1994).
120. Brooks v. Toyotomi Co., 86 F.3d 582, 586-87 (6th Cir. 1996).
12L See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
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appeal presents issues that are substantially clearer than the jurisdictional question, we apply the doctrine of hypothetical jurisdiction
and simply decide the issues presented."122 In other cases, one finds
even less-merely a declaration that jurisdiction would be assumed,
perhaps prefaced by a discussion of jurisdiction giving the reader
some indication of its difficult or uncertain nature. 12 Or, when a declaration of jurisdictional difficulty was provided, it was sometimes so
conclusory as to be entirely unhelpful. In one opinion, for example,
the Ninth Circuit simply declared that "we find the complexities involved in resolving the mootness issue to be such as to warrant the
1
invocation of hypothetical jurisdiction to reach the merits." 2
A third form of misuse, also consisting of an omission, was the
application of the doctrine without citing any authority at all. Given
the standard legal practice of citing authority-a practice most definitely required of litigants'25-and particularly given the extraordinary nature of hypothetical jurisdiction, one might have thought that
the omission of supporting authority under such circumstances would
only rarely have happened. Such was not the case, however, and
there is no shortage of examples of this third form of misuse. 126 The
omission of authority is all the more inexplicable given that relevant
authority from virtually all the circuits was readily at hand, and given

122. Freeman,1997 WL 377084, at *1; see also Zavala-Zaragoza v. INS, No. 95-70104, 1996
WL 413669, at *1 (9th Cir. July 23, 1996) (identical language); Lewin v. INS, No. 94-70867, 1996
WL 335359, at *1 (9th Cir. June 17, 1996) (identical language).
123. See, e.g., United States v. Tonry, 605 F.2d 144, 148 n.12 (5th Cir. 1979) ("We will
assume, without deciding, that [the party's] stake in the outcome of this case gives him standing
to assert the contentions made under the tenth amendment."); Chatterjee v. Due, 511 F. Supp.
183, 188 & n.5 (E.D. Pa. 1981) ("Assuming arguendo, that plaintiff has standing ....
).
124. Sumitomo Bank v. Tokai Credit Corp. (In re Eve Marie, Inc.), No. 92-55972, 1993 WL
530457, at *6 n.1 (9th Cir. Dec. 21, 1993) (emphasis supplied).
125. See, e.g., FED. R. APP. P. 28(aX6) (providing that an appellant's 'argument must
contain the contentions of the appellant on the issues presented, and the reasons therefor, with
citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on"); United States ex rel.
Verdone v. Circuit Court, 73 F.3d 669, 673 (7th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) ("Even pro se litigants,
particularly one so familiar with the legal system, must expect to file a legal argument and
some supporting authority."); Pelfresne v. Village of Williams Bay, 917 F.2d 1017, 1023 (7th Cir.
1990) ("A litigant who fails to press a point by supporting it with pertinent authority... forfeits
the point. We will not do his research for him." (citations omitted)).
126. See, e.g., Cole v. USDA, 133 F.3d 803, 808 n.6 (11th Cir. 1998); Brooks v. Toyotomi Co.,
86 F.3d 582, 586-87 (6th Cir. 1996); Siers v. United States Parole Comm'n, No. 94-6103, 1994
WL 200999, at *1 (4th Cir. May 19, 1994) (per curiam); J.C. Wyckoff & Assocs. v. Standard Fire
& Ins. Co., 936 F.2d 1474, 1490 (6th Cir. 1991); Huguley v. General Motors Corp., No. 89-2172,
1991 WL 22013, at *2 (6th Cir. Feb. 22, 1991); United Steelworkers v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189,
1309 n.167 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Slocum v. United States, 515 F.2d 237, 238 n.2 (5th Cir. 1975);
Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Provident Life Ins. Co., 499 F.2d 715, 721 (8th Cir. 1974); United States
v. Marihart, 472 F.2d 809, 811-12 (8th Cir. 1972); National Ass'n of Theatre Owners v. FCC, 420
F.2d 194, 205 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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that, in contrast to the first two forms of misuse, there is no obvious
reason why such authority should be omitted, especially where the
doctrine is otherwise expressly invoked. It is one thing to assume jurisdiction sub silentio, where authority would of course be omitted; it
is quite another to assume jurisdiction explicitly and then not cite any
precedent for doing so.
In addition to these three principal forms of misuse, one can
find a full assortment of other abusive techniques which further undermined whatever integrity the doctrine may have originally possessed. One court, for example, assumed jurisdiction in part because
"th[e] action [was] being litigated pro se by plaintiff."127 Not only is
this consideration not part of the doctrine-including the particular
authority cited by the court'm-but it is entirely irrelevant to the rationales and elements of hypothetical jurisdiction. It bears no relationship to judicial economy or restraint, for instance, nor does it bear
any obvious linkage to the five standard conditions for invoking the
doctrine. 129 Courts engaging in hypothetical jurisdiction also had a
tendency to conflate the conditions for its use, 130 or to be careless or
indulgent with their use of terminology and concepts. Inone case, the
Second Circuit framed the question of assuming jurisdiction as a
choice between whether "to deny standing" or whether "to give standing" to certain litigants, concluding that it was "preferable" to give
standing. 131 But, of course, Article III courts do not have such a
choice, nor do they have the power to "give" standing. Jurisdiction is
127. Fraser v. New York City Bd. of Educ., No. 96 Civ. 0625 (SHS), 1998 WL 55170, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 1998).
128. The district court cited Browning-FerrisIndus. v. Muszynski, 899 F.2d 151, 159 (2d
Cir. 1990), as authority for the assumption of jurisdiction, see Fraser,1998 WL 55170, at *4, but
Browning-Ferrismakes no mention of the plaintiff's litigation status.
129. One might try to link this factor to the fairness consideration, which, as noted earlier,
underlay the conditions that the merits be straightforward and resolved against the party
seeking jurisdiction. See supranotes 61-64 and accompanying text. Presumably, the idea would
be that the claims of pro se plaintiffs should be more readily rejected on the merits in the
absence of clear jurisdiction, perhaps to spare these plaintiffs the costs of refiling or otherwise
proceeding further with their suits. This would be quite a perversion of the notion of fairness,
however, and one suspects that no court would be willing to stand by this rationale once it is
explicitly articulated.
130. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
131. Friedman v. Beame, 558 F.2d 1107, 1110 n.3 (2d Cir. 1977) ("If we were to deny
standing to Arena and Harrison, we would then have to decide the difficult question, discussed
infra, of whether the district court should have abstained from considering Friedman's claims.
We consider it preferable to give standing to Arena and Harrison."). Likewise, in Lawrence v.
Board of ImmigrationAppeals, No. 97 Civ. 5669, 1997 WL 698140, *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 1997)
the court stated that "where questions of subject-matter jurisdiction are nettlesome but the
decision on the merits is simple and straightforward, the Second Circuit permits district courts
to dispose of the case on the merits." But, of course, the Second Circuit is not vested with the
authority to "permit" what is, at least in some cases, a constitutional violation.
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not some kind of equitable remedy, dispensed by the dictates of justice; it is a concept fixed by the Constitution, by statute, and by precedent, and triggered by the appropriate party's adequate pleadings.132
In another case, the Sixth Circuit assumed that the plaintiff had
standing and then declared that such an assumption "is without consequence and should not be construed as a decision on the merits of
the standing issue""-but, of course, its decision is not "without
consequence" in a more general sense, given that the substantive merits have been determined, the plaintiff has lost with prejudice, the defendant has correspondingly prevailed, and the court, by assuming
jurisdiction, has effectively announced that the standing issue is difficult and far-reaching.
While other instances of misuse no doubt occurred, there is little value in dredging them up in this forum. It is quite apparent,
merely from the examples provided, that hypothetical jurisdiction was
frequently twisted and diluted by the courts that invoked it. Short of
crude expediency, moreover, it is far from obvious how judges could
rationalize to themselves this level of misuse, especially when it was
the courts that initially imposed many of the limits in order to mitigate the doctrine's inherent illegitimacy. The Ninth Circuit, for its
part, maintained that the several conditions for the doctrine's application were not really "mandated by historical practice" as found in
Supreme Court precedent and that, as a consequence, their consideration could "in some instances be flexible." 3 4 This view, however, seriously misapprehends the logic and necessity of the doctrine's conditions. These elements were devised and instituted not because anyone believed that they were mandated by historical practice, but because they were the only thing standing between the doctrine's suspected illegitimacy and its complete and outright illegitimacy. In the
face of sound arguments that the doctrine was constitutionally devi132. See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 149 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 1998) ("As federal
courts, we are courts of limited jurisdiction, deriving our power solely from Article m of the
Constitution and from the legislative acts of Congress."). That said, Article I courts do claim
to possess, in possible contradiction to constitutional text or design, "inherent" or "implied"
power. See, e.g., Ray v. Eyster (In re Orthopedic "Bone Screw" Prods. Liab. Litig.), 132 F.3d 152,
156 (3d Cir. 1997) ("It has long been recognized that courts are vested with certain inherent
powers that are not conferred either by Article HI or by statute, but rather are necessary to all
other functions of courts."); Eash v. Riggins Trucking, Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 561-64 (3d Cir. 1985)
(en banc) (explaining the background and justifications for inherent judicial power and
categorizing such power into three areas).
133. J.C. Wyckoff & Assocs. v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 936 F.2d 1474, 1490 (6th Cir. 1991);
see also Huguley v. General Motors Corp., No. 89-2172, 1991 WL 22013, at *2 (6th Cir. 1991)
(using identical language).
134. United States v. Troescher, 99 F.3d 933, 934 n.1 (9th Cir. 1996).
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ant, they provided some assurance that the doctrine would remain a
rare exception to be invoked only after careful and rigorous analysis.135

Although the doctrine would likely have been repudiated in
time, the magnitude and frequency of its misuse may very well have
accelerated the process. From the Supreme Court's perspective, few
things are more unsightly than the federal courts engaging in a pattern of unconstitutional conduct. As a matter of institutional integrity, the federal judiciary-which holds the power to declare the acts
of the other branches unconstitutional-must be diligent, even zealous, in the enforcement of its own constitutional limitations. By using
and then misusing the doctrine of hypothetical jurisdiction, the federal courts degraded not only themselves as an institution, but also
the very idea of constitutional governance.
III. THE REPUDIATION OF HYPOTHETICAL JURISDICTION IN STEEL CO.

Even though many federal judges condoned the practice of hypothetical jurisdiction, in some cases fully aware of its deficiencies, 136
the doctrine was not entirely without its detractors.'3 7 Two circuit
judges, in particular, stood their ground despite the doctrine's seeming popularity: then-Judge Clarence Thomas of the District of
135. See Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Muszynski, 899 F.2d 151, 159 (2d Cir. 1990) (noting
that, "[iun applying the rule of judicial restraint and conservation of energy to avoid a difficult

jurisdictional issue," the conditions for assuming jurisdiction "need to be observed in order to
avoid restraint becoming lethargy and efficiency mere avoidance").
136. Speaking for the Seventh Circuit in Rekhi v. Wildwood Industries, 61 F.3d 1313, 1316
(7th Cir. 1995), Chief Judge Posner correctly noted that the doctrine, which he described as
potentially "inelegant" and even "illogical" may be "out of keeping with the Supreme Court's
current thinking, which is more formalistic." "But," he continued, "the Court has not repudiated
the doctrine, and it is well established in the courts of appeals, including our own; so we should
adhere to it at least until we have a clearer signal of the Court's current view." Id. These latter
observations may indeed explain why the Seventh Circuit might have considered the doctrine to
be still available. However, given that the doctrine was discretionary and not mandatory, see
id., they hardly justified its actual continued use, including in the Rekhi case itself. See id.
(bypassing the applicability of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine).

137. See, e.g., Santos v. District Council of United Bhd. of Carpenters, 547 F.2d 197, 199 (2d
Cir. 1977) ("The court below assumed standing arguendo and proceeded to consider the merits, a
practice that must be disapproved. It is axiomatic that a court should not consider the merits of
an action if the plaintiff cannot show some cognizable injury."). It is not clear whether Judge
Oakes, who authored Santos, was specifically criticizing the assumption of jurisdiction by
district courts, or by all federal courts, especially since the Second Circuit subsequently
exercised hypothetical jurisdiction without qualification, see, e.g., Crocco v. Xerox Corp., 137
F.3d 105, 108-09 (2d Cir. 1998); RNE Enters. v. SEC, 122 F.3d 93, 96 (2d Cir. 1997); Wells v.
SEC, No. 96-6237, 1997 WL 274270, at *1 (2d Cir. May 22, 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 386
(1997); Browning-FerrisIndus., 899 F.2d at 158-59, and since Judge Oakes himself sat on the
panels in both RNR Enterprisesand Wells.
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Columbia Circuit'5 8 and Judge Diarmuid O'Scannlain of the Ninth
Circuit.3 9 It was not until Steel Co. was decided in 1998, however,
that the principled steadfastness of these judges was fully vindicated. 140 The following Subparts will explore the nature and scope of
the Steel Co. decision, explaining why the repudiation was in many
ways exceptional, what benefits will likely result from it, how the
Justices coalesced and divided on the issue of repudiation, and which
related doctrines were not repudiated by the decision.
A. The ExceptionalNature of the Repudiation
Two questions were raised before the Court in Steel Co.: first,

whether the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act
authorizes citizen suits for violations that are remedied prior to filing
of the suit; and second, whether the plaintiff-respondent had standing
under Article M to bring such a suit.'4 ' At the outset, it is important
to note that neither question, in the manner and at the time raised,
had anything whatsoever to do with the doctrine of hypothetical
jurisdiction. Indeed, all indications are that the issue of hypothetical
jurisdiction was neither raised by the parties before the district or
circuit court nor addressed by either court, 42 nor listed as a question
presented on certiorari,'4 3 nor briefed by the parties on certiorari,'"

138. See Cross-Sound Ferry Servs., Inc. v. ICC, 934 F.2d 327, 339-46 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the denial of the petition for review).
139. See Clow v. HUD, 948 F.2d 614, 625-28 (9th Cir. 1991) (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting);
see also Koffv. United States, 3 F.3d 1297, 1300 (9th Cir. 1993) (O'Scannlain, J., concurring in
the judgment).
140. To be sure, both judges' opinions were cited in the majority's analysis. See Steel Co. v.
Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 118 S. Ct. 1003, 1014-15 (1998) (citing Clow, 948 F.2d at
627 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting)); Cross-Sound Ferry Servs., 934 F.2d at 344-45 & n.10
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the denial of the petition for review). Perhaps
for good measure, or perhaps out of antagonism, Justice Stevens also cited once to the Thomas
opinion, see Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1023-24 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing
Cross-SoundFerryServs., 934 F.2d at 341 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
denial of the petition for review)), the only lower court opinion, in fact, Justice Stevens cited as
authority in his discussion of jurisdictional principles.
141. See Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1008 ("The case presents the merits question ...whether
EPCRA authorizes suits for purely past violations. It also presents the jurisdictional question
whether respondent, plaintiff below, has standing to bring this action."); id. at 1009
("Petitioner... both in its petition for certiorari and in its briefs on the merits, has raised the
issue of respondenfs standing to maintain the suit, and hence this Court's jurisdiction to entertain it."). For an overview of the other issues addressed in Steel Co., see generally Janet A.
Brown & Jeremy Rosen, Note, Spring 1998 Term: Steel Company v. Citizens for a Better
Environment 4 ENVTL. LAW. 957 (1998).
142. See Steel Co., No. 95 C 4534, 1995 WL 758122 (N.D. IM. Dec. 21, 1995), rev'd, 90 F.3d
1237 (7th Cir. 1996).
143. Only one question was presented to the Court on certiorari:
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nor broached at oral argument, 145 nor even injected into the case by
one of the amici curiae. 146 Rather, the Court itself raised and decided
the issue sua sponte, without notice to, let alone briefing or argument
by, the parties. 147
According to the majority opinion, it was Justice Stevens' concurrence that injected the doctrine of hypothetical jurisdiction into the
case, 48 and, in turn, the majority's "disposition ma[de] it appropriate
Whether, in enacting the citizen suit provision of the Emergency Planning and
Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA), 42 U.S.C. § 11046, Congress intended to
authorize citizens to seek penalties for violations that were cured before the citizen suit
was filed, thereby granting EPCRA citizen suit plaintiffs greater enforcement authority
than that granted to citizen suit plaintiffs under other federal environmental statutes.
Brief for Petitioner at i, Steel Co., 523 U.S. 83 (1993) (No. 96-643), availablein 1997 WL 221790.
144. See id.; Brief for Respondent, Steel Co., 523 U.S. 83 (No. 96-643), availablein 1997 WL
348462; Reply Brief for Petitioner, Steel Co., 523 U.S. 83 (No. 96-643), available in 1997 WL
429733.
145. See Transcript of Oral Arguments (Oct. 6, 1997), Steel Co., 523 U.S. 83 (No. 96-643),
availablein 1997 WL 631058.
146. See generally Brief Amici Curiae of the American Iron & Steel Institute et al. in
Support of Petitioner, Steel Co., 523 U.S. 83 (No. 96-643), available in 1997 WL 218627; Brief
Amicus Curiae of the Pacific Legal Foundation in Support of Petitioner, Steel Co., 523 U.S. 83
(No. 96-643), available in 1997 WL 218629; Brief of American Forest & Paper Association and
the National Association of Manufacturers as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Steel Co.,
523 U.S. 83, available in 1997 WL 218632; Brief Amicus Curiae of the Washington Legal
Foundation in Support of Petitioner, Steel Co., 523 U.S. 83 (No. 96-643), available in 1997 WL
218635; Brief Amicus Curiae of the Clean Air Implementation Project in Support of Petitioner,
Steel Co., 523 U.S. 83 (No. 96-643), available in 1997 WL 218638; Brief Amicus Curiae of the
Chemical Manufacturers Association in Support of Petitioner, Steel Co., 523 U.S. 83 (No. 96643), availablein 1997 WL 218639; Brief Amicus Curiae of the Mid-America Legal Foundation
et al. in Support of Petitioner, Steel Co., 523 U.S. 83 (No. 96-643), available in 1997 WL 221815;
Brief Amicus Curiae of the United States in Support of Respondent, Steel Co., 523 U.S. 83 (No.
96-643), available in 1997 WL 343166; Brief Amicus Curiae of the State of New York et al. in
Support of Respondent, Steel Co., 523 U.S. 83 (No. 96-643), available in 1997 WL 348211; Brief
Amicus Curiae of the Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., et al. in Support of Respondent,
Steel Co., 523 U.S. 83 (No. 96-643), available in 1997 WL 351105. In fact, it appears as if the
only Supreme Court brief in which it appeared was an amicus brief in a case before the Court in
the prior term (an amicus which also happened to fie a brief in Steel Co.). See Brief of Amici
Curiae of the Washington Legal Foundation et al. at 5 n.1, Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997)
(No. 95-813), available in 1996 WL 279768 ("[Tlhe court of appeals rejected plaintiffs' NEPA
claim under the doctrine of hypothetical jurisdiction, i.e., even if plaintiffs did have standing
under NEPA, under Ninth Circuit precedent, no NEPA claim lies for a violation of ESA critical
habitat designation.") (citation omitted). In all events, the Court has clearly indicated that it
"do[es] not ordinarily address issues raised only by amici." Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc.,
500 U.S. 90, 97 n.4 (1991).
147. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 118 S. Ct. 1003, 1026 (1998)
(Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) ('The Court['s] ... discussion of 'hypothetical
jurisdiction!... is... not informed by any adversary submission by either party. Neither the
topic of 'hypothetical jurisdiction,' nor any of the cases analyzed, distinguished, and
criticized... was the subject of any comment in any of the briefs submitted by the parties or
their amici.").
148. See id. at 1012 (contending that "Justice Stevens' concurrence proceeds to argue the
bolder point that jurisdiction need not be addressed first" and that "[this is... the position
embraced by... Courts of Appeals, which find it proper to proceed immediately to the merits
question, despite jurisdictional objections.., at least where (1) the merits question is more
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to address" the doctrine as found in a "substantial body of court of appeals precedent." 149 The divide between the majority and Justice
Stevens was, in the first instance, one of legal characterization: Was
the disputed actionability of a citizen suit for past violations a jurisdictional or nonjurisdictional question? Justice Stevens, maintaining
that it was jurisdictional, contended that it could be addressed before
the obviously jurisdictional issue of Article III standing, given that a
court can choose between jurisdictional questions and, where one is
constitutional and one is not, should normally address the latter
first.51 The majority, by contrast, characterized the question of actionability as nonjurisdictional 5 ' and, after repudiating both Justice
Stevens' characterization 52 and the doctrine of hypothetical jurisdiction, 153 eventually found no constitutional standing'5 4 and thus declined to address the actionability question. 55
Rather than viewing Justice Stevens' advocacy of addressing
actionability first as solely a difference of characterization, the Court
viewed it as advocacy of the approach of hypothetical jurisdiction used
by the lower courts. 56 In turn, this reading of Justice Stevens' position necessarily opened up an entirely new debate over the propriety
of hypothetical jurisdiction, one rather removed from either the question presented on certiorari or the question of standing. As recounted
below, this tangential debate then produced not only a majority position, but also various degrees of agreement or disagreement by
Justices O'Connor and Kennedy in the former's concurrence, by
Justice Breyer in his partial concurrence, and, of course, by Justice
Stevens in his concurrence in the judgment, which at points was
joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg.
readily resolved, and (2) the prevailing party on the merits would be the same as the prevailing
party were jurisdiction denied").
149. Id. at 1012 n.1.
150. See id. at 1022-25 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
151. See id. at 1010.
152. See id. at 1010-12.
153. See id. at 1012-16.
154. See id. at 1017-20 (specifically finding no redressability, the third of three
requirements for Article I standing).
155. See id. at 1020:
Having found that none of the relief sought by respondent would likely remedy its
alleged injury in fact, we must conclude that respondent lacks standing to maintain this
suit, and that we and the lower courts lack jurisdiction to entertain it. However
desirable prompt resolution of the merits EPORA question may be, it is not as important
as observing the constitutional limits set upon courts in our system of separated powers.
EPCRA will have to await another day.
156. See id. at 1012 n.1 (contending that "Justice Stevens' concurrence takes essentially the
same approach" as 'the approach taken by this substantial body of court of appeals precedent").
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Whether or not the Court correctly perceived the need or justification to address hypothetical jurisdiction can itself be debated.
Justice Stevens, for one, thought not, contending that the Court's
"long excursion" 157 into the doctrine was "pure dictum because it [was]
entirely unnecessary to an explanation of the Court's decision." 158 But
the fact that the Court addressed an unpleaded, unbriefed legal
theory at all is itself noteworthy. This noteworthiness stems not only
from the jurisprudential and institutional significance that naturally
attends a decision to address a theory under such circumstances, but
also from the apparent irony-in light of the circumstances-of
reaching out to address the particular theory in question.
There is, to begin with, enormous jurisprudential and institutional significance to addressing an unargued issue of law in light of
the Court's own rules, two of which are directly relevant. The first is
that "[o]nly the questions set out in the petition [for certiorari], or
fairly included therein, will be considered by the Court." 59 The second is that, "[wihere issues are neither raised before nor considered
by the Court of Appeals, this Court will not ordinarily consider
them." 60 While the Court has "on occasion rephrased the question
presented by a petitioner, or requested the parties to address an important question of law not raised in the petition for certiorari," 6' and

while its "power to decide is not limited by the precise terms of the
question presented"162 and extends to "subsidiary question[s] fairly

included" in the questions actually presented,163 the Court has admon157. Id. at 1025 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
158. Id. at 1026.
159. Sup. CT. R. 14.1(a). According to the Court, this rule serves two purposes: (1) "[It

provides the respondent with notice of the grounds upon which the petitioner is seeking
certiorari, and enables the respondent to sharpen the arguments as to why certiorari should not
be granted," Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 535-36 (1992), and (2) it "assists the Court
in selecting the cases in which certiorari will be granted." Id. at 536; see also id. at 538 (noting
the "benefit of developed arguments on both sides and lower court opinions squarely
address[ing] the question").
160. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 147 n.2 (1970); see, e.g., White v.
Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 214 n.12 (1983) (declining to
address a particular issue the lower court did not resolve because it "has not been, to any great
extent, briefed or argued in this Court," and because the Court "did not grant certiorari on the
issue").
161. Yee, 503 U.S. at 535 (citation omitted); see also ROBERT L. STERN ET AL., SuPREME

COURT PRACTICE § 5.11, at 246 (7th ed. 1993) (noting that the Court, particularly after ordering
reargument of a case, may "specifly] or add[] certain questions to be addressed by the parties in
additional briefs and oral arguments"); id. § 6.25(g), at 340-41 (discussing the power of the Court
to rephrase or add to the questions presented).
162. Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 559 n.6 (1978).
163. SuP. CT. R. 14.1(a) ('The statement of any question presented is deemed to comprise
every subsidiary question fairly included therein."); see generally STERN ET AL., supra note 161, §
6.25(f), at 338-39.

19991

HYPOTHETICAL JURISDICTION

ished that there is a "heavy presumption"' that it will "not consider
questions outside those presented in the petition for certiorari."1ss But
"[tihis rule is prudential in nature," and the presumption it creates
can be overcome or "disregard[ed] ... 'in the most exceptional
cases.'' 6 6
In particular, while the Court remains "generally
reluctant"167 to consider an issue not presented in the certiorari
petition or not raised in the lower courts, 68 the Court may do so
where the issue is "important,"169 or "significant," 170 or poses an
"important question of judicial administration," 71 or where it is
"recurring,"7 2 or "where reasons of urgency or of economy suggest the

164. Yee, 503 U.S. at 537.
165. Id. at 535; cf Youakim v. Miller, 425 U.S. 231, 234 (1976) ("Ordinarily, this Court does
not decide questions not raised or resolved in the lower court."); Adickes, 398 U.S. at 147 n.2

(same).

166. Yee, 503 U.S. at 535; cf Duignan v. United States, 274 U.S. 195, 200 (1927) ("It is only
in exceptional cases coming here from the federal courts that questions not pressed or passed
upon below are reviewed."). While the rule is entirely prudential in cases arising from federal
courts-which would thus encompass the hypothetical jurisdiction scenario-the Court has
"expressed inconsistent views as to whether this rule is jurisdictional or prudential in cases
arising from state courts." Yee, 503 U.S. at 533.
167. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420,443 (1984).
168. Some of the legal standards cited in the text, see infra notes 169-73 and accompanying
text, are drawn from the Court's discussion of addressing questions not raised in the lower
courts, though possibly raised in the certiorari petition. Because of fundamental similarities
between that situation and one in which the Court addresses a question not set forth in the
certiorari petition, and because hypothetical jurisdiction in fact presented both situations, those
cases are cited here as relevant authority. Cf STERN ET AL., supra note 161, § 6.26, at 348
(noting that the Court itself has not always separated these analyses).
169. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 17 n.2 (1980); Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University
Found., 402 U.S. 313, 320 n.6 (1971) (noting that the rule "does not limit our power to decide
important questions not raised by the parties").
170. Cf. Blonder.Tongue Labs., 402 U.S. at 320 n.6 (reaching a question not presented in
the petition for certiorari in part because "it is a significant one," though also noting that it is
"in the same general field" as judicial administration and "has been fully briefed and argued by
the parties and amici").
17L Id. (noting that in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), "a landmark
decision involving an important question of judicial administration in the federal courts, this
Court overruled a prior decision of many years' standing although the parties did not urge such
a holding in their briefs"); see also Carlson, 446 U.S. at 17 n.2 (reaching a question not presented below because "the interests of judicial administration will be served by addressing the
issue on its merits," though also noting that "the issue is squarely presented and fully briefed"
and "is properly raised in another petition for certiorari being held pending disposition of this
case").
172. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 17 n.2 (reaching an "important, recurring" question); cf. City of
Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 257 & n.15 (1981) (reaching an issue that was
neither properly preserved below nor suitable for plain error review in part because it "is important and appears likely to recur," although noting that "the question was squarely presented
and decided on a complete trial record by the court of first resort, was argued by both sides to
the Court of Appeals, and has been fully briefed before this Court").
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need to address the unpresented question in the case under
consideration." 173
Apparently, though with little discussion, Steel Co. must have
been a "most exceptional case" and this presumption must have been
overcome, for the Court quite obviously reached the propriety of hypothetical jurisdiction despite the doctrine's total absence from any of
the pleadings or proceedings to that point. 74 The Court's decision to
do so likely reflected several considerations that only underscore the
jurisprudential and institutional significance of the decision itself.
Foremost among these is that the issue of hypothetical jurisdiction
did indeed pose an imp6rtant and recurring question of judicial
administration. Though it did not concern the Court's own jurisdiction as such, in which case the Court clearly could have addressed it despite its having been "neither raised by the parties nor
passed upon by the courts below," 175 it did concern the jurisdiction of
the Article III judiciary as a whole and the obligation of the lower
courts to obey the Supreme Court's interpretations of Article 11I.176

173. Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 535 (1992).
174. By contrast, the Court, just a few months later in a decision also authored by Justice
Scalia, summarily declined to address a constitutional issue raised in the petitioner's brief, but
not addressed by the lower courts. See Pennsylvania Dep't of Corrections v. Yeskey, - U.S. -,
118 S. Ct. 1952, 1956 (1998).
175. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530 (1967) ("Before considering
the issues presented by the petition for certiorari, we find it necessary to dispose of a question
neither raised by the parties nor passed upon by the courts below. Since the matter concerns
our jurisdiction, we raise it on our own motion."); see also Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch.
Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986) (i[Elvery federal appellate court has a special obligation to
'satisfy itself not only of its own jurisdiction, but also that of the lower courts in a cause under
review,' even though the parties are prepared to concede it.") (quoting Mitchell v. Maurer, 293
U.S. 237, 244 (1934)); STERN ET AL., supranote 161, § 6.26, at 346 ("Jurisdictional issues, of
course, can always be considered, even sua sponte, whether or not raised below.").
176. See Thomas J. Long, Note, Deciding Whether Conflicts with Supreme Court Precedent
Warrant Certiorari,59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1104, 1105 (1984) (arguing that once a conflict is found
between the Supreme Court and a lower court decision, "the certiorari decision should be in-

formed by two interrelated considerations unique to vertical conflicts: whether and to what extent the allegedly conflicting lower court decision (1) compromises the precedential value of
Supreme Court decisions, or (2) undermines the integrity of the judicial hierarchy"). Needless
to say, "[flederal district courts and circuit courts are bound to adhere to the controlling decisions of the Supreme Court..
. . '[U]nless we wish anarchy to prevail within the federal judicial
system, a precedent of this Court must be followed by the lower federal courts no matter how
misguided the judges of those courts may think it to be.'" Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F.2d 1526,
1532 (11th Cir. 1983) (quoting Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 375 (1982)), affd, 472 U.S. 38
(1985); see also David C. Bratz, Comment, Stare Decisis in Lower Courts: Predictingthe Demise
of Supreme Court Precedent,60 WASH. L. REV. 87, 91 (1984) ("[Llower courts are... constrained

by their subordinate position in the judicial system. The American judicial hierarchy deprives
lower courts of the right simply to refuse to follow binding Supreme Court precedent."). For a
comprehensive, provocative, and well-reasoned analysis of this obligation, see Evan H.
Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 817
(1994).
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More than that, it implicated the federal judiciary's constitutional
fidelity and institutional integrity, given the special "province and the
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is"177 and, in
particular, its unique obligation to articulate and preserve the
constitutional limits of governmental power. 78
Furthermore, the use of hypothetical jurisdiction by the lower
federal courts was so manifestly aberrant that there was arguably no
need to solicit arguments from the parties or to be presented with a
lower court decision invoking the doctrine. In other contexts, the
Court has recognized its own "authority to notice plain error" despite
the absence of briefings or arguments, 179 just as it has recognized that
"a federal appellate court is justified in resolving an issue not passed
on below.., where the proper resolution is beyond any doubt." 80
Given the apparent futility of any debate over the validity of the doctrine, at least in light of its ultimate repudiation by the Court, the criterion of economy certainly disfavored additional briefing or avoidance
of the issue altogether. 8 ' Moreover, as explained elsewhere in this
177. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
178. The Court in City of Boerne noted:
Our national experience teaches that the Constitution is preserved best when each part
of the government respects both the Constitution and the proper actions and
determinations of the other branches. When the Court has interpreted the Constitution,
it has acted within the province of the Judicial Branch, which embraces the duty to say
what the law is. When the political branches of the Government act against the
background of a judicial interpretation of the Constitution already issued, it must be
understood that in later cases and controversies the Court will treat its precedents with
the respect due them under settled principles, including stare decisis, and contrary
expectations must be disappointed.
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2172 (1997); see also Powell v.
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 549 (1969) ("[Ilt is the responsibility of this Court to act as the
ultimate interpreter of the Constitution."); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) ("Deciding
whether a matter has in any measure been committed by the Constitution to another branch of
government... is itself a delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation, and is a
responsibility of this Court as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution."); Jaffree, 705 F.2d at
1532 ("Under our form of government and long established law and custom, the Supreme Court
is the ultimate authority on the interpretation of our Constitution and laws; its interpretations
may not be disregarded.").
179. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University Found., 402 U.S. 313, 320 n.6 (1971) (noting
the option "where the parties have not briefed or argued a question that the Court nevertheless
finds controlling under its authority to notice plain error"); see also SUP. CT. R. 24.1(a) ("At its
option.., the Court may consider a plain error not among the questions presented but evident
from the record and otherwise within its jurisdiction to decide."); STERN ET AL., supra note 161, §
3.20, at 138-40, § 6.26, at 346-49 (reviewing the doctrine).
180. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121 (1976). For a general discussion, see Rhett R.
Dennerline, Note, PushingAside the General Rule in Order to Raise New Issues on Appeal, 64
IND. L.J. 985 (1989).
181. In any event, to the extent that competing arguments were necessary, they could be
readily found in various federal appellate opinions. Compare, e.g., Browning-Ferris Indus. v.
Muszynski, 899 F.2d 151, 154-60 (2d Cir. 1990) (defending the doctrine at length), with Clow v.
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Article, the likelihood of the Court ever being squarely presented with
the question was extremely remote, despite the doctrine's recurring
incidence. 182 Thus, much like the exception allowing consideration of
an otherwise moot dispute where the issue is "capable of repetition,
yet evading review," 1' the lifting of the prudential bar against addressing unpresented questions on certiorari did have a certain compelling logic in this case.'8 Finally, though quite speculatively, one
can imagine that the doctrine of hypothetical jurisdiction had likely
been in a few justices' sights for some time, 8 5 and that Steel Co.
(particularly Justice Stevens' concurrence) came "close enough" for
purposes of isolating and eliminating the doctrine.
The significance of addressing hypothetical jurisdiction despite
its absence from the pleadings and lower court decisions is farther
magnified by an unusual degree of irony. After all, the Court in Steel
Co. reached out amidst this total absence to address, of all things, the
unauthorized reaching out by federal courts to address the merits in
the absence of jurisdiction. It did so, moreover, prior to the verification of subject-matter jurisdiction, 86 despite its simultaneous admoni-

United States Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 948 F.2d 614, 625-28 (9th Cir. 1991) (O'Scannlain,
J., dissenting) (criticizing the doctrine at length), and Cross-Sound Ferry Servs., Inc. v. ICC, 934
F.2d 327, 339-46 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the denial of
the petition for review) (same).
182. See infra notes 306-11 and accompanying text. Had the doctrine's validity been
squarely presented as a question in a certiorari petition, the Court could easily have justified
granting review. The circuits were more or less unified in their general condemnation of the
doctrine, and the paradigmatic basis for review is a circuit split, see SuP. CT. R. 10(a) (indicating
that the Court will consider granting review when there is a split of authority between federal
circuit courts); Layne & Bowler Corp. v. Western Well Works, Inc., 261 U.S. 387, 393 (1923)
("Ilt is very important that we be consistent in not granting the writ of certiorari except.., in
cases where there is a real and embarrassing conflict of opinion and authority between the
circuit courts of appeals."). However, the Court could have determined that "a United States
court of appeals has decided an important question of federal law that has not been, but should
be, settled by this Court, or has decided an important federal question in a way that conflicts
with relevant decisions of this Court." SuP. CT. R. 10(c); see also STERNETAL., supra note 161, §
4.5, at 176 (noting that certiorari may be appropriate where a lower court decision "involves a
question upon which prior decisions of the Supreme Court are irreconcilable or inconsistent, or
where the decision below is premised upon a prior Supreme Court opinion whose implications
are in need of clarification") (citations omitted).
183. Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482 (1982) (per curiam); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
125 (1973); National Black Police Ass'n v. District of Columbia, 108 F.3d 346, 350 (D.C. Cir.
1997).
184. Cf. Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 265 n.5 (1981) (reaching an issue "not raised on
appeal below or included as a question in the petition for certiorari" in part because the
circumstances of the case were such that it was "unlikely" that the attorney below would have
raised the issue).
185. Justice Thomas, of course, had vigorously dissented from the doctrine's use in 1991
while sitting on the District of Columbia Circuit. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
186. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 118 S. Ct. 1003, 1025 (1998)
(Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) ("The Court... argu[es] that the standing question
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tion to lower federal courts that "jurisdiction be established as a
threshold matter," a requirement which it described as "'inflexible
and without exception.'"187 Finally, as Justice Stevens argued, the
Court's repudiation of hypothetical jurisdiction was "entirely unnecessary to an explanation of the Court's decision"18 and, not having been
adversarially addressed by the parties, was comparable to an advisory
opinion. 8 9 To be sure, in light of the Court's eventual holding that the
plaintiff-respondent lacked standing and thus the federal courts
lacked jurisdiction, it is difficult to see how a lower court on remand
could have invoked hypothetical jurisdiction, which requires that the
jurisdictional issue be difficult and heretofore unresolved.
Whether or not there is ultimate meaning to this depth of
irony is, of course, unclear, particularly since irony is not necessarily
or intrinsically a legally significant phenomenon.' 9° It is at times,
however, an indicator of deeper instability or tectonic change amidst
the strata and substrata of a legal or jurisprudential culture.191 The
foundational case of Marbury v. Madison, 92 in which Chief Justice
Marshall discussed the merits at length only to conclude that the
Court lacked jurisdiction, is perhaps the classic (and perhaps -the
most relevant) example. If nothing else, then, the rich irony of Steel
Co. may reveal a level of turbulence within the law of jurisdiction not
evident from the surface of the majority's opinion (though confirmed

must be addressed first. Ironically, however, before 'first' addressing standing, the Court takes
a long excursion that entirely loses sight of the basic reason why standing is a matter of such
importance to the proper functioning of the judicial process."). The majority reasoned that:
[Standing] would normally be considered a threshold question that must be resolved in
respondent's favor before proceeding to the merits. Justice Stevens' opinion concurring
in the judgment, however, claims that the question whether section 11046(a) permits
this cause of action is also Jurisdictional,' and so has equivalent claim to being resolved
first. Whether that is so has significant implications for this case and for many others,
and so the point warrants extended discussion.
Id. at 1009.
187. Id. at 1012 (quoting Mansfield, C. & L.M. Ry. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379,382 (1884)).
188. Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1026 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
189. See id.
190. Cf. Amanullah v. Nelson, 811 F.2d 1, 18 (1st Cir. 1987) (observing that "irony is no
stranger to the law").
191. For an extremely useful inventory of other grammatical or rhetorical devices used in
judicial opinion writing, accompanied by commentary on their deeper meaning and culminating
in an analysis of their deployment specifically in jurisdictional opinions, see Laura E. Little,
Hiding with Words: Obfuscation,Avoidance, and Federal JurisdictionOpinions, 46 UCLA L.
REV. 75 (1998).
192. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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as well by the many divisions among the Court's members and by the
confusion that the decision has already engendered).93
B. The Reasoning and Merits of the Repudiation
Notwithstanding the exceptionality of the Court's decision to
address hypothetical jurisdiction at all, what is most significant is
that ultimately it did reach, and did repudiate, the doctrine.94 In
light of the doctrine's renegade nature, this repudiation was more or
less straightforward and, in the Court's words, "should [have] come as
no surprise."195 Though noting that several circuit courts had
embraced some version of it, the Court "decline[d] to endorse [it,"96
principally on two interdependent grounds of constitutional structure.
First, the practice of hypothetical jurisdiction transgresses the limited
and enumerated powers of the judiciary-if not the very concept it193. Some courts have described the Court's action in general terms in a manner that
portrays the repudiation as straightforward. See, e.g., Seaborn v. Florida, 143 F.3d 1405, 1407
n.2 (11th Cir. 1998) ("The Supreme Court squarely rejected the doctrine of hypothetical jurisdiction in Steel and instructed that a challenge to Article I subject matter jurisdiction must be
resolved before a court may address the merits of the underlying claim in any manner."),
petition for cert. filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3409 (U.S. Sept. 14, 1998) (No. 98-998); Nagel v. ADM Inv.
Servs., Inc., No. 96 CV 2675, 1998 WL 381978, at *4 (N.D. Ill.
July 6, 1998) (stating that Steel
Co. "abolish[ed]" hypothetical jurisdiction). Several other courts, however, have found the
decision slightly less lucid. See, e.g., Hardemon v. City of Boston, 144 F.3d 24, 26 (1st Cir. 1998)
("The Supreme Court... has recently issued a decision in which a plurality disapproves [the
assumption of jurisdiction]. The various opinions in the case, read as a whole, are not entirely
clear as to whether (or to what extent) Steel Co. undermines our earlier practice.") (citation
omitted); East Bay Mun. Util. Dist. v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 142 F.3d 479, 482 (D.C.
Cir. 1998) (noting that it is "uncertain whether Steel Co.'s holding requires us to resolve the
government's waiver claim first, when, as here, even the merits evidence that would be excluded
under the government's waiver theory comes nowhere near establishing liability, and when we
are certain of our jurisdiction over the suit itself"); Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm. v.
FEC, 139 F.3d 951, 952 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ("Steel Co. seems to hold that before deciding the
merits, federal courts must.., decide... standing whenever it is in doubt. We say 'seems'
because two of the Justices comprising the five-Justice majority on this point interpreted the
Court's opinion as not setting down an absolute, rigid, unbending rule."); Oil, Chem. & Atomic
Workers Int'l Union v. Pefia, 18 F. Supp. 2d 6, 14 n.6 (D.D.C. 1998) (acknowledging the
uncertainty expressed, the D.C. Circuit in DemocraticSenatorial CampaignCommittee); see also
Marathon Oil Co. v. A.G. Ruhrgas, 145 F.3d 211 (5th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (dividing 9-7 over
whether Steel Co. allows personal jurisdiction to be assessed prior to the verification of subjectmatter jurisdiction), cert.granted,119 S.Ct. 589 (1998) (No. 98-470).
194. The judgment in Steel Co. was 9-0, but the Justices parted ways on the reasoning.
Justice Scalia authored the majority opinion, which was joined in whole by four other Justices
(Rehnquist, O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas) and in part by Justice Breyer, who also filed an
opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice
Kennedy, filed a concurring opinion. Justice Stevens filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, which was joined in selected parts by Justices Souter and Ginsburg, the latter of whom
also filed her own opinion concurring in the judgment. See generally Steel Co. v. Citizens for a
Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 118 S.Ct. 1003 (1998).
195. Id. at 1012.
196. Id.
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self-by "carr[ying] the courts beyond the bounds of authorized judicial action." 197 Federal courts, after all, are limited to the adjudication
of "cases" and "controversies" within the meaning of Article III,
Section 2,198 which is essentially to say they are prohibited from rendering advisory opinions.19 According to the Court, "[h]ypothetical
jurisdiction produces nothing more than a hypothetical
judgment-which comes to the same thing as an advisory opinion,
disapproved by this Court from the beginning."200 Second and
relatedly, the practice of hypothetical jurisdiction "offends
fundamental principles of separation of powers."201 This is so because
"[t]he statutory and (especially) constitutional elements of jurisdiction
are an essential ingredient of separation and equilibration of powers,
restraining the courts from acting at certain times, and even
restraining them from acting permanently regarding certain
subjects."202

Given the Court's willingness to address the doctrine of hypothetical jurisdiction sua sponte, without briefing or argument, this
Article propounds that the doctrine, and hence the doctrine's repudiation, are of more than passing importance. This is indeed the case,
197. Id.
198. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (IThe judicial Power shall extend to all Cases
[enumerated] ... [and] to Controversies [enumerated] ... ."); see also Lewis v. Continental Bank
Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990) ("Under Article MI of the Constitution, federal courts may
adjudicate only actual, ongoing cases or controversies.").
199. See, e.g., Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 8 (1988) (noting "Art. I1ls
proscription against advisory opinions"). The Court has noted:
[Ilt is quite clear that "the oldest and most consistent thread in the federal law of
justiciability is that the federal courts will not give advisory opinions." Thus, the
implicit policies embodied in Article M, and not history alone, impose the rule against
advisory opinions on federal courts. When the federal judicial power is invoked to pass
upon the validity of actions by the Legislative and Executive Branches of the
Government, the rule against advisory opinions implements the separation of powers
prescribed by the Constitution and confines federal courts to the role assigned them by
Article Ill.
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 96 (1968) (footnote omitted) (quoting CHARLES A. WRIGHT,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 34 (st ed. 1963)).
200. Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1016 (citing Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346,362 (1911);
Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408 (1792)); see also James Madison Ltd. v. Ludwig, 82 F.3d
1085, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (rejecting a party's "suggest[ion] ... that we need not reach its
jurisdictional arguments until after we consider the merits of the case" because "we have an
affirmative obligation 'to consider whether the constitutional and statutory authority exist for
us to hear each dispute'" and "[ilf... federal courts cannot grant any of the relief sought.., a
decision of this court would be an advisory opinion barred by Article Ill of the Constitution"
(quoting Herbert v. National Academy of Sciences, 974 F.2d 192, 196 (D.C. Cir. 1992))), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 737 (1997).
20L Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1012.
202. Id. at 1016 (citing United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974); Schlesinger
v. Reservists Comm. to Stp the War, 418 U.S. 208, 227 (1974)).
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and it is well worth noting the value of this repudiation to the judiciary as an institution and to the nation's system of constitutional governance. To be sure, while the doctrine itself may have possessed certain potential attributes, such as judicial economy and restraint,
these attributes are simply incomparable to the benefits that arise
from its avoidance. The most obvious such benefit is the legitimacy
that derives from adhering, even formalistically, to the structural
mandates of the Constitution. In order to remain authoritative in its
enforcement of such mandates against the other branches and the
states, the federal judiciary must first keep its own house in order,
especially since the vestiture of constitutional review exclusively with
the courts, combined with the institution of life tenure, effectively
makes them the only case-by-case check on their own power. 203 Not
only, then, must the federal bench avoid constitutional impropriety, it
must arguably avoid even the appearance of constitutional impropriety, and hypothetical jurisdiction-which amounted to the exercise of
power without authority-posed a serious obstacle to the fulfillment
of these commitments.
The constitutional promise of limited
government, both as a recognition of popular sovereignty and as a
safeguard against the abridgment of liberty,2°4 demands that there
must be discernible boundaries to federal power. By clarifying the necessity of confirmed subject-matter jurisdiction, the Steel Co. decision
demarcates one such boundary and, in so doing, reaffirms this promise of limited government.
The consequences of the Steel Co. decision extend well beyond
the abstractions of constitutional principle, however. The decision,
after all, not only repudiated a doctrine; it also terminated the abuse
203. In theory, Congress may generally and prospectively restrict, or even abolish, the
jurisdiction of the lower courts. See Lauf v. E.G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323, 330 (1938)
("There can be no question of the power of Congress ... to define and limit the jurisdiction of
the inferior courts of the United States."); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 449 (1850)
("[Hiaving a right to prescribe, Congress may withhold from any court of its creation
jurisdiction... [over] any of the enumerated controversies."). Congress may also qualify the
Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction "with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as
the Congress shall make." U.S. CONST. art. M, § 2. But the actual extent of Congress's power
to limit jurisdiction remains uncertain, see generally Lawrence Gene Sager, The Supreme Court,
1980 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress's Authority To Regulate the
Jurisdictionof the FederalCourts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17 (1981). The separation of powers clearly
prohibits Congress from "'prescrib[ing] rules of decision to the Judicial Department of the
government in cases pending before it,'" or "retroactively commanding the federal courts to
reopen final judgments" for purposes ofrevision. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211,
218, 219 (1995) (quoting United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146 (1872)).
204. See, e.g., Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Our Bill of Rights, 25 IND. L. REV. 937, 940 (1992) ("The
structure of limited government that the Constitution imposes... protects freedom by dispersing power (i) between the state and national governments and (ii) among the three branches of
federal authority.").
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of this doctrine. As illustrated earlier, the federal courts apparently
could not limit the doctrine even to its own requirements, leading
both to its overapplication and to its misapplication.205 Additionally,

there is some evidence that the doctrine was not applied, or even misapplied, on an even-handed or random basis, but instead was employed in certain contexts more than in others. Appeals involving
claims arising under section 440 of the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act,20 for example, appear to have been especially good
candidates for its invocation. 20 7 In turn, to the extent that this non-

randomness transgressed congressional will, or fell upon politically or
legally vulnerable classes, the judicial misuse of hypothetical jurisdiction may have been even more unlawful and problematic-and thus
its repudiation even more salutary-than one might have first supposed. 20
In addition, the aberrant nature of hypothetical jurisdiction, as
often happens with deviant legal phenomena, necessarily generated
secondary disturbances in the jurisprudential field. It has already
been noted, for instance, that the doctrine effectively perpetuated itself by encouraging courts to avoid difficult jurisdictional issues, simply tossing them from one case to another, or one tribunal to another,
in the manner of a hot potato. 2°9 Because these issues will now require resolution, the legal system in theory should benefit by marginal reductions both in uncertainty and in needless and redundant
litigation over identical jurisdictional questions.210 At the same time,
the elimination of hypothetical jurisdiction will obviate the need for
courts, which after already having assumed jurisdiction in an earlier
case decide or discover that jurisdiction did not in fact exist, to have to
wait until the issue is raised again in a different, subsequent case to
set the record straight. Forcing a jurisdictional determination at the

205. See supraPart mI.C.

206. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified as amended at scattered sections
of 8, 15, 18, 22, 28, 40, 42, 50 U.S.C.).

207. See Prakash, supra note 105, at 1433 n.87 (listing cases).
208. The disfigurement of jurisdictional doctrines in a manner adverse to vulnerable legal
classes, potentially justified as a matter of judicial economy, is apparently not unprecedented.
See generally Nancy Levit, The Caseload Conundrum, Constitutional Restraint and the
Manipulationof Jurisdiction,64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 321 (1989).

209. See supra text accompanying note 75.
210. As noted by then-Justice Rehnquist, "[w]ith the vast expansion in the case dockets of
all federal courts in recent years, the more settled the procedural system by which these cases
are to run the judicial gauntlet, the better off will be litigants, lawyers, and judges." Yazoo
County Indus. Dev. Corp. v. Suthoff, 454 U.S. 1157, 1161 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from
the denial of certiorari).
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time it is raised will, in other words, not only reduce uncertainty but
211
will do so in a prompt, efficient manner.
Finally, the availability of hypothetical jurisdiction undermined certain jurisdictional principles, which in turn undermined certain judicial practices. It has sometimes been asserted, for example,
that a prior or lower court's silence on the issue of subject-matter
212
jurisdiction, though itself not necessarily a desirable circumstance,
could nevertheless amount to an implied finding of jurisdiction of
which a subsequent or higher court could take notice. 213 But this
211. Of course, it is also true that a jurisdictional determination, even if erroneous, will
likely enjoy the force of res judicata, such that courts will now, more than before, have to live
with their jurisdictional errors as well. See Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 171-72 (1938);
Assuming JurisdictionArguendo, supra note 4, at 719-20. This rule would not apply, however,
to cases that are still pending. Cf. United States v. Kuhn, 638 F.2d 17, 17 (5th Cir. 1981) (per
curiam) (holding in regard to a prior opinion in the same case that, because the court "expressly
reserv[ed] th[e] question" of jurisdiction and the court in a different case had held against jurisdiction on similar facts, that the earlier opinion is "of no effect" and that "[w]e withdraw it").
212. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 118 S. Ct. 1003, 1011 (1998)
(labeling such practices "drive-by jurisdictional rulings").
213. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Morales, 949 F.2d 141, 144 (5th Cir. 1991)
(noting in a later appeal of the same case that, "[w]hile the prior opinion does not explicitly
discuss it, the necessary assumption is that the prior panel found subject matter jurisdiction
present. Otherwise, the panel would not have reached the merits and affirmed the preliminary
injunction."), affd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 504 U.S. 374 (1992); Schultz v.
Wellman, 717 F.2d 301, 304 n.7 (6th Cir. 1983) (noting on appeal that, "[wihile not explicitly
stated, we assume that the [district court] found jurisdiction to consider such claims under 28
U.S.C. § 1331, federal question jurisdiction"); River Park, Inc. v. City of Highland Park, 703
N.E.2d 883, 890-91 (Ill. 1998) (concluding that a particular claim, previously filed in federal
court, must have been dismissed by the federal court for failure to state a claim rather than for
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, in part because the federal court had reviewed the merits
and "without subject matter jurisdiction, they would have had no power to conduct this sort of
review") (citing Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1012); Assuming JurisdictionArguendo, supra note 4, at
714 ("If the court reaches the merits of a dispute without expressly addressing subject matter
jurisdiction, a finding of jurisdiction is implied.") (citing Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 171-72
(1938)). Although a finding of jurisdiction may generally be implied or inferred, it need not be,
and the normal rule is that "[ilssues, even jurisdictional issues, lurking in the record but not
addressed do not bind the court in later cases." R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co. v. FTC, 931 F.2d
430, 433 (7th Cir. 1991); see also Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 352 n.2 (1996) ("[T]he existence
of unaddressed jurisdictional defects has no precedential effect."); Kershaw v. Shalala, 9 F.3d
11, 13 n.3 (5th Cir. 1993) (noting that the Court's exercise of jurisdiction in a prior decision does
not "constitute a binding precedent... because the jurisdictional issue was neither raised by
the parties nor addressed by the Court"); Grant v. Shalala, 989 F.2d 1332, 1341 (3d Cir. 1993)
("[Slince the district court's authority to make findings was not challenged or addressed in the
district court, the court of appeals, or the Supreme Court, the mere fact that findings were made
is inconsequential for precedential purposes."); National Cable Television Ass'n, Inc. v.
American Cinema Editors, Inc., 937 F.2d 1572, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("When an issue is not
argued or is ignored in a decision, such decision is not precedent to be followed in a subsequent
case in which the issue arises."); Brooks v. Flagg Bros., Inc., 553 F.2d 764, 774 (2d Cir. 1977)
(stating that "such a sub silentio jurisdictional ruling is not binding precedent in this
court .... "), rev'd on other grounds, 436 U.S. 149 (1978); Shattuck v. Hoegl, 523 F.2d 509, 514
n.8 (2d Cir. 1975) ("[Tihe precedential value of a per curiam exercise of jurisdiction noting an
affirmance in open court is at best doubtful where the issue of jurisdiction apparently was not
raised but passed sub silentio."); Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v.
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practice can operate only if two basic principles are observed: first,
that a court cannot proceed to the merits without subject-matter
jurisdiction, and second, that a court is under an obligation to raise
and assess its jurisdiction, sua sponte if necessary.214 Hypothetical
jurisdiction, however, directly undermines both foundational
principles, for it allows courts to reach the merits without confirming
jurisdiction and, as a practical matter, essentially excuses them from
their obligation to undertake such confirmation. Accordingly, by
repudiating hypothetical jurisdiction the Court has restored the
reliability of these principles and, in turn, has once again rendered
operative the various practices that derive their validity from them.
C. The Strength of the Repudiation
For all its merit, the Steel Co. Court's repudiation of hypothetical jurisdiction is, when viewed as a whole, not an exemplar of clarity,
which itself is perhaps one more ironic feature of the decision. At
least three factors cause this ambiguity.
First, several
justices-including two of the five majority justices-wrote separately
in a manner that potentially undercut the reach, or at least the
rigidity, of the repudiation. Second, the majority opinion itself, rather
than overruling the Court's cases that spawned the doctrine in the
lower courts, attempted instead to distinguish them categorically,
which in turn preserved a number of related doctrines and effectively
left intact a number of potential loose ends. And third, as decisions
often do, the Steel Co. opinion generated or left unresolved a number
of related questions, some of which have already been raised in the
decision's wake. This Subpart will discuss the breakdown of the
Justices in Steel Co., while the following Subpart will discuss the doctrines apparently preserved by the decision.

Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F.2d 623, 628-29 (3d Cir. 1954) (noting that where "the question
of federal jurisdiction was passed sub silentio" it does not amount to "binding precedent on the
issue of jurisdiction"), affid, 348 U.S. 437 (1955). Few cases, however, expressly prohibit implied
findings of jurisdiction-some candidates include Getty Oil Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North
America, 841 F.2d 1254, 1261 (5th Cir. 1988) ("Since the district court did not even mention
jurisdiction before entering a final judgment, we cannot assume that it made such a determination, nor can we affirm its judgment."), and Crawford v. United States, 796 F.2d 924, 928 (7th
Cir. 1986) ("[D]ecisions that fail to remark [on) a jurisdictional issue are not assumed to have resolved it by their silence.)-rather, it appears to be a matter within the prerogative of the sub-

sequent or appellate court.
214. See, e.g., Harper v. National Flood Insurers Ass'n, 494 F. Supp. 234, 239-40 (M.D. Pa.
1980) (noting the importance of this latter requirement as a premise for implying a finding of
jurisdiction).
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The repudiation of hypothetical jurisdiction was accomplished
in Part III of the majority opinion, which was supported by no more
than five votes. These include its author, Justice Scalia, and the four
who signed on to that part-Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas. 215 In addition to the majority opinion, there were four separate opinions of differing alignments. Justice
O'Connor, joined by Justice Kennedy, concurred, specifically expressing some hesitation over the majority's treatment of the doctrine of
hypothetical jurisdiction. Justice Breyer concurred in part (but not in
Part III) and concurred in the judgment, specifically disagreeing with
the majority's treatment of the doctrine. Justice Stevens, joined in
part by Justice Souter and in lesser part by Justice Ginsburg, concurred only in the judgment, offering a different conceptualization of
the issues and, from the majority's perspective, a contrary view of the
doctrine of hypothetical jurisdiction. Finally, Justice Ginsburg also
concurred in the judgment only, offering no commentary whatsoever
on the doctrine.
Of these separate opinions, two aspects in particular render
the repudiation less than definitive: the O'Connor concurrence and
the uncertain positions of Justice Ginsburg and, potentially, of
Justices Stevens and Souter. First, Justices O'Connor and Kennedy
"agree[d] with the Court's statement that federal courts should be certain of their jurisdiction before reaching the merits of a case"216 and
further that the Court's precedents seemingly to the contrary were
"defensible." 217 But they "wr[olte separately to note that.., the
Court's opinion should not be read as cataloging an exhaustive list of
circumstances under which federal courts may exercise judgment in
'reserv[ing] difficult questions of... jurisdiction when the case alternatively could be resolved on the merits in favor of the same
party.' "218
While this is hardly a loss of two of the five votes supporting
repudiation at a general level, it is potentially significant in a number
of ways. At the very least, it corrodes the seemingly rigid stance articulated by the majority,219 which in turn could invite the lower fed-

215. Justice Breyer joined only Parts I and IV of the majority opinion.
216. Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1020 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
217. Id.
218. Id. (quoting Norton v. Mathews, 427 U.S. 524, 532 (1976)).
219. This is precisely what one panel of the District of Columbia Circuit concluded. See
Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 139"F.3d 951, 952 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (per
curiam) ("Steel Co. seems to hold that before deciding the merits, federal courts must always
decide Article IH standing whenever it is in doubt." (citing Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1020
(O'Connor, J., concurring))); see also Dao v. Knightsbridge Int'l Reinsurance Corp., 15 F. Supp.
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eral courts-as well as the Court itself, for that matter-to view
certain applications of hypothetical jurisdiction as unaffected and to
experiment once again with the concept of hypothetical jurisdiction in
different or uncharted contexts. 220 Moreover, to the extent that the
O'Connor concurrence deprives the main opinion of its majority
status-reducing it, as one court has concluded, to a plurality
opinion22x-then the O'Connor-Kennedy position would itself assume a
more important status. Although some courts treat plurality opinions
simply as non-binding, 222 the Supreme Court has explained that
"[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale
explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, 'the holding of
the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members
who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.' "2 In
other words, the holding would comprise the "common ground shared
by five or more justices"22--in Steel Co., the main opinion as qualified
by the O'Connor concurrence. Having articulated the rule, it should
further be noted that Justices O'Connor's and Kennedy's joining of the
main opinion, apart from their concurrence, renders the actual formal
status of the main opinion uncertain, and lower courts should not be
eager to relegate it to plurality status. Should it be so relegated, however, then the O'Connor concurrence, and not the main opinion, would
ultimately provide the holding on the issue of hypothetical jurisdiction.
Lest the matter were not already sufficiently complicated,
there is also some uncertainty in the other direction. Because Justice
2d 567, 578 n.9 (D.N.J. 1998) (noting that "the split among the Supreme Court suggests that
this may not exactly be an unbending rule," although further noting that "the better practice is
not 'to test the outer limits of the [Supreme] Court's tolerance'") (quoting Hardemon v. City of
Boston, 144 F.3d 24, 26 (1st Cir. 1998)); Bowers v. NCAA, 9 F. Supp. 2d 460, 498 n.15 (D.N.J.
1998) (same).
220. As the First Circuit further observed, "[t]he various opinions in the case, read as a

whole, are not entirely clear as to whether (or to what extent) Steel Co. undermines our earlier
practice [of assuming jurisdiction]." Hardemon, 144 F.3d at 26.
22L See id. (MTe Supreme Court... has recently issued a decision in which a plurality
disapproves such an approach.").

222. See, e.g., United States v. Stewart, 65 F.3d 918, 924 (11th Cir. 1995) ("[P]lurality
opinions do not bind this Court."); Guam v. Gill, 59 F.3d 1010, 1013 (9th Cir. 1995) ("[A]
plurality decision ... does not by its own force act as binding precedent on this court.").
223. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.

153, 169 n.15 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, & Stevens, JJ.)); see also King v. Palmer, 950
F.2d 771, 781-82 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (en banc) (elaborating on the Marks approach); United States
v. Martino, 664 F.2d 860, 872-73 (2d Cir. 1981) (same); see generally Note, PluralityDecisions
and Judicial Decisionmaking,94 HARV. L. REV. 1127 (1981); Note, The Precedential Value of
Supreme Court PluralityDecisions, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 756 (1980).
224. Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1176, 1182 (2d Cir. 1992) ("In essence, what
we must do is find common ground shared by five or more justices.").
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Ginsburg, for example, did not join the relevant portions of the majority's, of Justice Breyer's, or of Justice Stevens' opinions, it cannot be
stated with genuine confidence that, in a different milieu, she might
not be willing to repudiate hypothetical jurisdiction as the majority
did in Steel Co. 22- Even the positions of Justices Stevens and Souter,
the latter of whom for the most part joined the former's separate opinion, remain somewhat unclear on the ultimate propriety of hypothetical jurisdiction. Justice Stevens, after all, fundamentally rejected the
majority's characterization of his legal stance, proclaiming that "[tihe
doctrine of 'hypothetical jurisdiction' [wa]s irrelevant"2 6 and that the
majority's discussion of it was "pure dictum because it [wa]s entirely
unnecessary to an explanation of the Court's decision."227 Accordingly,

even while the majority's repudiation of hypothetical jurisdiction is
possibly weakened by the O'Connor concurrence, it may
simultaneously enjoy the unarticulated support, at least under different circumstances, of anywhere from one to three of the Justices who
did not join the majority.
D. The DoctrinesPreservedDespite the Repudiation
Even by its own terms, putting aside the separate opinions, the
majority opinion is less than straightforward in its repudiation of the
doctrine. As a consequence of the Court's own handiwork over the
last few decades, the majority spent most of its analysis distinguishing its prior cases, explaining why in each case the seeming as225. A search of the decisions of the District of Columbia Circuit, on which Justice
Ginsburg sat prior to her elevation to the Supreme Court, reveals her participation in only one
case where jurisdiction was assumed, and the assumption may actually not have been
inconsistent with Steel Co. See Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. ICC, 985 F.2d 589, 593-94 (D.C. Cir.
1993) (determining the merits over a portion of the case in which jurisdiction was established,
and then applying that determination to another portion of the case in which jurisdiction was
disputed-a practice arguably consistent with either Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707 (1975),
or Norton v. Mathews, 427 U.S. 524 (1976), both of which were reaffirmed in Steel Co.). By
contrast, Justice Breyer, while sitting as a judge on the First Circuit, not only participated in
several such cases-see, e.g., Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Natl Bank v. Howard Communications
Corp., 980 F.2d 823, 829 (1st Cir. 1992) (assuming appealability of a civil contempt order);
Robinson v. Dep't of Pub. Utils., 835 F.2d 19, 21 (1st Cir. 1987) (per curiam) ("assumfing]
arguendo"that the court had jurisdiction over a denial to intervene)-but even authored one of
the opinions, see Caribbean Transp. Sys. Inc. v. Autoridad De Las Navieras, 901 F.2d 196, 197
(1st Cir. 1990) (bypassing dispute over whether certain parties were properly specified in the
notice of appeal). Justice Souter, also a judge on the First Circuit prior to his elevation to the
Supreme Court, authored no opinions while sitting in that capacity and the one panel opinion in
which he fully participated, United States v. Waldeck, 909 F.2d 555 (1st Cir. 1990), did not
implicate in any way the issue of hypothetical jurisdiction.
226. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 118 S. Ct. 1003, 1026 (1998)
(Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
227. Id.
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sumption of jurisdiction was defensible, and why none of these "lookalike-but-inapposite cases" 22 provided support for the doctrine of hypothetical jurisdiction as formulated and practiced in the lower federal courts. This effort, in turn, generated essentially a laundry list of
doctrines, each somehow related to hypothetical jurisdiction, that appear nonetheless to remain intact after Steel Co.
These unrepudiated doctrines provide the focus of this Subpart
of the Article. Before exploring these doctrines, two qualifications
should be noted. First, this Article will confine itself to the principal
doctrines left intact by Steel Co., even though Steel Co. necessarily
preserved other related principles and doctrines, whether or not the
majority took note of them.2

29

It is quite clear, for example, that Steel

Co. does not prevent non-Article III tribunals from assuming
jurisdiction as a constitutional matter,O just as the Constitution itself
does not,m1 although such courts may be bound by prudential
228. Id. at 1016 n.3 ('"The more numerous the look-alike-but-inapposite cases Justice
Stevens cites, the more strikingly clear it becomes: his concurrence cannot identify a single
opinion of ours deciding the merits before a disputed question of Article III jurisdiction.").
229. For example, the Court's summary distinguishments of Secretary of Navy v. Avrech,
418 U.S. 676 (1974) (per curiam), Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398 U.S. 74 (1970), United
States v. Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348 (1969), and Neese v. Southern Railroad Co., 350 U.S. 77
(1955), will not be addressed below. The Court noted that both Avrech and Augenblick involved
issues that at the time were deemed jurisdictional but were later held not to be. See Steel Co.,
118 S. Ct. at 1014-15. Chandler,in its view, did not truly involve an assumption ofjurisdiction,
but rather ultimately resulted in a declination of jurisdiction. See id. at 1015. And in Neese,
"the issue pretermitted... was not Article III jurisdictional at all." Id. at 1015-16 n.3.
230. See, e.g., Kay v. Pick, 711 A.2d 1251, 1256 (D.C. 1998) (retaining for the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals-an Article I court-the doctrine that '[where... the answer to a
jurisdictional issue is 'a very complicated one' and where 'the merits of the underlying
claim ... can easily be resolved,' this Court has held that 'we do not need to consider the
jurisdictional issue,'" while explicitly acknowledging the Steel Co. ruling) (quoting Stevens v.
Quick, 678 A.2d 28, 31 (D.C. 1996)). Recent cases from the United States Court of Federal
Claims, also an Article I court, would appear to be to the contrary. See Ramcor Servs. Group,
Inc. v. United States, 41 Fed. Cl. 264, 266 (Fed. Cl. 1998) (concluding that the Supreme Court's
repudiation of hypothetical jurisdiction "requir[es] the court" to address jurisdictional issues at
the outset); see also Stelco Holding Co. v. United States, 42 Fed. Cl. 101, 103, 117-18 (Fed. Cl.
1998) (similar). The Court of Federal Claims considers itself bound by the Article HI case-orcontroversy requirements so as not to preclude appellate review by the Federal Circuit Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court, both Article I courts. See American Maritime Transp, Inc. v.
United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 283, 290-91 (Ct. Cl 1989) ('"The United States Claims Court, although
an entity of Article I... applies the Article HI standing requirements enforced by other federal
courts.... Under Article HI of the Constitution, neither [the Federal Circuit nor the Supreme
Court] would be able to enforce such actions in the absence of a justiciable case or
controversy."); Welsh v. United States, 2 Cl. Ct. 417, 420-21 (Ct. Cl. 1983) (noting that issuance
of an advisory ruling by the Claims Court, though authorized in specific instances, "would
remove the matter from the rubric of 'case or controversy' essential to justiciability under the
Constitution'" and neither the Federal Circuit nor the Supreme Court "would be able to confirm
the advice or reject it").
231. See, e.g., Neely v. Benefits Review Bd., 139 F.3d 276, 279 n.2 (1st Cir. 1998) (observing
that the case-or-controversy requirements "pertain to jurisdiction of federal courts and do not
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requirements to like effect. 232 Second, of no particular concern at this
juncture is the relative accuracy of the majority's, or of Justice
Stevens', or of the lower federal courts' interpretations of prior
Supreme Court cases where jurisdiction was apparently assumed.
That inquiry, though interesting and not unimportant, is greatly
complicated by the indeterminacy of many of those prior cases2 3 and,
from a practical standpoint, is largely mooted by the simple fact that
five Justices have now held that most of those cases do not, in fact,
support the doctrine of hypothetical jurisdiction as it had been
expounded by the lower federal courts. It will, however, be revisited
in Part V, where the deeper institutional significance of hypothetical
jurisdiction will be examined.
1. The Substantiality Doctrine
No sooner did Steel Co. repudiate hypothetical jurisdiction
it
than reaffirmed the equally curious "substantiality doctrine," which
provides that federal courts may dismiss for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction where the claim asserted, even though federal, is insubstantial and frivolous. 23 To fully understand the odd nature of this

necessarily apply to Executive Branch agencies"); Northwest Envtl. Defense Ctr. v. Bonneville
Power Admin., 117 F.3d 1520, 1527-28 (9th Cir. 1997) ("Article IIs standing requirement does
not apply to agency proceedings.. . ."); Zevalkink v. Brown, 102 F.3d 1236, 1243 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
("As a court established under Article I of the U.S. Constitution, the Court of Veterans Appeals
is not bound to the 'case or controversy' requirement of Article HI.") (citation omitted), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2478 (1997).
232. See, e.g., Zevalkink, 102 F.3d at 1243 ("[The Court of Veterans Appeals] has decided,
based on the same prudential considerations behind the 'case or controversy' requirement, i.e.,
courts should only decide real and substantial controversies, not hypothetical claims, that it
would refrain from deciding cases that do not present an actual case or controversy.") (citation
omitted); Climax Molybdenum Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 703 F.2d 447, 451 (10th Cir. 1983)
("[Ain agency possesses substantial discretion in determining whether the resolution of an issue
before it is precluded by mootness. However, in exercising this discretion, an agency receives
guidance from the policies that underlie the 'case or controversy' requirement of Article I.")
(citation omitted).
233. See, e.g., Tisza v. Communications Workers, 953 F.2d 298, 300 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting
interpretive disagreement over Supreme Court precedent); Dane, supra note 6, at 119 n.347
(concluding that the attempt of then-Judge Clarence Thomas to distinguish the Supreme
Court's own precedents as not invoking hypothetical jurisdiction, was not "completely
convincing"). To be sure, though the Steel Co. majority denied that the precedents dredged up
by Justice Stevens, and before him by lower federal courts justifying their exercise of
hypothetical jurisdiction, truly supported such a doctrine, it did concede that "some of
the[se]... cases must be acknowledged to have diluted the absolute purity of the rule that
Article I jurisdiction is always an antecedent question." Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better
Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 1016 (1998).
234. See Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1010 (stating that "the District Court has
jurisdiction... unless the claim '... is wholly insubstantial and frivolous'") (quoting Bell v.
Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682-83 (1946)).
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exception, and hence both the significance and the irony of its retention by the Court, a brief overview of two of the principal bases for
dismissal may prove helpful.
Normally, the assertion of a federal claim that is ultimately
without legal merit will give rise, upon a defendant's proper motion,
to a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.23 5 Correspondingly, the assertion of a claim that
turns out not to present a federal question at all-even though it may
have merit if asserted in, say, state court-will give rise, either by a
defendant's proper motion or by the court sua sponte, to a Rule
12(b)(1) dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.2 6 Much
more than nomenclature is at stake, however, in terms of whether
one's dispute is dismissed under 12(b)(1) or 12(b)(6).2 7 A Rule
12(b)(1) dismissal is entirely jurisdictional and in theory indicates
nothing about the merits of the suit; accordingly, with the exception of
the jurisdictional issue itself,238 the dismissal is without prejudice or
235. FED. R. C1V. P. 12(b)(6).
236. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(bXl), (bX3) ("Whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or
otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action.").
237. In addition to the difference of res judicata effect, whether one's dispute is challenged
or addressed under 12(bXl) or 12(bX6) will affect both the nonwaivability of the challenge, and
the allocation and nature of the burden of proof, see Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926
F.2d 1406, 1408-09 (3d Cir. 1991) (explaining the ways in which "[t]he legal standards governing
these two motions are different"); Crowley Cutlery Co. v. United States, 849 F.2d 273, 276-77
(7th Cir. 1988) ("The most important difference between dismissing a case on the merits and
dismissing it for lack of jurisdiction because it is frivolous is that the latter form of dismissal is
possible, indeed mandatory, even if the defendant fails to preserve the ground that
demonstrates the suit's lack of merit."). The type of dismissal may even affect "[p]rivate
agreements among the parties or between the parties and their attorneys or indemnitors." Clow
v. HUD, 948 F.2d 614, 627 n.4 (9th Cir. 1991) (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting).
238. See, e.g., Ricketts v. Midwest Nat'l Bank, 874 F.2d 1177, 1182 n.4 (7th Cir. 1989)
("Where... a plaintiff responds to a jurisdictional dismissal by filing a substantially similar
complaint in federal court, the district court's earlier dismissal is binding."). The jurisdictional
holding will have res judicata effect. See Winslow v. Walters, 815 F.2d 1114, 1116 (7th Cir.
1987) ('[A] ruling granting a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is not on
the merits; its res judicata effect is limited to the question ofjurisdiction."). This is true even if
the jurisdictional holding is erroneous. See Assuming JurisdictionArguendo, supra note 4, at
719-20 (discussing the contemporary doctrine that jurisdictional determinations, even if
jurisdiction is not found or is erroneously found, normally enjoy the force of res judicata). Such
effect may not be recognized, however, where the error involved federal preemption or an
improper waiver of sovereign immunity. See Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 114 (1963) (noting
that "the general rule of finality of jurisdictional determinations is not without exceptions" and
that "[d]octrines of federal pre-emption or sovereign immunity may in some contexts be
controlling"); United States v. Van Cauwenberghe, 934 F.2d 1048, 1059 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting
such exceptions). An "allegation of fraud in obtaining the judgment" may also prevent
preclusion. Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 172 (1938). Finally, preclusion may be foreclosed
where there was no opportunity to litigate jurisdiction. See Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343,
350 (1948) ("IT]he doctrine of res judicata applies to adjudications relating either to jurisdiction
of the person or of the subject matter where such adjudications have been made in proceedings
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res judicata effect as to any subsequent suit that the party may file in
federal or state court.23 9 This is so for the simple reason that "in the
absence of subject matter jurisdiction there can be no preclusive find4 A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal,
ings or conclusions on the merits."m
by
contrast, amounts to an adverse judgment on the merits and, as such,
is prejudicial insofar as it may enjoy the force of res judicata.241 This
fundamental distinction-that "a dismissal for failure to state a claim
is with prejudice whereas a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction is

without prejudice"24-is obviously of paramount importance to both
litigants and the legal system, and it is for this very reason that
courts have warned against conflating the two categories of dis-

missal.m
Notwithstanding such admonitions, courts have also conceded
that, "[w]hile distinguishing between a dismissal for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) and a dismissal for failure to
state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) appears straightforward in theory, it
is often much more difficult in practice."M In turn, they have devised
in which those questions were in issue and in which the parties were given full opportunity to
litigate.") (footnote omitted); see also Republic Supply Co. v. Shoaf, 815 F.2d 1046, 1052-53 (5th
Cir. 1987) (noting that "the parties need only have had the opportunity to raise the question of
jurisdiction").
239. See, e.g., In re Orthopedic "Bone Screw" Prods. Liab. Litig., 132 F.3d 152, 155-56 (3d
Cir. 1997) (citing cases); Ricketts, 874 F.2d at 1182 n.4 ("[T]he proper application of the doctrine
[of dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction] should effectively redirect plaintiffs with
state law claims to their rightful forum."); Daigle v. Opelousas Health Care, Inc., 774 F.2d 1344,
1348 (5th Cir. 1985) ("A dismissal for want of jurisdiction bars access to federal courts and is res
judicata only of the lack of a federal court's power to act. It is otherwise without prejudice to
the plaintiffs claims, and the rejected suitor may reassert his claim in any competent court.");
see also FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b) (specifically exempting "a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction" from
the general rule that an involuntary dismissal "operates as an adjudication upon the merits");
cf. Neal v. District of Columbia, 131 F.3d 172, 175 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (noting that "[d]ismissals
for lack of supplemental jurisdiction are without prejudice"), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 46 (1998).
240. Aerolineas Argentinas v. United States, 77 F.3d 1564, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1996); accord
Nowak v. Ironworkers Local 6 Pension Fund, 81 F.3d 1182, 1188 (2d Cir. 1996) ("[Blecause a
dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) is not on the merits, it can have no res judicata effect.");
Johnson v. Boyd-Richardson Co., 650 F.2d 147, 148 (8th Cir. 1981) ("[W]hen a dismissal is for
'lack of jurisdiction,' the effect is not an adjudication on the merits, and therefore the res judicata bar does not arise.").

241. See, e.g., Daigle, 774 F.2d at 1348 ("If... a plaintiffs complaint fails to state a
claim,... dismissal [of the complaint] operates as resjudicataof the claim alleged and of other
claims that might have been asserted.").
242. Republic of Pan. v. BCCI Holdings (Lux.) SA., 119 F.3d 935, 940 (11th Cir. 1997); see
also Exchange Natl Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1130-31 (2d Cir. 1976) (noting
"the important difference that judgments under Rule 12(b)(6) are on the merits, with res judicata effects, whereas judgments under Rule 12(b)(1) are not"), modified by Chemical Bank v.
Arthur Anderson & Co., 726 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 884 (1984).
243. Noting the distinction, Judge Friendly once remarked that "[t]his lesson has been
taught as often in decision as it has been ignored in argument and dicta." Fogel v. Chestnutt,
668 F.2d 100, 106 (2d Cir. 1981).
244. Nowak, 81 F.3d at 1187.
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a handful of supplementary doctrines to deal with cases located in
what one court has described as "the admittedly hazy boundary between Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6)."2 5 Among the more prominent is
the substantiality doctrine, which provides that subject-matter
jurisdiction itself will be lacking "when the question presented is too
But "[t]he claim must be 'so
insubstantial to consider."2 6
insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions of this Court
or otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal
controversy within the jurisdiction of the District Court.' "-7 In other
words, "even if a federal claim is asserted on the face of the
complaint,"248 if the claim is frivolous or insubstantial, then the suit
will actually be dismissed under 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction, not under 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.249 The obvious significance of the doctrine to
would-be plaintiffs is that, "[w]hereas dismissal based on failure to
state a claim requires a judgment on the merits and cannot be decided
before the court assumes jurisdiction, a substantiality doctrine
dismissal does not operate as a judgment on the merits and 'thus
allows a plaintiff the opportunity to seek relief in state court or to
assert a claim for which the federal courts have jurisdiction.' "25
Note, however, the tension between this doctrine and the jurisdictional mandate reiterated in Steel Co. While a dismissal under
245. Thomason v. Norman E. Lehrer, P.C., 182 F.R.D. 121, 128, (D.N.J. 1998).
246. Cook v. Peter Kiewit Sons Co., 775 F.2d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir. 1985). The other principal exception is where "the claim 'clearly appears to be immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction .... ' Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 118 S.
Ct. 1003, 1010 (1998) (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946)).
247. Cook, 775 F.2d at 1035 (quoting Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S.
661, 666 (1974)); see also Bell, 327 U.S. at 682-83 (noting that "a suit may sometimes be dismissed for want of jurisdiction... where such a claim is wholly insubstantial and frivolous");
Crowley Cutlery Co. v. United States, 849 F.2d 273, 276 (7th Cir. 1988) ('The Supreme Court
has frequently said that a suit which is frivolous does not invoke the jurisdiction of the federal
courts."). According to the Fifth Circuit, "[this 'standard is met only where the plaintiff's claim
'has no plausible foundation' or 'is clearly foreclosed by a prior Supreme Court decision.'"
Eubanks v. McCotter, 802 F.2d 790, 793 (5th Cir. 1986) (quoting Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d
404,416 (5th Cir. 1981)).
248. Nowak, 81 F.3d at 1189.
249. However, as the Seventh Circuit has observed, the standard for a dismissal for lack of
substantiality is "[bly its own terms.., a rigorous one." Ricketts v. Midwest Nat'1 Bank, 874
F.2d 1177, 1182 (7th Cir. 1989). "The Supreme Court has repeatedly employed exacting adjectives to define the degree of insubstantiality required before a case is to be dismissed on these
grounds-a claim must be 'wholly,' 'obviously,' or 'plainly' insubstantial or frivolous; it must be
'absolutely devoid of merit' or 'no longer open to discussion.' As these adjectives imply, insubstantiality dismissals should be applied only in extraordinary circumstances." Id. (quoting
Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-39 (1974) (footnote omitted)).
250. Cook, 775 F.2d at 1035 (quoting Franklin v. Oregon State Welfare Div., 662 F.2d 1337,
1343 (9th Cir. 1981)).
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the substantiality doctrine may not yield a judgment on the merits
per se, it most certainly entails a thorough assessment of the merits
and a ruling based on that assessment.21 Yet it does so ultimately in
the absence of jurisdiction, as must formalistically be the case given
the reliance on 12(b)(1). Superficially, at least, this is inconsistent
with the repudiation of hypothetical jurisdiction and with the fundamental principles warranting that repudiation.252 In fact, if anything,

a 12(b)(1) insubstantiality dismissal is even more troubling than the
assumption of jurisdiction: while there may or may not be jurisdiction
in the latter case, there is technically none in the former. Moreover,
though a federal court always has subject-matter jurisdiction to determine its own subject-matter jurisdiction,2 3 it does not automatically follow from this principle that a court is empowered to assess
the substantiality of a claim in order to reach its jurisdictional determination. Much to its discredit, the Steel Co. Court did little to recon251 See Thomason v. Norman E. Lehrer, P.C., 182 F.R.D. 121, 128 (D.N.J. 1998) (noting
that when courts dismiss under the substantiality doctrine of 12(bXl), rather than for failure to
state a claim under 12(b)(6), they risk "mak[ing] preliminary forays into the merits of a case
under the guise of ruling on a jurisdictional issue").
252. Not unlike hypothetical jurisdiction, the substantiality doctrine "has been questioned,"
Crowley Cutlery, 849 F.2d at 276, and has "evoked sharp criticism directed at its vitality as a
jurisdictional first principle." Ricketts, 874 F.2d at 1180; see also Yazoo County Indus. Dev.
Corp. v. Suthoff, 454 U.S. 1157, 1160-61 & n.* (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from the denial
of certiorari) (questioning the clarity, if not the validity, of the doctrine); Bell, 327 U.S. at 683
(noting that "It]he accuracy of calling these dismissals jurisdictional has been questioned");
Assuming JurisdictionArguendo, supra note 4, at 733-34 & n.126 (citing cases). It appears to
survive, however, for two somewhat unprincipled reasons. First, it enjoys the force of stare decisis to a seemingly irrational degree at every level of the federal judiciary. See, e.g., Crowley
Cutlery, 849 F.2d at 276 ("lit is an established principle of federal jurisdiction and 'remains the
federal rule.' It is the basis of a large number of lower-court decisions, and at this late date only
the Supreme Court can change it.") (quotingHagans,415 U.S. at 538). Second, it is perceived as
useful insofar as its invocation can forestall "the use of frivolous federal claims as pretexts for
bringing pendent claims into federal court." Assuming JurisdictionArguendo, supra note 4, at
734. Today, the assertion of such claims-now called supplemental claims-is governed statutorily by 28 U.S.C. § 1367. The supplemental jurisdiction statute effectively reinforces the utility of the substantiality doctrine by providing that a "district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim... if... the district court has dismissed all claims over
which it has original jurisdiction .... " 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1994 & Supp. 1996). The substantiality doctrine authorizes the summary jurisdictional dismissal of the federal claim, and section
1367 then authorizes the dismissal of any nonfederal claims.
253. See Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 403 n.3 (1970) (noting "the truism that a court
always has jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction"); Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 171-72
(1938) ("There must be admitted... a power to interpret the language of the jurisdictional instrument and its application to an issue before the court.... Every court in rendering a judgment tacitly, if not expressly, determines its jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter.") (footnote omitted); Shannon v. Shannon, 965 F.2d 542, 545 (7th Cir. 1992) ("A primordial
element of our jurisprudence is that federal courts have jurisdiction to determine whether they
have subject matter jurisdiction."); see also Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83,
118 S. Ct. 1003, 1024 (1998) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting that "a court
always has jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction") (citing United States v. Mine
Workers, 330 U.S. 258,290 (1947)).
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cile the apparent contradiction. Instead, it merely reaffirmed that
district courts may invoke 12(b)(1) to dismiss insubstantial federal
claims,2 54 even while admonishing that federal jurisdiction should
normally not turn on the merits of a claim 25 s and, in all events, that
the merits should not be determined without a definite jurisdictional

footing.256

2. The Bell Doctrine
A second doctrine preserved by Steel Co. is one commonly associated with Bell v. Hood, which held that whether or not a cause of action exists is not a jurisdictional issue as such 25 7 and that "the nonexistence of a cause of action [i]s no proper basis for a jurisdictional
dismissal."25 With regard to hypothetical jurisdiction, this doctrine is
particularly relevant "when the basis of jurisdiction is also an element
in the plaintiffs federal cause of action."2 9 In such cases:
[Tihe proper course of action for the district court (assuming that the plaintiffs
federal claim is not immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining
federal jurisdiction and is not insubstantial and frivolous) is to find that
jurisdiction exists and260deal with the objection as a direct attack on the merits
of the plaintiffs case.

254. The Court stated:
[A] District Court has jurisdiction if "the right of petitioners to recover under their
complaint will be sustained if the Constitution and laws of the United States are given
one construction and will be defeated if they are given another," unless the claim
"clearly appears to be immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining
jurisdiction or where such a claim is wholly insubstantial and frivolous."
Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1010 (quoting Bell, 327 U.S. at 682-83, 685).
255. The Steel Co. Court further asserted:
It is firmly established in our cases that the absence of a valid (as opposed to arguable)
cause of action does not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction, i.e., the courts' statutory
or constitutional power to adjudicate the case. As we stated in Bell v. Hood,
"[lurisdiction... is not defeated.., by the possibility that the averments might fail to
state a cause of action on which petitioners could actually recover."
Id. (citations omitted).
256. See generally id. at 1012-16 (repudiating hypothetical jurisdiction).
257. Bell, 327 U.S. at 682 (asserting that jurisdiction remains even if "averments might fail
to state a cause of action on which petitioners could actually recover. For it is well settled that
the failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits and not for a
dismissal for want of jurisdiction").
258. Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1013 (summarizing its holding in Bell).
259. Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404,415 (5th Cir. 1981).
260. Id.; accord Nowak v. Ironworkers Local 6 Pension Fund, 81 F.3d 1182, 1189 (2d Cir.
1996) ("[Wlhere the asserted basis for subject matter jurisdiction is also an element of the
plaintif's allegedly federal cause of action," the court only looks at whether "the
complaint... seeks recovery under federal law or the Constitution." If so, the court "assume[s]
or find[s] a sufficient basis for jurisdiction, and reserve[s] further scrutiny for an inquiry on the
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In turn, "the jurisdictional determination should await a
determination of the relevant facts on either a motion going to the
merits or at trial. "261
This judicial posture can be defended on several grounds. For
one thing, it is essentially warranted by the basic jurisdictional principles reaffirmed in Steel Co. As the Court noted in Bell, "[w]hether
the complaint states a cause of action on which relief could be granted
is a question of law and just as questions of fact it must be decided
after and not before the court has assumed jurisdiction over the controversy."262 For another thing, "no purpose is served by indirectly ar-

guing the merits in the context of federal jurisdiction. Judicial economy is best promoted when the existence of a federal right is directly
reached and, where no claim is found to exist, the case is dismissed on
the merits."263 In addition, the "refusal to treat indirect attacks on the
merits as Rule 12(b)(1) motions provides... [more] protection to the
plaintiff who in truth is facing a challenge to the validity of his claim:
the defendant is forced to proceed under Rule[s] ... which place

merits."). As the Williamson decision indicates, the substantiality doctrine may actually be
conceptualized as an exception to the Bell rule that jurisdictional dismissals normally should
not be merits-based. Williamson, 645 F.2d at 416 (noting that generally, "a claim cannot be
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because of the absence of a federal cause of
action. The exceptions to this rule are narrowly drawn, and are intended to allow jurisdictional
dismissals only in those cases where the federal claim is clearly immaterial or insubstantial.");
accord Turner/Ozanne v. Hyman/Power, 111 F.3d 1312, 1316-17 (7th Cir. 1997) (describing the
substantiality doctrine as a "common-sense exception to this cardinal rule").
261. Augustine v. United States, 704 F.2d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1983); cf Crawford v. United
States, 796 F.2d 924, 929 (7th Cir. 1986) (citing Augustine, 704 F.2d at 1077-78, and explaining
that "[m]aybe in some cases the jurisdictional issue will be so bound up with the merits that a
full trial on the merits may be necessary to resolve the issue"). Post-Steel Co. cases involving
intertwined jurisdictional and merits issues include Johnson v. State Technology Center, 24 F.
Supp. 2d 833, 844 (W.D. Tenn. 1998) (deeming Eleventh Amendment immunity to be
jurisdictional, and therefore in need of determination at the outset, but recognizing that the
merits question-namely, whether Congress validly abrogated Eleventh Amendment
immunity-will be resolved by that determination), and Mixer v. M.K-FergusonCo., 17 F. Supp.
2d 569, 575 (S.D. W. Va. 1998) (determining, as part of the threshold jurisdictional analysis in a
removal case, whether plaintiff's state law claim was preempted by federal law-a merits issue
in its own right-insofar as federal subject-matter jurisdiction turned on preemption). For
examples of pre-Steel Co. cases of this ilk, see In re Grand Jury, 821 F.2d 946, 951 n.3 (3d Cir.
1987) (bypassing issue of whether intervenors had standing to assert a legislative privilege
claim because "[wlhether the intervenors have standing... depends on the scope of the
privilege, and we cannot determine the scope of a hypothetical privilege if it does not exist");
Locals 2222, 2320-2327 v. New England Telephone & Telegraph Co., 628 F.2d 644, 646-47 (1st
Cir. 1980) (bypassing issue of appealability of a remand order in the arbitration context because
"[tihe matter of appealability is... intertwined with one of the central substantive issues,
namely, the proper characterization of the present section 301 action [and] the resolution of the
appealability issue does not affect the outcome of the case").
262. Bell, 327 U.S. at 682.
263. Williamson, 645 F.2d at 415.
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greater restrictions on the"district court's discretion." 26 Lastly, as the
Fifth Circuit has observed, "[ilf federal jurisdiction turned on the
success of a plaintiffs federal cause of action, no such case could ever
be dismissed on the merits" 26 5-in other words, all dismissals would
necessarily be jurisdictional.
Regarding the relationship between the Bell doctrine and the
doctrine of hypothetical jurisdiction, two points are of note. First and
foremost, "[t]he question of whether a cause of action exists is not a
question of jurisdiction, and therefore may be assumed without being
decided." 266 Accordingly, the repudiation of hypothetical jurisdiction
theoretically leaves the Bell doctrine unaffected and intact, a matter
which the Court itself implicitly acknowledged by its restatement and
implementation of the doctrine in Steel Co.267 Second, the Court's disjunction of the doctrines was warranted precisely because of a tendency by some to invoke the case in support of hypothetical jurisdiction. In Steel Co., it was Justice Stevens' interpretation of Bell that
prompted the Court to address the issue, 268 although, as it turns out,
some lower courts had in fact treated Bell as a hypothetical jurisdic26 9
tion case.
3. The NationalRailroadPassengerCorp. Doctrine
Steel Co. also preserved the authority of a court to bypass a
nonconstitutional jurisdictional question and reach a merits question,
as long as the court's constitutional subject-matter jurisdiction is first
Relying on National Railroad Passenger Corp. v.
established.

264. Id. The court further noted:
The court must take the plaintiff's allegations as true when a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is
raised, and in addition must determine that no genuine issue of material fact exists
when a Rule 56 motion is granted.... [Hiowever, a Rule 12(b)(1) motion can be based on
the court's resolution of disputed facts as well as on the plaintiffs allegations and
undisputed facts in the record.
Id. at 415-16; see also Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1408-09 (3d Cir.
1991) (noting the different standards governing 12(bXl) and 12(b)(6) analyses).
265. Eubanks v. McCotter, 802 F.2d 790, 795 (5th Cir. 1986).
266. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471,476 n.5 (1979).
267. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 118 S. Ct. 1003, 1010, 1013
(1998).
268. Compare id. at 1010 (explaining why Bell is not a hypothetical jurisdiction case), with
id. at 1024 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (contending that "Bell demonstrates that
the Court has the power to decide whether a cause of action exists even when it is unclear
whether the plaintiff has standing").
269. See, e.g., Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Muszynski, 899 F.2d 151, 157-58 (2d Cir.
1990) (basically lumping the Bell doctrine in with other cases allegedly supporting the assumption ofjurisdiction).
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National Association of Railroad Passengers,270 and refuting Justice
Stevens' contrary interpretation, the Court explained that this case
"determined whether a statutory cause of action existed before determining whether.., the plaintiff came within the 'zone of interests' for
which the cause of action was available. The latter question is an issue of statutory standing [not one of] whether there is case or controversy under Article III."271 Thus, as the Seventh Circuit has concluded in light of Steel Co., "th[is] latter type of jurisdictional issue
('prudential standing' as it is sometimes called) may be bypassed in
favor of deciding the merits when the outcome is unaffected and the
272
merits issue is easier than the jurisdictional issue."

The Court's reaffirmation of National Railroad Passenger
Corp. is noteworthy in a number of respects. First, there was some
uncertainty prior to Steel Co. as to whether National Railroad
Passenger Corp. authorized the assumption of any jurisdictional requirement, or simply those of a statutory or nonconstitutional nature. 73 Steel Co. now makes clear that the case relates only to the lat270. National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453
(1974).
271. Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1013 (citation omitted).
272. McNamara v. City of Chicago, 138 F.3d 1219, 1222 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.
Ct. 444 (1998); see also George E. Warren Corp. v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 164
F.3d 676, 676 (D.C. Cir. 1999) ("Although Article III precludes us from deciding a matter on the
merits before determining that the party presenting it has constitutional standing to do so,
there is no such barrier to deciding a matter on the merits before determining that the party
presenting it has prudential standing." (citing Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1013 & n.2)), amending
159 F.3d 616 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Kauthar SDN BHD v. Sternberg, 149 F.3d 659, 669 n.13 (7th Cir.
1998) ("Because this standing question is prudential in nature, we may 'elide the jurisdictional
issue' in order to reach the merits of the district courtes grounds for dismissing the securities
claims." (quoting McNamara, 138 F.3d at 1222) (citing Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1013 n.2)), cert.
denied, 119 S. Ct. 890 (1999); id. at 671 ('Taking note of the issue, we too decide that this
question more appropriately awaits another day when we are required to determine the
appropriate approach for the extraterritorial application of RICO. Because this is a statutory
standing question, we need not resolve it definitively before addressing merits questions."
(citing Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1013 & n.2)). In McNamara, the Seventh Circuit noted that "the
jurisdictional issue is not whether the plaintiffs have been harmed (Article III) but whether they
should be allowed to sue for that harm (zone of interests)." McNamara, 138 F.3d at 1222.
273. Cf Gillis v. United States Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 759 F.2d 565, 570 n.5
(6th Cir. 1985) (noting that the "language ... in PassengerCorp. appears to support the idea,
argued by one of the parties, that constitutional standing can be bypassed in favor of determining whether a statute authorizes a private cause of action," but ultimately rejecting that reading). The Court in National RailroadPassenger Corp. repeatedly employed the unmodified
terms of standing and jurisdiction, without expressly limiting them to their statutory or prudential dimensions. National R.R. PassengerCorp., 414 U.S. at 455-56. In Steel Co., the Court
observed that "there was no question of injury in fact or effectiveness of the requested remedy,"
Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1013, which is more or less consistent with a prior disposition by the
circuit court. See Potomac Passengers Ass'n v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 475 F.2d 325, 33031 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (finding factual injury). Instead, the Court said, National Railroad
Passenger Corp. involved "an issue of statutory standing. It has nothing to do with whether
there is case or controversy under Article III." Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1013.
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ter. Second, there was also some uncertainty, despite National
Railroad Passenger Corp., regarding the bypassability of prudential
jurisdictional requirements, such as prudential standing.27 4 Steel Co.
now also makes clear that such requirements can be bypassed, other
possible conditions notwithstanding, as long as constitutional jurisdiction is confirmed. 275 Third, and conversely, Steel Co.'s reading of
National RailroadPassenger Corp. appears to indicate that such assumptions of jurisdiction are only prohibited, or more specifically are
only unconstitutional, when they implicate the core constitutional requirements of Article III.276 This distinction is important, for it simultaneously narrows the scope of the repudiation, leaving a world of jurisdictional issues subject to assumption, yet also renders the repudiation itself relatively non-negotiable, putting aside the various indeterminacies of the majority opinion.
4. The Norton Doctrine
Of all the Supreme Court cases cited by the lower federal
courts to justify the doctrine of hypothetical jurisdiction, Norton v.

274. See, e.g., Busse Broad. Corp. v. FCC, 87 F.3d 1456, 1462 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("Whether
th[e] test [for assuming jurisdiction] applies to prudential standing issues is not entirely
clear... .") (citing Cross-Sound Ferry Servs., Inc. v. ICC, 934 F.2d 327, 333 (D.C. Cir. 1991);
National Maritime Union v. Commander, Military Sealift Command, 824 F.2d 1228, 1238 (D.C.
Cir. 1987)).
275. As it turns out, several courts-including the Supreme Court-had done so prior to
Steel Co. See, e.g., FWIPBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 237 (1990) (assuming third
party standing, a prudential doctrine, and adversely deciding the merits of a constitutional
challenge); Clopper v. Merrill Lynch Relocation Management, Inc. (In re Merrill Lynch
Relocation Management, Inc.), 812 F.2d 1116, 1121-22 (9th Cir. 1987) (assuming third party
standing where the issue appeared "questionable" and "had not been briefed" and where the
court "ha[d) no difficulty disposing of appellants' arguments on the merits"); Shiffler v.
Schlesinger, 548 F.2d 96, 102-03 (3d Cir. 1977) (bypassing inquiry into prudential standing
because the claim was barred under the doctrine of laches); see also Whitaker v. Frito-Lay, Inc.
(In re Olympia Holding Corp.), 88 F.3d 952, 959 n.13 (11th Cir. 1996) (noting that, under
National RailroadPassenger Corp., the issue of statutory standing "need not be addressed"
where "a cause of action does not exist in favor of the plaintiff').
276. The principal contrary passage in Steel Co. is the following, which appears in the concluding paragraph of Part HI of the opinion: "The statutory and (especially) constitutional elements of jurisdiction are an essential ingredient of separation and equilibration of powers, restraining the courts from acting at certain times, and even restraining them from acting permanently regarding certain subjects." Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1016. The Court is obviously hedging
here, not wanting to invite assumptions of nonconstitutional jurisdiction but obviously realizing
that its preceding analysis, especially of the National RailroadPassengerCorp. case, does not
permit it to foreclose such assumptions. Despite this passage, therefore, the repudiation should
only be limited to the assumption of constitutional jurisdictional requirements, and more specifically of Article M jurisdictional requirements, and possibly of only Article MI case-orcontroversy requirements.
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It is hardly surprising,

therefore, that the case is cited or discussed not only by the Steel Co.
majority,278 but also by Justices O'Connor, Breyer, and Stevens in
each of their separate opinions. 279 And it is hardly surprising that the
majority made certain to explain why the case did not, in fact, support
the hypothetical jurisdiction doctrine.
Norton had reached the Court with a companion case, Mathews
v. Lucas,280 and the Court's threshold resolution of Lucas necessarily
resolved the merits of Norton. But Norton also posed a separate jurisdictional question. Norton had been decided below by a three-judge
district court, rather than a standard one-judge court, and there was
some dispute as to whether the district court was properly convened
and, thus, whether the Supreme Court properly had appellate jurisdiction.281 The Court bypassed this dispute, however, and, pursuant

to Lucas, entered judgment on the merits. According to Steel Co., the
Norton Court's decision to do so could be interpreted and thereby justified in two ways, and neither way was "meant to overrule, sub silentio, two centuries of jurisprudence affirming the necessity of determining jurisdiction before proceeding to the merits."282 The first
reading is that the Norton Court "declined to decide that jurisdictional
question.., with the consequence that the jurisdictional question
could have no effect on the outcome ....Thus, Norton did not use the
pretermission of the jurisdictional question as a device for reaching a
question of law that otherwise would have gone unaddressed. " 2 83 The
277. Norton v. Mathews, 427 U.S. 524 (1976).
278. Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1014.
279. See id. at 1020 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 1021 (Breyer, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment); id. at 1026 n.15 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
280. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976).
28L The Court noted that:
The question whether the three-judge court was properly convened upon appellants

demand for injunctive relief is relevant, of course, to our appellate jurisdiction. If the
court was not empowered to enjoin the operation of a federal statute, then three judges
were not required to hear the case under 28 U.S.C. § 2282, and this Court has no
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1253.
Norton, 427 U.S. at 528-29.
282. Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1014.
283. Id. (citation omitted). The Court quoted from Norton: "If the three-judge court had
been properly convened, we would have affirmed, and if not we would have vacated and remanded for a fresh decree from which an appeal could be taken to the Court of Appeals, the
outcome of which was foreordained by Lucas." Id (quoting Norton, 427 U.S. at 531). Another
case reaffirmed by Steel Co., arguably a variation on Norton, was Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S.
707 (1975). That case involved materially identical claims against a state and a federal official,
but the joinder of the federal defendant under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) was jurisdictionally
questionable. Resolving the merits of the claim as it pertained to the state defendant, see
Philbrook,421 U.S. at 713-19, the Court ultimately dismissed the federal defendant's appeal for
failure to brief the jurisdictional question adequately, but nevertheless directed the injunction
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second reading is that the Norton Court "seems to have regarded the
merits judgment... as equivalent to a jurisdictional dismissal for
failure to present a substantial federal question. The Court said:
'This disposition [Lucas] renders the merits in the present case a decided issue and thus one no longer substantial in the jurisdictional
sense.' "284 Lest a third means of distinguishing Norton were necessary, the Court also invoked the reliable adjectival method, labeling it
a "peculiar case" that exhibited an "extraordinary procedural posture[ ]."28
Importantly, these first two readings of Norton differ in their
potential consequences, and each in its own way undermines the
Court's larger effort to repudiate hypothetical jurisdiction. The first
reading, for example, essentially authorizes hypothetical jurisdiction
in comparable circumstances, such as where, in a companion case or
elsewhere in the same case, the merits are already decided and where
the issue reached is not one "that otherwise would have gone
unaddressed."m It is perhaps this very realization that would explain
the Court's adjective-heavy effort to emphasize the decision's uniqueat the state and federal defendants alike, on the grounds that the merits would have been
decided in any event and that the federal defendant did not allege that the issuance was
wrongful. See id. at 721-22; see also McNamara v. City of Chicago, 138 F.3d 1219, 1222 (7th Cir.
1998) (holding in light of Steel Co., though not citing to the analysis of either Norton or
Philbrook, that it was proper to "elide the jurisdictional issue" of whether certain plaintiffs had
standing where three other plaintiffs did have standing and "the merits issue cannot be
avoided") (citing Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1013), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 444 (1998).
284. Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1014 (quoting Norton, 427 U.S. at 530-31) (alteration in
original).
285. Id. Another potentially notable aspect of Norton, at least in comparison to cases on
the Court's discretionary docket, is that it presented an appeal within the Court's mandatory
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1253 and (the now-repealed) 28 U.S.C. § 2282. As such, the
Court theoretically could not simply deny review at the outset in the face of jurisdictional ambiguity-as it could (perhaps inappropriately) in the certiorari context-nor, once it took up the
case, could it later simply dismiss the appeal without resolving the ambiguity-as it could
(again, perhaps inappropriately) in the certiorari context. See STERN ET AL., supra note 161, §
4.27(b), at 214-15 (noting that consideration of factors other than the merits "would have been
inconsistent with the statutes providing for appeals and the accepted difference between appeal
and certiorari" although noting that the Court's rules appeared to allow consideration of, and
thus the Court may have considered, such factors).
286. The clearest post-Norton example is one also involving the issue of whether the district court should have been comprised of one or three judges, although here it was the district
court that bypassed the issue. See Hodges v. Weinberger, 429 F. Supp. 756, 759 (D. Md. 1977).
Another post-Norton, pre-Steel Co. case involving an analogous assumption of jurisdiction is
Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. ICC, 985 F.2d 589 (D.C. Cir. 1993), in which the court
bypassed an "exceptionally difficult" jurisdictional question in one segment of the case, where
"the [merits] decision on the segment where our jurisdiction is clear fully determines the
outcome on the segment as to which it is disputed." Id. at 593. The court noted that "resolving
the merits issues is exceptionally easy (at least in the sense that it requires no extra
expenditure ofjudicial resources) because we necessarily must resolve them in the portion of the
case over which we plainly have jurisdiction." Id. at 594.
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ness. The second reading, and the Court's rhetorical effort to marginalize it as well, are even more interesting than the first. The Steel
Co. majority, as indicated above, stated that the Norton Court "seems
to have regarded the merits judgment that it entered on the basis of
Lucas as equivalent to a jurisdictional dismissal for failure to present
a substantial federal question."287 But that characterization is too
equivocal, for it is quite clear that the Norton Court did so regard its
merits judgment. This is evident not only from the Norton passage
quoted in Steel Co.-that "[tlhis disposition... renders the merits in
the present case a decided issue and thus one no longer substantial in
the jurisdictional sense"28-but also from the concluding paragraph of
Norton, which stated that "we perceive no reason why we may not so
proceed in this case where the merits have been rendered plainly
insubstantial. 289 What is striking about the Norton Court's reasoning, and what might explain the Steel Co. Court's uncertain rendition
of it, is that it effectively legitimizes the power of an appellate court to
issue a prejudicial judgment (an affirmance on the merits, as in
Norton) on the ground that the claim, being insubstantial, should or
could be subject to jurisdictional dismissal, even though such a dismissal would normally be prejudicial only on the issue of federal court
jurisdiction. Read this way, in other words, Norton legitimates the
doctrine of hypothetical jurisdiction in a more general sense, albeit
under the guise of insubstantiality, and this is obviously significant in
terms of sidestepping the doctrine's apparent repudiation.
5. The Alternative Jurisdictional Grounds Doctrine
Steel Co. also preserved the power of a court to bypass one jurisdictional question in favor of another, especially if the question bypassed is constitutional in nature and the one reached is not.29° In

287. Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1014.

288. Id.
289. Norton, 427 U.S. at 532.
290. See, e.g., Ohio Forestry Ass'n, Inc. v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 118 S. Ct. 1665, 1670
(1998) (dismissing a suit for lack of ripeness, at least partly prudential, without addressing
standing) (citing Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1015 n.3); ONRC Action v. Bureau of Land
Management, 150 F.3d 1132, 1140 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Steel Co. for the proposition that "a

decision of statutory standing may take priority over an issue of Article III standing") (citing
Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1013 n.2). But see Conte Bros. Automotive, Inc. v. Quaker State-Slick 50,
Inc., 165 F.3d 221, 225 (3d Cir. 1998) (interpreting Steel Co. as stating that the "question of Art.
HI standing is [a] threshold issue that should be addressed before issues of prudential and
statutory standing" despite no such statement in the Court's opinion); Mixer v. M.I.-Ferguson
Co., 17 F. Supp. 2d 569, 575-76 (S.D. W. Va. 1998) (holding that, when faced with two
jurisdictional issues-whether a federal question has been presented (an Article III issue), and
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particular, the Court distinguished hypothetical jurisdiction from the
situations in both Moor v. County of Alameda,291 where the Court decided "a discretionary jurisdictional question before a nondiscretionary jurisdictional question," 292 and Ellis v. Dyson,293 where the Court
294
invoked Younger abstention, which it has "treated as jurisdictional,"
without first deciding whether a case or controversy existed.295 To be
sure, this doctrine had been previously distinguished from hypothetical jurisdiction by the lower federal courts, 296 and, when invoked,
clearly did not pose the sort of conceptual or doctrinal difficulties that
accompanied the latter.297
This doctrine, in fact, is quite defensible in terms of both logic
and principle. As elsewhere noted, a court always has jurisdiction to
determine its own jurisdiction, 298 and all jurisdictional questions,
therefore, may presumptively be reached in the first instance. In
turn, to the extent that an earlier-reached jurisdictional question
yields a finding of no jurisdiction, there would simply be no need to
299
identify, let alone determine, any remaining jurisdictional issues.
whether the plaintiff was obligated to exhaust arbitral remedies (a statutory issue)-the court
must, under Steel Co., first address the existence of a federal question).
291. Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973).
292. Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1015 n.3 (citing Moor, 411 U.S. at 715-16).
293. Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426 (1975).
294. Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1015 n.3 (citing Ellis, 421 U.S. at 436).
295. See Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1015 n.3 (citing Ellis, 421 U.S. at 436); see also Steel Co.,
118 S. Ct. at 1013-14 n.2 (noting that "a statutory standing question can be given priority over
an [Airticle III question" and referring to cases cited by Justice Stevens, id. at 1022-23 (Stevens,
J., concurring in the judgment)).
296. See, e.g., Louisiana Envtl. Action Network v. Browner, 87 F.3d 1379, 1384-85 (D.C.
Cir. 1996) ("Although we would be reluctant to pretermit a jurisdictional question in order to
reach a merits question, we have no difficulty dismissing a case based on one jurisdictional bar
rather than another.") (citing Cross-Sound Ferry Servs., Inc. v. ICC, 934 F.2d 327, 343-46 (D.C.
Cir. 1991) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the denial of the petition for review)).
297. See, e.g., Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1022-24 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment)
(noting that "we have routinely held that when presented with two jurisdictional questions,
the Court may choose which one to answer first"); Louisiana Envtl. Action Network, 87 F.3d at
1384-85 (expounding the doctrine and citing cases); Can v. United States, 14 F.3d 160, 162 & n.1
(2d Cir. 1994) (bypassing jurisdictional questions of federal sovereign immunity and
nonexhaustion of administrative remedies, and holding that the claim was nonjusticiable under
the political question doctrine).
298. See supra note 253 and accompanying text.
299. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Glickman, 156 F.3d 606, 619-20 (5th Cir. 1998) ("[W]e read
[Steel Co.] as making Article III jurisdiction... the threshold issue that a court must address.
When two or more Article I jurisdictional grounds are presented to the court ... the court
need [not] address all of those arguments or address the arguments in any particular order.");
Louisiana Envtl. Action Network, 87 F.3d at 1385 ("Because issues of standing, ripeness, and
other such 'elements' of justiciability are each predicate to any review on the merits, a court
need not identify all such elements that a complainant may have failed to show in a particular
case."). Conversely, where the earlier-reached jurisdictional inquiry yields a finding ofjurisdic-
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This doctrine is not obviously inconsistent with Steel Co., which holds
only that a court cannot reach the merits of the suit prior to verifying
jurisdiction and does not necessarily speak to the niceties of verification itself. Moreover, to the extent that the doctrine encourages the
determination of nonconstitutional questions before constitutional
questions, it obviously furthers the values of restraint, and in some
cases may preserve the separation of powers or federalism. 3°w
IV. THE POTENTIAL PERSISTENCE OF HYPOTHETICAL JURISDICTION
Although the general doctrine of hypothetical jurisdiction has
officially been repudiated, there is reason to believe that it will persist
under alternative guises and manifestations well after its interment
in pages of the United States Reports. It is precisely this possibility
that is the subject of this Part of the Article. Subpart A, building on
Parts II and III, will explain why the doctrine was so attractive to
judges and, more importantly, why it will remain so despite Steel Co.
Subpart B will then discuss five techniques by which judges might attempt to sidestep the prohibition on the doctrine's use, some of which
are likely to work and some of which are not. In so doing, this Article
is by no means contending that federal judges are overwhelmingly
committed to the crafty avoidance of the Steel Co. decision, and that
tion, the court would simply proceed through the remaining jurisdictional questions one by one.
See, e.g., Peoples Gas, Light & Coke Co. v. United States Postal Serv., 658 F.2d 1182, 1188-94 &
n.3 (7th Cir. 1981) (addressing first the statutory jurisdictional question concerning reviewability of an agency determination and then, only after finding such jurisdiction, addressing constitutional standing).
300. See, e.g., Louisiana Envtl. Action Network, 87 F.3d at 1385 ("[A]s precedent and prudence counsel us to avoid unnecessary dicta, especially that on potentially difficult constitutional questions, we see substantial reason not to review each element of justiciability in a dispute that we ultimately conclude does not lie within our jurisdiction.") (citations omitted). As
between two jurisdictional requirements of Article m, there may be no principled method of
analytical triage. Cf. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 215 n.5
(1974) (remarking, though not remedying, "[t~he lack of a fixed rule as to the proper sequence of
judicial analysis of contentions involving more than one facet of the concept of justiciability").
In O'Hair v. White, 675 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1982), the court confronted both a constitutional
standing challenge and an allegation that the claim was nonjusticiable under the political question doctrine insofar as it posed a challenge under the Republican Guarantee Clause, U.S.
CONST. art. IV, § 4. Acknowledging that "as a general matter courts should decide standing
issues first," the court nevertheless bypassed this issue because, as was the case there, "if an
issue is clearly nonjusticiable for reasons other than lack of standing a court may make its decision without reaching the standing question." Id. at 684 n.5. For other perspectives, see No
GWEN Alliance of Lane County, Inc. v. Aldridge, 855 F.2d 1380, 1382 (9th Cir. 1988) ("When
both standing and political question issues are before the court, the court should determine the
question of standing first."); Clark v. Valeo, 559 F.2d 642, 647 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (concluding that
the court "need not address those [questions] pertaining to standing or political question,
because the unripeness of the action is so pervasive"), affd, 431 U.S. 950 (1977).
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their decisions will ultimately reveal a pattern of duplicity and deviance as they attempt to sidestep the decision's holding. The evidence
to date, in fact, suggests at least moderate compliance,1 and the repudiation has even helped some judges to see certain jurisdictional
questions with greater clarity.3 2 That said, the potential for such
avoidance, whether conscious or not, remains quite real, and this
Article is intended merely to highlight both this potential and the
means by which it might be actuated.
A. The Attractiveness of Hypothetical Jurisdiction
Any analysis of the apparent demise of hypothetical jurisdiction must confront the reality that its application by every single circuit court of appeals was neither coincidental nor accidental. Rather,
the doctrine was (and remains) an extremely useful device-so useful,
apparently, that judges were willing to overlook the fundamental
problem of judicial power inherent in its application. This Part will
explore the doctrine's utility in greater depth, mostly as a prelude to
an analysis of whether, or perhaps simply why, the doctrine may persist in some form or another despite its repudiation by the Supreme
Court.
1. Diminished Likelihood of Appeal or Reversal
Although one might have thought that a discussion of the doctrine's utility would begin with judicial economy or restraint-the two
rationales typically articulated by its defenders-this one will begin

301. See, e.g., Seaborn v. Florida Dep't of Corrections, 143 F.3d 1405, 1407 & n.2 (11th Cir.
1998) (concluding in light of Steel Co. that because "[a]n assertion of Eleventh Amendment immunity essentially challenges a courtessubject matter jurisdiction" it "must be resolved before a
court may address the merits of the underlying claim[s]"), petition for cert. filed, 67 U.S.L.W.
3409 (U.S. Sept. 14, 1998) (No. 98-998); Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 139
F.3d 951, 952 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (deliberately forgoing the assumption of jurisdiction in light of
Steel Co., and remanding to the district court for a determination of standing); see also Hayden
v. New York Stock Exch., Inc., 4 F. Supp. 2d 335, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (restating the Bell

doctrine as articulated in Steel Co. and noting that '[clareful adherence to this rule is essential
to preserve the prohibition against advisory opinions as a meaningful limitation upon the power
of the federal judiciary").
302. InHardemon v. City of Boston, 144 F.3d 24, 25-26 (1st Cir. 1998) (citing Rojas v. Fitch,
127 F.3d 184, 187 (1st Cir. 1997)), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 2341 (1998), the court noted that it
was "i]nitially... tempted to bypass the jurisdictional issue because the [defendant] easily prevails on the merits"-and presumably because the jurisdictional issue was difficult. Then,
however, in a moment of apparent revelation brought about by Steel Co.'s elimination of this
bypass option, the court was able to conclude that, in fact, "[t]here is no doubt" that jurisdiction
existed. Hardemon, 144 F.3d at 26.
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on a slightly more strategic note. Put bluntly, it is quite probable that
the doctrine in many instances effectively reduced the likelihood
either that the losing party would appeal or, if he or she did, that the
appellate court would reverse. This, of course, would render it
particularly significant to lower court judges, who by nature try to
303
avoid reversal wherever and however possible.
This diminished likelihood stems from several factors. First of
all, to the extent that the lower court is correct on the merits-and
hypothetical jurisdiction, in its classic formulation, necessitates an
easy merits-based ruling-it *is doubtful that the losing party would
seek appellate review. As the Supreme Court has noted, in a case
often invoked in support of hypothetical jurisdiction, "even the most
diligent and zealous advocate could find his ardor somewhat dampened in arguing a jurisdictional issue where the decision on the merits
is... foreordained."3 04 Indeed, even if the improper ruling on the
merits is vacated for want of jurisdiction, the plaintiff-appellant
would still find herself out of federal court, albeit without prejudice.
If she had an interest in refiling in state court, this would obviously
be beneficial insofar as it eliminated the bar of res judicata-although, realistically speaking, the state court judge would presumably not blind himself to the federal court's determination that her
suit was meritless.305 And if she had no interest in refiling in state
court, then an appeal would serve no immediate interest of hers.
There would, of course, be an interest in not having an adverse judgment on record, but one suspects that the run-of-the-mill plaintiff,
weighing the costs and benefits of an appeal, would not distinguish

303. "Most participants in and observers of trial courts perceive reversal to be a major concern of trial judges." Richard S. Higgins & Paul H. Rubin, JudicialDiscretion,9 J. LEGAL STUD.
129, 130 (1980)); Kate Stith, The Risk ofLegal Errorin Criminal Cases: Some Consequences of
the Asymmetry in the Right To Appeal, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 37 n.92 (1990) (citing RICHARD A.
PosNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 506 (3d ed. 1986)); see also Steven Shavell, The Appeals
Processas a Means of ErrorCorrection, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 379, 391 (1995) (noting that "O[judges
may fear reversal because it may result in harm to their reputation... or the likelihood of their
promotion").
304. Secretary of the Navy v. Avrech, 418 U.S. 676, 678 (1974).

305. State courts, in certain circumstances and in some jurisdictions, may take judicial notice of federal court rulings. See, e.g., Roberts v. Hollandsworth, 616 P.2d 1058, 1060 (Idaho
1980) (holding that "Idaho state courts may take judicial notice of the judgments and decisions

of the federal courts which affect the subject matter of an action before the state court"); Pfaffv.
Chrysler Corp., 610 N.E.2d 51, 67 (Ill. 1992) (taking judicial notice of a federal district court
remand order); Collins v. Industrial Bearing & Transmission Co., 575 S.W.2d 875, 879 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1978) (taking judicial notice of a federal circuit court decision). Likewise, federal courts
may often take judicial notice of state court proceedings. See, e.g., St. Louis Baptist Temple,
Inc. v. FDIC, 605 F.2d 1169, 1172 (10th Cir. 1979) ("[Federal courts, in appropriate circumstances, may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal
judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.").
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between a merits-based and a jurisdictional dismissal, both of which,
superficially at least, are adverse rulings. There would also be an interest in confining the federal courts within their constitutional and
statutory limits, the very principle vindicated in Steel Co., but few
litigants are so devoted to purifying our constitutional structure that
they would be willing to bankroll an otherwise meritless appeal
merely to achieve such purification. Needless to say, if the offending
tribunal is a circuit court, then the prospect of higher review is
particularly low, 30 given both the nature of certiorari as a discre-

tionary writ 3 7 and the enormity of the Supreme Court's docket.308
That reality alone might be enough to ward off some would-be petitioners.
Even if an appeal were taken, the reviewing court would be
unlikely to reverse, which of course is yet another factor diminishing
the value of an appeal. Several factors combine to reduce the
306. See Martha J. Dragich, Will the Federal Courts ofAppeals PerishIf They Publish? Or
Does the Declining Use of Opinions To Explain and Justify Judicial Decisions Pose a Greater
Threat?, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 757, 766 (1995) ("[The courts of appeals have become the effective
courts of last resort in the federal system. In more than 99 [percent] of the cases the courts of
appeals hear, they bear ultimate law-making responsibility.") (footnote omitted). This is especially true if, as was the case with many of the Ninth Circuit's hypothetical jurisdiction cases,
see supra note 8, the opinion remains unpublished (or if the decision yields no opinion whatsoever, published or unpublished). Judge Wald explained the importance of publishing opinions in
her separate statement in National ClassificationCommittee v. United States:
[T]he parties have little chance of prevailing on a suggestion for rehearing en banc in
this court or a petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court when the court renders
judgment with no opinion. Given the large number of suggestions for rehearing en banc
which come through the court in a year... an unpublished opinion with no precedential
effect and no opinion to highlight the issues and reasoning of the court is not likely to
draw significant attention from the overburdened judges in our court.
National Classification Comm. v. United States, 765 F.2d 164, 174 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Wald, J.,
separate statement)
307. See generally SuP. CT. R. 10 (1998) (nonexhaustively delineating the circumstances
warranting a grant of certiorari, and providing that "[a] petition for a writ of certiorari will be
granted only for compelling reasons" and that "[a] petition for a writ of certiorari is rarely
granted when the asserted error consists of erroneous factual findings or the misapplication of a
properly stated rule of law").
308. Judicial economy, if nothing else, dictates that the Court simply cannot and obviously
does not grant review in every case, even where a lower court conflict might actually exist or the
law is grossly uncertain. See Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 536 (1992) ("Last Term
alone we received over 5,000 petitions for certiorari, but we have the capacity to decide only
a... fraction of these cases on the merits. To use our resources most efficiently, we must grant
certiorari only in those cases that will enable us to resolve particularly important questions.");
Beaulieu v. United States, 497 U.S. 1038, 1040 (1990) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) ("Being current in our docket is a major consideration; and it may not be wise to delay
prompt review in every case, even though many of them involve issues of paramount importance, simply to overcrowd our argument docket with many other cases of lesser significance.");
STERN ET AL., supra note 161, § 6.31(b), at 355 ("Whether a case is important enough to review
may... depend on the size of the Court's workload and how many other cases are deemed more
important.").
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probability of reversal. For one thing, by not deciding a contestable
jurisdictional issue, the lower court has eliminated by avoidance what
was likely the most vulnerable legal issue for review. Because there
was no actual jurisdictional determination, there would be no basis
for appellate review, unless perhaps the appellate court itself desired
to take up the jurisdictional issue sua sponte.
Absent that
circumstance, however, the appellate court itself would only be compounding the constitutional error by effectively issuing an advisory
opinion. For another thing, the lower court's highlighting of the difficulty of the jurisdictional question may itself be enough to keep the
higher court from reaching the jurisdictional issue, even if it were
properly within the scope of appellate review. 309 After all, if the reviewing court is a court of appeals, then that court, too, must be concerned about reversal by the Supreme Court, and there are few better
ways to increase the chances of certiorari review than to create or solidify a federal circuit court split,31o especially if the issue has constitutional dimensions. 8" In short, unless the lower court were thoroughly off-the-wall-either because the merits were complicated or
should have gone the other way or because the jurisdictional issue
was actually simple-hypothetical jurisdiction potentially provided a
safe harbor for merits-based determinations, essentially insulating
them from appeal or reversal.

309. In addition, there is a classic fox-guarding-the-henhouse problem with regard to
hypothetical jurisdiction. Because courts of appeals themselves found the doctrine so useful, the
likelihood that they would have overridden a district court's assumption of jurisdiction-unless
that assumption were truly misguided-was also diminished, lest they might have had to
explain why district courts, but not circuit courts, are bound to the requirement that subjectmatter jurisdiction must be verified as a threshold matter. Needless to say, any such
explanation would have been rather untenable given that both types of courts are equally
subject to the limitations of Article II. Cf United States v. Igbonwa, 120 F.3d 437, 440 n.2 (3d
Cir. 1997) (assuming jurisdiction and observing that the particular challenge to jurisdiction
"relate[s] to both the district court and this court" and that, if accepted, would result not only in
the dismissal of the appeal but also "in the district court order being vacated), cert. denied, 118
S. Ct. 1059 (1998).
310. See SuP. CT. R. 10(a) (providing that the Court will consider granting certiorari review
if "a United States court of appeals has entered a decision in conflict with the decision of another United States court of appeals on the same important matter"); Braxton v. United States,
500 U.S. 344, 347 (1991) ("A principal purpose for which we use our certiorari jurisdiction, and
the reason we granted certiorari in the present case, is to resolve conflicts among the United
States courts of appeals and state courts concerning the meaning of provisions of federal law.").
31L See SUP. CT. R. 10(c) (providing that the Court will consider granting certiorari review
if "a United States court of appeals has decided an important question of federal law that has
not been, but should be, settled by this Court"); Braxton, 500 U.S. at 347 (distinguishing between constitutional and other federal law questions for purposes of certiorari review, and noting with respect to the latter, review may be less compelling because "we are not the sole body
that could eliminate such conflicts, at least as far as their continuation into the future is concerned").
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2. Judicial Economy
On one point at least, both the supporters and the detractors of
hypothetical jurisdiction seem generally to agree-namely, that the
doctrine potentially fostered judicial economy or the more efficient use
of limited judicial resources. This perspective is found not only in decisions justifying the doctrine prior to its repudiation, 3 2 but also in
pre-repudiation decisions criticizing it,' 13 post-repudiation opinions
observing its passing, 314 and various academic works. 3 5 Perhaps the
best statement of this perspective is found in Justice Breyer's partial
concurrence in Steel Co., in which he clearly expresses his pragmatic
conceptualization of federal jurisdiction, a conception rather at odds
with that of Justice Scalia. In Justice Breyer's view:
This Court has previously made clear that courts may "reserve difficult
questions of... jurisdiction when the case alternatively could be resolved on
the merits in favor of the same party." That rule makes theoretical sense, for
the difficulty of the jurisdictional question makes reasonable the court's
jurisdictional assumption. And that rule makes enormous practical sense.
Whom does it help to have appellate judges spend their time and energy

312. See, e.g., House the Homeless, Inc. v. Widnall, 94 F.3d 176, 179-80 n.7 (5th Cir. 1996)
("Rather than remand the cause to the district court to more fully develop the record [on standing], in the interest of judicial economy we invoke the exception to the general rule that calls for
reaching the standing issue and proceed to the merits of this appeal."), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct.
1434(1997).
313. See, e.g., Koff v. United States, 3 F.3d 1297, 1300 (9th Cir. 1993) (O'Scannlain, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (observing that "assuming for purposes of jurisdiction that we have
jurisdiction, and deciding this case on the merits ... is undeniably an attractive and, in general,
a useful [solution]" to an apparent jurisdictional conflict).
314. See, e.g., Legal Aid Soc'y v. Legal Servs. Corp., 145 F.3d 1017, 1029-30 (9th Cir. 1998)
(White, J.) ("The Supreme Court (in Steel Co.] rejected th[e] doctrine [of hypothetical
jurisdiction] .... Thus, we must 'spend [our] time and energy puzzling over the correct answer
to an intractable jurisdictional matter,' even if we think that the substantive merits are easily
disposed of by well-settled law." (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83,
118 S. Ct. 1003, 1021 (1998) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment))),
cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 539 (1998); Hardemon v. City of Boston, 144 F.3d 24, 25-26 (1st Cir.
1998) (conceding that "[ilnitially we were tempted to bypass the jurisdictional issue because the
City easily prevails on the merits" but declining to do so in light of Steel Co.); City of Chicago v.
Shalala, No. 97 C 4884, 1998 WL 164889, at *2 (N.D. 11. Mar. 31, 1998) ("The court notes that
its task would be greatly simplified if it could dispense with threshold jurisdictional issues and
simply reach the merits under the doctrine of hypothetical jurisdiction.... The Supreme Court,
however, has recently abolished this doctrine.") (citing Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1012-16).
315. See, e.g., 3 KENNETH Cu~l' DAVIS & RIcHARi J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 16.6, at 45-46 (3d ed. 1994) (contending that "it would be a waste of scarce resources
for a court to engage in a protracted hearing to resolve difficult issues of causation rather than
to moot the standing question by writing a brief opinion resolving the easy merits question
against the petitioner") (citing Norton v. Mathews, 427 U.S. 524, 530-32 (1976)); Assuming
JurisdictionArguendo, supra note 4, at 730 ("From an administrative standpoint, substantial
savings in judicial resources can be achieved by allowing courts to skirt complex and time-consuming jurisdictional arguments when the questions on the merits are more simply resolved.").
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puzzling over the correct answer to an intractable jurisdictional matter, when
(assuming an easy answer on the substantive merits) the same party would
win or lose regardless? More importantly, to insist upon a rigid "order of
operations" in today's world of federal court caseloads that have grown
enormously over a generation means unnecessary delay and consequent added
cost. It means a more cumbersome system. It thereby increases, to at least
a
316
small degree, the risk of the 'justice delayed" that means "justice denied."

Not only does hypothetical jurisdiction promote economy
within a given case, say, by obviating the need for a remand, it also
promotes economy by discouraging suits involving similar claims on
the merits. This very point was expressed by the First Circuit in a
case in which it bypassed a "close issue of appealability" in order to
reach the merits.3 17 Concluding that its view of the merits compelled
affirmance, the court then specifically noted its hope that its "views
on the merits may provide useful guidance in recurring situations of
this character."31 In light of the fact that the dockets of the federal
judiciary already are more or less saturated, it is not difficult to see
how the prospect of preempting nonmeritorious suits could be
sufficiently attractive that a court might be willing, from time to time,
to bend the jurisdictional rules.
3. Judicial Restraint
As discussed in Part II, hypothetical jurisdiction was often defended as a medium of judicial restraint, insofar as it purportedly
kept the courts from addressing unnecessary constitutional questions
and helped to reduce friction with the other branches and with the
states. Although at times there may be reason to doubt the integrity
of this justification,3' 9 most federal judges are genuinely sensitive to
these concerns, which in turn can powerfully affect their decisionmaking. To be sure, this justification is also an important factor in the
316. Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1021 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (citations omitted) (quoting Norton, 427 U.S. at 532).
317. See Massachusetts v. Hale, 618 F.2d 143, 145 n.3 (1st Cir. 1980).
318. Id.
319. See, e.g., Ian Shapiro, Richard Posner's Praxis, 48 OHIo ST. L.J. 999, 1046 (1987)
(concluding that despite the call for greater judicial restraint sounded by Richard Posner,
"Posner adheres to principles of judicial restraint as and when it suits him, and he happily violates these to advance his own particular neoclassical conceptions of the economics of labor and
antitrust law"); see also Rodriguez v. City of Chicago, 156 F.3d 771, 778-80 (7th Cir. 1998)
(Posner, C.J., concurring) (contending that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 should be
deemed categorically inapplicable to claims by public safety officers seeking religiously based
exemptions from assigned duties, even though the text of Title VII contains no such exception
and, in fact, provides for a case-by-case balancing of employer-employee interests), petition for
cert. filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3409 (U.S. Dec. 21, 1998) (No. 98-1005).
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substance and execution of the prudential components of standing,320
ripeness,3 21 mootness, 322 political question doctrine, 323 and of the
various abstention or abstention-like doctrines. 32 As the District of
Columbia Circuit has said, describing the ripeness doctrine: "If we do
not decide it now, we may never need to. Not only does this rationale
protect the expenditure of judicial resources, but it comports with our
theoretical role as the governmental branch of last resort. Article IlI
courts should not make decisions unless they have to."25

320. See, e.g., United States v. Doe (In re Grand Jury Investigation), 59 F.3d 17, 19 (2d Cir.
1995) ("[T]he prudential limitation on standing 'stem[s] from a salutary 'rule of self-restraint'
designed to minimize unwarranted intervention into controversies where the applicable
constitutional questions are ill-defined and speculative.' "); Sullivan v. Syracuse Hous. Auth.,
962 F.2d 1101, 1106 (2d Cir. 1992) ("The prudential requirements of standing have been
developed by the Supreme Court on its own accord and applied in a more discretionary fashion
as rules of judicial 'self-restraint,' further to protect, to the extent necessary under the
circumstances, the purpose of Article I...
." (citation omitted)).
32L See, e.g., National Treasury Employees Union v. United States, 101 F.3d 1423, 1431
(D.C. Cir. 1996) ("Prudentially, the ripeness doctrine exists to prevent the courts from wasting
our resources by prematurely entangling ourselves in abstract disagreements, and ... to protect
the other branches from judicial interference until their decisions are formalized and their
'effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties.'") (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Gardner,
387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967)).
322. "Prudential mootness addresses 'not the power to grant relief but the court's discretion
in the exercise of that power.'" Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Smith, 110 F.3d 724, 727
(10th Cir. 1997) (quoting Chamber of Commerce v. United States Dep't of Energy, 627 F.2d 289,
291 (D.C. Cir. 1980)). A controversy may be "so attenuated that considerations of prudence and
comity for coordinate branches of government counsel the court to stay its hand, and to withhold
relief it has the power to grant." Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, 110 F.3d at 727.
323. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Joseph v. Cannon, 642 F.2d 1373, 1378-79 (D.C. Cir.
1981) (noting that the "concept of justiciabiity ... traces its origins both to inherent limitations
on the capabilities ofjudicial tribunals as well as to the separation of powers concerns central in
our system of government" and that "so-called political questions are denied judicial scrutiny,
not only because they invite courts to intrude into the province of coordinate branches of government, but also because courts are fimdamentally underequipped to formulate national policies or develop standards of conduct for matters not legal in nature" (footnotes omitted)), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 999 (1982).
324. See, e.g., Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 716 (1996) (noting that
"federal courts may decline to exercise their jurisdiction, in otherwise 'exceptional circumstances,' where denying a federal forum would clearly serve an important countervailing interest, for example where abstention is warranted by considerations of 'proper constitutional adjudication,' 'regard for federal-state relations,' or 'wise judicial administration' ") (quoting
Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813, 817 (1976)).
Other abstention-like doctrines govern the relationships between federal courts and military
legal proceedings, see United States ex rel. New v. Perry, 919 F. Supp. 491, 495-99 (D.D.C.
1996), dismissal of habeas corpus affd, 129 F.3d 639 (D.C. Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct.
1364 (1998), foreign legal proceedings, see Turner Entertainment Co. v. Degeto Film GmbH, 25
F.2d 1512 (11th Cir. 1994), tribal court proceedings, see Pittsburgh & Midway Coal Min. Co. v.
Watchman, 52 F.3d 1531, 1536-40 (10th Cir. 1995), and the legal proceedings or determinations
of religious institutions, see Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976);
O'Connor v. Diocese of Honolulu, 885 P.2d 361 (Haw. 1994).
325. National TreasuryEmployees Union, 101 F.3d at 1431 (citation omitted).
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But judicial sensitivity to such concerns is arguably not the
most attractive aspect of judicial restraint. Rather, it is that such restraint places one on a sort of moral high ground, variously reflecting
the virtues of humility, respect, prudence, and self-control. And there
is no better means of whitewashing a usurpation of power, as is hypothetical jurisdiction, than to simultaneously express the unselfishness
of one's motives and the forbearance of one's conduct. Such was the
case with Chief Justice Marshall's foundational opinion in Marbury v.
Madison,3 6 which has been described as "the most famous case in our
history"3 2 7 and "the decision that rendered constitutional law itself
possible,"3 2 yet also as a "masterwork of indirection, a brilliant example of Marshall's capacity to sidestep danger while seeming to court it,
to advance in one direction while his opponents are looking in another." 29 There is, in turn, little reason not to believe that it was also
the case in some, even several, of the decisions invoking hypothetical
jurisdiction.
4. Institutional Values
Hypothetical jurisdiction was also attractive-and remains
so-because of its capacity to preserve certain institutional values of
the federal bench, including the exercise of judgment, respect for
coordinate federal courts, and maintenance of the Article III judiciary

326. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). As one commentator has explained:
Marshall's constitutional fault was not that he chose to discuss issues not absolutely
necessary to the resolution of a case properly before the Court. That would have been a
venial transgression-one that the Court frequently commits. It was, instead, to
pronounce its conclusions on the merits of a case over which, according to its own
judgment in that very case, the Constitution prohibited Congress to grant the Court, or
the Court to assume, jurisdiction. The decision to rule on the merits was therefore as

much a violation of the Constitution as anything Jefferson or Madison or Congress may
have done. It was a deliberate flouting by the Court of the constitutional limits on its
authority that were specifically identified by the Court in the very same case in which it
ignored them.
Dean Alfange, Jr., Marbury v. Madison and Original Understandingsof Judicial Review: In
Defense of TraditionalWisdom, 1993 SuP. CT. REv.329, 389.
327. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 567 (1985) (Powell, J.,
dissenting); see also Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLuM. L.
REV.1, 8 (1983) (calling it "our most important decision").
328. Jed Rubenfeld, The Right to Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REv. 737, 740 (1989).
329. ROBERT G. McCLOSKEY, THE AMERicAN SUPREME COURT 40 (1960). McCloskey contends that Marshall's "pre-eminence among builders of the American constitutional tradition

rests not only on his well-known boldness, his 'tiger instinct for the jugular vein' as an enthusiastic metaphorist once called it, but also on his less-noticed sense of self-restraint." Id.
Marbury,he maintains, "appears to contradict this proposition but in fact confirms it." Id.
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as a forum for meritorious suits.330 In her concurrence, for example,
Justice O'Connor declined to limit the types of cases in which jurisdiction may defensibly be assumed, as had the majority when it distinguished and preserved the various doctrines noted earlier. "[I]n my
view," she wrote, "the Court's opinion should not be read as cataloging
an exhaustive list of circumstances under which federal courts may
exercise judgment in 'reserv[ing] difficult questions of... jurisdiction
when the case alternatively could be resolved on the merits in favor of
the same party.' "331 What Justice O'Connor did not want to foreclose,
in other words, was the ability of the federal courts to engage in the
act of reasoned judgment, which, after all, is a primary interpretive
function of judges,33 2 but which could be stifled by too rule-bound or
333
formalistic a methodology.
Another institutional value ostensibly served by hypothetical
jurisdiction is the maintenance of congruity or institutional harmony
among federal courts. In one case, for example, the Sixth Circuit
"simply assume[d] the existence of appellate jurisdiction arguendo,
without holding that jurisdiction exists," largely "in the interest of
avoiding an unnecessary conflict with the en banc court on the jurisdictional issue."334 Likewise, in another case the Third Circuit declined to address what was arguably a jurisdictional issue, thereby
obviating the need to possibly override the district court's reasoning,
in part because "the interests of an appellate system of jurisprudence
330. For a more general discussion of institutional values, see Jon 0. Newman, Between
Legal Realism and Neutral Principles: The Legitimacy of Institutional Values, 72 CAL. L. REV.
200, 208-14 (1984) (discussing "values that concern the judge's conception of the role of the
courts and other sources of law, the judge's view of the federal system, and the judge's informed
sense of the process of adjudication").
331. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 118 S. Ct. 1003, 1020 (1998)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (quoting Norton v. Mathews, 427 U.S. 524, 532
(1976)).
332. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 440 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987)
(maintaining that "[t]he courts must declare the sense of the law;" that they should
"exercise... JUDGMENT" as opposed to "WILL"; and that an "independent spirit in the judges"
is "essential to the faithful performance of so arduous a duty" as the enforcement of a "limited
Constitution against legislative encroachments").
333. Justice O'Connor's approach in Steel Co., joined by Justice Kennedy, appears to be
consistent with their earlier approach in Planned Parenthoodv. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992),
which called for "reasoned judgment" in the constitutional scrutiny of abortion-restrictive legislation. Justice O'Connor stated that '[t]he inescapable fact is that adjudication of substantive
due process claims may call upon the Court in interpreting the Constitution to exercise that
same capacity which by tradition courts always have exercised: reasoned judgment. Its
boundaries are not susceptible of expression as a simple rule." Id. at 849; see also Kathleen M.
Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106
HARV. L. REV. 22, 79 & n.395 (1992) (expanding on the concept of reasoned judgment or reasoned elaboration).
334. Brooks v. Toyotomi Co., 86 F.3d 582, 587 (6th Cir. 1996).
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are well served when reviewing courts, if possible, dispose of cases on
grounds correctly decided by the trial court."135 Finally, and as noted
in the discussion of judicial economy, hypothetical jurisdiction can be
employed to deter the initiation of nonmeritorious suits, thereby preserving the capacity of the federal courts to process those of a more
worthy nature. At the same time, because the judgment rendered is
on the merits adverse to the plaintiff, the doctrine effectively allows
for the punishment of the initiators of such suits, thereby preserving
the integrity of the federal docket as well.
B. The Means To Avoid the Rule Against Hypothetical Jurisdiction
Given the attractiveness of hypothetical jurisdiction, it would
be quite remarkable were the doctrine, or at least the concept underlying it, to be totally eradicated by a single Supreme Court decision.
In fact, there arguably are several ways by which courts may either
avoid the repudiation or achieve substantially similar effects as hypothetical jurisdiction despite the Steel Co. decision. Examined here are
five such techniques, each of which varies in its propriety, efficacy,
33 6
and legal consequences.
1. Ignore the Repudiation Entirely
The most obvious means of avoiding Steel Co. is, of course,
simply to avoid it. This can be accomplished two ways-either remain
unaware of it or disregard it outright. Lest these seem like heretical
alternatives, it should be noted that the former has already come
about. Five weeks after Steel Co., a panel of the Second Circuit issued
a decision plainly relying on the repudiated doctrine of hypothetical
jurisdiction, even referring to it by name in a citation. 37 And the
335. Switlik v. Hardwicke Co., 651 F.2d 852, 856 n.3 (3d Cir. 1981).
336. Needless to say, the five techniques examined do not comprise an exhaustive list of
possibilities. Not included, for example, is the notion of manipulating the jurisdictional doctrines of standing and ripeness, which, at least at the margins, are sufficiently flexible that
courts seeking a merit-based dismissal may simply find jurisdiction without substantial fear of
creating unavoidable precedent.
337. See Hayes v. Coombe, 142 F.3d 517, 519 (2d Cir. 1998) (per curiam) ("Because we
agree with the government that petitioner's claim is patently devoid of merit, we may affirm the
dismissal of his petition without addressing the procedural complications that have been raised
by the appellee. And we may do so even if these complications are jurisdictional in nature.")
(citing Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Muszynski, 899 F.2d 151, 159 (2d Cir. 1990)). Less than three
weeks after that, a panel of the same circuit did acknowledge the doctrine's demise. See Fidelity
Partners, Inc. v. First Trust Co., 142 F.3d 560, 565 (2d Cir. 1988). But then, six weeks later and
over three months after Steel Co., yet another panel engaged in hypothetical jurisdiction. See
Karacsonyi v. United States, No. 97-1220, 1998 WL 401273, at *1 n.2 (2d Cir. June 10, 1998)
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Second Circuit is not alone in its oversight.38s Needless to say, such
inadvertence can persist for only so long, and in all events cannot be
justified under even the most charitable view of the judicial process.
339
"Article III judges," after all, "are presumed to know the law."
The second approach, deliberate disregard, presents a more
interesting but equally problematic means of avoidance. Because an
actual holding of the Supreme Court cannot be ignored by a lower federal court, 340 the only justifiable basis for completely disregarding
Steel Co. is to adopt Justice Stevens' position that "[t]he
Court['s] ... discussion of 'hypothetical jurisdiction'... is... pure
dictum because it is entirely unnecessary to an explanation of the
Court's decision."31 In turn, because "dictum is not authoritative" and
"is the part of an opinion that a later court, even if it is an inferior

(declining to address whether the appellant's notice of appeal was timely because the "appeal is
meritless" and citing Browning-FerrisIndus., 899 F.2d at 154-60, a case specifically referenced
by the Steel Co. Court in its repudiation ofhypothetical jurisdiction, see Steel Co. v. Citizens for
a Better Env't 523 U.S. 83, 118 S. Ct. 1003, 1012 (1998)). The district courts of the Second
Circuit appear to be following its lead. See, e.g., Perez v. McElroy, No. 97 Civ. 7811, 1998 WL
557592, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 1998) (declining to address, over five months after Steel Co.,
whether administrative remedies had been exhausted and whether the court was divested of
juridiction under the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, because
"[wihere questions of jurisdiction are nettlesome but decision on the merits is simple and
straightforward, the court may dispose of the case on its merits" and citing the pre-Steel Co.
hypothetical jurisdiction case of Cantor FitzgeraldL.P. v. Peaslee, 88 F.3d 152, 155 (2d Cir.
1996)).
338. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Turner Indus., Inc., 141 F.3d 554, 559 n.11 (5th Cir. 1998)
(explaining matter-of-factly, over two months after Steel Co., that "[flor purposes of deciding a
particular case, courts of appeal will occasionally assume arguendo a variety of questions, including, interalia, standing to assert a claim, the existence of a cause of action, a material disputed fact, etc." and citing several hypothetical jurisdiction cases); Society Hill Towers Owners'
Ass'n v. Rendell, 20 F. Supp. 2d 855, 859 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (assuming that plaintiffs had
standing and ultimately granting summary judgment in favor of defendants on all counts).
339. United States v. Kezerle, 99 F.3d 867, 870 (7th Cir. 1996).
340. See, e.g., Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F.2d 1526, 1532-33 (11th Cir. 1983) (explaining the
binding nature of Supreme Court rulings on lower federal courts), affd, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
This is true even if the Supreme Court decision appears to have been implicitly overruled. See,
e.g., Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989) ("If a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in
some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly controls,
leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions."); West v. Anne Arundel
County, 137 F.3d 752, 760 (4th Cir. 1998) (observing that "[1]ower federal courts have repeatedly
been warned about the impropriety of preemptively overturning Supreme Court precedent"),
cert. denied, Anne Arundel County v. West, 119 S. Ct. 607 (1998); see generally Margaret N.
Kniffen, Overruling Supreme Court Precedents: AnticipatoryAction by United States Courts of
Appeals, 51 FoRDHAm L. REV. 53 (1982) (thoroughly analyzing this and related issues); Bratz,
supra note 176, at 91-93 (setting forth the position in favor of implicit overruling).
34L Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1026 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
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court, is free to reject,"342 one could conclude syllogistically that lower
courts are free to reject the Court's discussion of hypothetical
jurisdiction.
Though in many respects Justice Stevens'
characterization is probably correct, the Court's repudiation of
hypothetical jurisdiction is more than just some stray passage
mingled amidst the text or relegated to a footnote of the opinion.
Rather, it is what is often labeled "considered dictum," and as such
should command the obedience of all but the most oblivious lower
court judges.
Two reasons, one doctrinal and one practical, compel such obedience. The doctrinal reason is that, while considered dictum may not
be fully binding as such, "federal courts 'are bound by the Supreme
Court's considered dicta almost as firmly as by the Court's outright
holdings, particularly when... [the dicta] is of recent vintage and not
enfeebled by any [later] statement.'"343 In other words, even if a
Supreme Court passage is arguably dictum, lower courts should generally adhere to it where it is "clear, direct, explicit, and
unqualified."3 " The practical reason is that, while considered dictum
may not amount to a holding as such, it is often an excellent predictor
34
of how the Court would hold if squarely presented with the issue. 5
Were the Court's discomfort with hypothetical jurisdiction not evident
prior to Steel Co., it is fairly evident in the decision's wake, regardless
of how one categorizes the Court's treatment of the issue. In short,
courts will likely find it quite difficult to sidestep entirely the Court's

342. United States v. Crawley, 837 F.2d 291, 292 (7th Cir. 1988); see also Kniffen, supra
note 340, at 57-58 & n.27. Karl Llewellyn speaks of"kill[ing] offa dictum, as such and without
more." KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEAis 86 (1960).
343. City of Timber Lake v. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, 10 F.3d 554, 557 (8th Cir. 1993)
(alterations in original) (quoting McCoy v. Massachusetts Inst. of Tech., 950 F.2d 13, 19 (1st Cir.
1991)); see also In re Thirteen Appeals Arising Out of San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig.,
56 F.3d 295, 305 (1st Cir. 1995) ("[Clonsidered dictum emanating from the High Court carries
great persuasive force.").
344. Public Serv. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 315 F.2d 306, 310 n.6 (10th Cir. 1963) ("The
contention is made that the quoted phrase is dictum to which the lower courts are not required
to yield. Without exploring the intricate distinctions between dictum and language necessary to
decision, we conclude that we must recognize the clear, direct, explicit, and unqualified statement of the Supreme Court.").
345. See Reich v. Continental Cas. Co., 33 F.3d 754, 757 (7th Cir. 1994):
When the Court's view is embodied in a holding, the Court's reluctance to overrule its
precedents enables a confident prediction that that holding is 'the law.' When the view
is embodied in a dictum, prediction cannot be made with the same confidence. But
where it is a recent dictum that considers all the relevant considerations and
adumbrates an unmistakable conclusion, it would be reckless to think the Court likely
to adopt a contrary view in the near future. In such a case the dictum provides the best,
though not an infallible, guide to what the law is, and it will ordinarily be the duty of a
lower court to be guided by it.
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repudiation of hypothetical jurisdiction, even if, as Justice Stevens
maintained, it is nothing but "pure dictum."
2. Interpret the Repudiation Narrowly
Although Steel Co. cannot realistically be avoided altogether, it
may still be susceptible to limiting interpretations. As a general matter, the binding scope of precedent may be determined and circumscribed by several means.3 6 It may, for example, be confined to its
facts.37 Alternatively, it can be construed in terms of the legal rule,

doctrine, or standard invoked in support of its holding.m Or it can be
read in light of the substantive or institutional purposes that animated and shaped the holding. 49 In the following paragraphs, the
potential utility of each of these techniques will be more closely examined.
One of the most convenient and effective ways of limiting a
precedent is to distinguish it on factual grounds, given both the probable variation of the facts and the mechanical nature of the method.3 50
In the case of Steel Co., however, this method will likely prove fruitless. Because the Court's treatment of hypothetical jurisdiction, being
dictum rather than a holding, was not directly attached to a set of
346. See, e.g., Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 723, 763 (1988) (noting that "precedent... has been viewed as limited to the
'decision' on the 'material facts' as seen by the precedent court... for others, the term means
the 'rules' formulated by the precedent court; for still others, the term includes the reasons
given for the rules formulated") (footnotes omitted).
347. See, e.g., LLEWELLYN, supra note 342, at 84, 86-87.
348. See, e.g., Monaghan, supra note 346, at 764 ("What the Court said must include the
Court's rule or standard. This constitutes the 'enactment force of precedent,' in Dworkin's
phrase, or the 'precept,' in Pound's. This is the core of the precedent.") (footnotes omitted)
(quoting RONALD DWORKN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 111 (1978); Roscoe Pound, What of Stare

Decisis?, 10 FORDHAM L. REv. 1, 9-10 (1941)).
349. See, e.g., Velasquez v. Frapwell, 160 F.3d 389, 394 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting that "a lower
court should reexamine its cases in light of the reasoning as well as the narrowest possible
holding of a subsequent Supreme Court decision"), vacated in part on other grounds, No. 981547, 1999 WL 25681 (7th Cir. Jan. 20, 1999) (per curiam); Monaghan, supra note 346, at 75859 (discussing the analogical mode of judicial reasoning which looks to "the grounds of the
decision-the underlying reasoning or principles that generated the rule or standard"); id. at
764-65 (arguing that the underlying reasoning should be included within the concept of
precedent).
350. Factual variation for legal purposes has at least two components: the facts as they
actually are, which must always differ to some extent, and the characterization of these facts,
which can either bring two cases closer together or set them further apart. See Frederick
Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 577 (1987) ("For a decision to be precedent for another decision does not require that the facts of the earlier and the later cases be absolutely
identical.... Tlhe relevance of an earlier precedent depends upon how we characterize the
facts arising in the earlier case [and] characterizations are inevitably theory-laden.") (footnotes
omitted).
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facts, it would be difficult to limit the repudiation on factual grounds.
To be sure, the Court's disapproval of hypothetical jurisdiction is more
or less stated as a matter of principle, and as such does not lend itself
particularly well to situational negotiation. In addition, courts have
repeatedly warned against confining a Supreme Court ruling, especially a constitutional ruling, to the particular facts of the case. 351 As
a general rule, "unless the Supreme Court expressly limits its opinion
to the facts before it, it is the principle which controls and not the
35 2
specific facts upon which the principle was decided."
This rule, however, simply means that any effort to limit Steel
Co. would likely have to focus on the principle, and not the facts, of
the case. Narrowly viewed, the basic principle of Steel Co. is that an
Article III court cannot decide the merits of a dispute without first
verifying that the Article III case-or-controversy requirements have
been satisfied. So stated, the principle leaves a number of related
practices intact, each of which has already been examined or will be
examined in the rest of this Part. For example, the principle does not
prohibit non-Article III federal courts from engaging in hypothetical
jurisdiction. Nor does it necessarily prohibit Article III courts from
deciding non-merits issues without first establishing that the case-orcontroversy requirements are met, although, as will be discussed
shortly in Part IV.B.3, this is presently a matter of dispute among
lower courts. Nor does the principle prohibit Article III courts from
merely assessing the merits of a dispute, as long as they do not enter
judgment based on that assessment. Nor does it necessarily prohibit
such courts from deciding merits issues where non-Article III
jurisdictional requirements are not verified, as long as the Article III
requirements are met, although this too is presently disputed and will
also be addressed in Part IV.B.3. This would encompass not only
statutory or judge-made requirements, including the prudential aspects of standing, ripeness, and mootness as well as the complete diversity requirement, 353 but possibly also various non-Article III
351. See, e.g., City of Timber Lake v. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, 10 F.3d 554, 557 (8th
Cir. 1993) ("Federal courts.., are not free to limit Supreme Court opinions precisely to the
facts of each case?") (quoting McCoy v. Massachusetts Inst. of Tech., 950 F.2d 13, 19 (1st Cir.
1991)); United States v. Underwood, 717 F.2d 482, 486 (9th Cir. 1983) (en banc) ("The Supreme
Court cannot limit its constitutional adjudication to the narrow facts before it in a particular
case.... The system could not function if lower courts were free to disregard such guidelines
whenever they did not precisely match the facts of the case in which the guidelines were announced."). But see Long, supra note 176, at 1109 ("The most legitimate method of avoiding
Supreme Court precedent is to distinguish factually the case at hand from the precedent.").
352. Walker v. Georgia, 417 F.2d 5, 8 (5th Cir. 1969).
353. The requirement, in a case premised on diversity jurisdiction, that the opposing parties be completely diverse is not a constitutional mandate, but rather a judge-made limitation
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constitutional requirements such as those arising from the Eleventh
Amendment or the doctrine of sovereign iMMUnity. 54 It may even
include the political question doctrine insofar as that doctrine may not
be a genuine case-or-controversy component of Article HI, although
there is debate over that issue,355 and at least one commentator has

that is presently conceptualized as a construction of 28 U.S.C. § 1332. See State Farm Fire &
Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530-31 (1967). Under the same logic, courts may also be able
to bypass other aspects of section 1332, such as the amount-in-controversy requirement, but see
Iglesias v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 156 F.3d 237, 242-43 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding that the amountin-controversy requirement is not bypassable under Steel Co.), or the so-called domestic
relations exception, which limits the scope of federal jurisdiction in cases of divorce, alimony,
and child custody, see Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 693-703 (1992).
354. There is significant debate over whether federal sovereign immunity is a constitutional doctrine and, if so, the source of it in the Constitution. For cases claiming constitutional
authority for the doctrine, see Pullman Constr. Indus., Inc. v. United States, 23 F.3d 1166, 1168
(7th Cir. 1994) (tying it to the Appropriations Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7); Bartlett v.
Bowen, 824 F.2d 1240, 1248 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (joint statement dissenting from the vacatur of
orders and from the denials of rehearing en banc) (stating that it "is derived from Article III,
section 2, of the Constitution"); Jaffee v. United States, 663 F.2d 1226, 1251 (3d Cir. 1981)
(Gibbons, J., dissenting) (stating that it "has constitutional underpinnings and citing U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7); Daniel E. O'Toole, Regulation ofNavy Ship Discharges Under the Clean
Water Act: Have Too Many Chefs Spoiled the Broth?, 19 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLY REV. 1,
25 (1994) (asserting that it is "grounded in the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution").
For assertions that federal sovereign immunity is a common law doctrine, see Zych v.
Unidentified Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel, 19 F.3d 1136, 1142 (7th Cir. 1994) (describing it as
such); Susan Bandes, Reinventing Bivens: The Self-Executing Constitution, 68 S. CAL. L. REV.
289, 343 (1995) (asserting that it is "purely a creature of common law, with no statutory or
constitutional basis"). Finally, for a claim that sovereign immunity derives from general public
law, see Alaska v. United States, 64 F.3d 1352, 1354 n.3 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that it "derives
from public law, but it is not explicit in either the Constitution or statutes").
355. The general sense is that the political question doctrine is rooted in Article Il. See,
e.g., Adams v. Vance, 570 F.2d 950, 954 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (stating that "an allegation of nonjusticiability [under the political question doctrine] calls into question our jurisdiction under
Article IIf"). But it may or may not be a case-or-controversy requirement as such. Compare
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 939-43 (1983) (separating its "case or controversy" analysis from
its "political question" analysis), and Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198-99 (1962) (distinguishing
between "nonjusticiability," which encompasses the political question doctrine, and "a lack of
federal jurisdiction," which encompasses whether the cause "arise[s] under" federal law and
whether it poses a "case or controversy"), and Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549,
570 (1947) (differentiating in dictum between "the case and controversy limitation... and the
policy against entertaining political questions"), with Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop
the War, 418 U.S. 208, 215 (1974) ("[Tlhe concept of justiciability, which expresses the jurisdictional limitations imposed upon federal courts by the 'case or controversy' requirement of Art.
M, embodies both the standing and political question doctrines .... ."), and Neely v. Benefits
Review Bd., 139 F.3d 276, 279 (1st Cir. 1998) ("The 'case or controversy' label is used to
embrace.., the requirement of a concrete dispute between adversaries, standing, ripeness,
mootness and limitations relating to political questions."), and Occidental of Umm al Qaywayn,
Inc. v. A Certain Cargo of Petroleum, 577 F.2d 1196, 1203 (5th Cir. 1978) ("[P]olitical questions
have been held to be nonjusticiable and therefore not a 'case or controversy' as defined by.
Article MI."), and Laura A- Smith, Justiciability and Judicial Discretion: Standing at the
Forefront of Judicial Abdication, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1548, 1559 (1993) (stating that "the
political question doctrine... is derived from the 'case or controversy' requirement of Article
II).
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argued that the political question doctrine is simply incompatible with
3 6

the logic of hypothetical jurisdiction.

As this analysis illustrates, the technique of limiting Steel Co.
to its doctrinal principle or rule is critical to determining the
permissibility of related practices. A third and final technique is to
view Steel Co. through a purposivist lens, seeking to discern the core
objectives underlying the doctrinal principle. It should be noted at
the outset, however, that this approach tends to expand rather than
contract the scope of precedent, largely because these objectives are
often articulated at a relatively general level. In Steel Co., the
majority expressly identified two underlying objectives: first, to keep
courts within "the bounds of authorized judicial action; 357 and second,
by keeping them within these bounds, to preserve "fundamental
principles of separation of powers." s58 Immediately, one can see the
difficulty of adverting to either of these objectives. The first would
appear to bar every assumption of jurisdiction, including those
reaffirmed by the Court, given that all are not "authorized" in one way
or another (except, of course, by the Court). Even if one were to read
this as "constitutionally authorized," this would only create more
difficulties because then courts could expand their jurisdiction to the
limits of Article III even though Congress, exercising its constitutional
prerogative, has plainly affirmed less jurisdiction than the
Constitution has granted.
Likewise, the separation of powers
rationale, which has already been echoed by certain lower courts, 59 is
either too broad or too narrow. If it means that the judiciary cannot
override any congressionally established limits, then this is basically
a restatement of the first rationale. Even purely judge-made limits,
356. See Assuming JurisdictionArguendo, supra note 4, at 746-48. According to the
author:
When a court assumes arguendo the nonexistence of a political question and decides a
case on its merits, a logical conflict is created. The issue purportedly reserved-whether
the controversy on the merits is a proper subject for judicial resolution-has in fact been
decided in the
mative .... Hypothetical jurisdiction with respect to political
questions is therefore logically barred, because deciding the issue on the merits
necessarily implies a decision that no political question exists.
Id. at 746. But see New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 185 (1992) (assuming without
deciding that the suit did not pose a political question); Adams v. Vance, 570 F.2d 950, 954 & n.7
(D.C. Cir. 1978) (same).
357. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 118 S. Ct. 1003, 1012 (1998).
358. Id.
359. See, e.g., Harline v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 148 F.3d 1199, 1202 (10th Cir. 1998)
(construing Steel Co. as holding that the "assumption of jurisdiction to address merits violates
separation of powers"), cert. denied sub noma., Harline v. Department of Justice, 119 S. Ct. 798
(1999); City of Orrville v. FERO, 147 F.3d 979, 984-85 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ("Separation of powers
principles oblige us to address the Commission's standing argument first.....") (citing Steel Co.,
118 S. Ct. at 1012).
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such as the doctrine of prudential ripeness, rest partly on the
separation of powers and consequently might not be bypassable under
such a broad approach. By contrast, if it means that the judiciary can
override any jurisdictional limit unless the separation of powers is
implicated, then this would potentially allow a court to assume that
there is diversity of citizenship between the parties, for example, or
that a question arises under federal law-textual requirements of
Article I, to be sure, but ones whose assumption would primarily be
objectionable on federalism grounds (as well as the obvious ground
that the judiciary would be acting ultra vires). 60 In short, it will
probably best serve courts to interpret Steel Co. doctrinally, without
attempting either to assess it on factual grounds (which, as noted,
seems illogical) or to assess it in terms of its underlying objectives
(which, as illustrated, seems unhelpful).
3. Categorize an Issue Appropriately
By requiring that courts address jurisdictional issues before
addressing merits-related issues, the Court seems, at first blush, to
have created a bipolar analytical scheme wherein a court must
initially categorize an issue as either jurisdictional or merits-related.
If jurisdictional, then it cannot be bypassed (as it could have been
under hypothetical jurisdiction). If merits-related, then it cannot be
reached without first verifying jurisdiction (again, as it could have
been under hypothetical jurisdiction). But the doctrinal aftermath of
Supreme Court decisions is rarely so uncomplicated, and Steel Co. is
no exception. As it turns out, the analytical framework of Steel
Co.-consistent with the decision's complex precedential context and
with the inherent variability of legal questions-appears to include
yet a third category of issues, the uncertain boundaries of which
promise to complicate greatly the task of adhering to the decision.
This third category, which essentially falls between the other
two, consists of at least two groups of issues. The first encompasses
issues that are indeed jurisdictional, but that may not fall within the
range of jurisdictional issues that must, under Steel Co., be verified
prior to reaching the merits. The Steel Co. Court, after all, seemingly
intended to repudiate hypothetical jurisdiction only with regard to

360. Cf. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 117-21 (1984) (holding
that the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction does not override the Eleventh Amendment's general
prohibition on state law claims against states in federal court).
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core Article III jurisdictional issues, such as constitutional standing.361
But the Court did not speak with absolute clarity,362 and there is
already disagreement over the extent to which the Steel Co. mandate
applies to non-Article III jurisdictional questions. 63 The second group
under this intermediate third category encompasses issues that are
neither jurisdictional nor merits-related. Though potentially fewer in
number,3 64 they appear to have been entirely unaddressed by the Steel
Co. Court, leaving lower courts to speculate as to their precise role in
the Steel Co. framework.

361 See Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1013 (speaking exclusively of "Article I jurisdiction"); id.
at 1013 n.2 (speaking exclusively of "Article III questions"); id. at 1014 (describing hypothetical
jurisdiction as "the practice of deciding the cause of action before resolving Article Il jurisdiction"); id. at 1016 (speaking of "the rule that Article III jurisdiction is always an antecedent
question"); see also supra notes 270-76 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's reaffirmation of National RailroadPassenger Corp. v. NationalAss'n of RailroadPassengers,414
U.S. 453 (1974), on the ground that the jurisdictional issue bypassed in order to reach a meritsrelated question was one of statutory, not constitutional, standing).
362. See Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1012 (speaking more generally of 'jurisdictional objections"); id. at 1014 (discussing "the necessity of determining jurisdiction before proceeding to
the merits"); id. at 1016 (justifying the rule against hypothetical jurisdiction by explaining that
"[tlhe statutory and (especially) constitutional elements of jurisdiction are an essential ingredient of separation and equilibration of powers").
363. Compare Larsen v. Senate of Pa., 152 F.3d 240, 245 (3d Cir. 1998) ("[A] federal court
cannot proceed to consider the merits of an action until it is satisfied that the dispute falls
within the class of cases or controversies to which Article III, [section] 2 of the United States
Constitution has extended the judicial power of the United States.") (citing Steel Co., 118 S. Ct.
at 1012), petition for cert. filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3437 (U.S. Dec. 22, 1998) (No. 98-1038), and Broad
v. DKP Corp., No. 97 Civ. 2029, 1998 WL 516113, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 1998) ("In Steel Co.,
the Court reaffirmed the importance of considering threshold jurisdictional questions, which
spring from the constitutional requirements of Article I, before reaching the merits of an
action.") (citing Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1012-16), with McCarty Farms, Inc. v. Surface Transp.
Bd., 158 F.3d 1294, 1298-99 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (interpreting Steel Co. as requiring that it "must
resolve all jurisdictional questions before proceeding to the merits" and proceeding to assess its
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1336(b)) (emphasis added), and Williams v. General Elec. Capital
Auto Lease, Inc., 159 F.3d 266, 268-70 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1012, for the
proposition that the court "must discuss two issues related to our appellate jurisdiction," even
though the two issues did not involve the case-or-controversy requirements and one issue, in
fact, did not implicate Article III at all). See also Sierra Club v. Glickman, 156 F.3d 606, 619
(5th Cir. 1998) (interpreting Steel Co. "as making Article HI jurisdiction, of which standing,
mootness, and ripeness are equally important parts, the threshold issue that a court must
address," although specifically addressing the issue of whether Steel Co. was intended to apply
exclusively or especially to standing).
364. As a matter of standard legal categorization, issues or doctrines that are neither jurisdictional nor merits-related will probably fall under the heading of procedural, remedial, or
evidentiary. See, e.g., American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 899 F.2d 651, 653 (7th Cir. 1990)
(distinguishing "substantive" from "jurisdictional, procedural, or remedial"), affd, 499 U.S. 606
(1991); Comeau v. Rupp, 810 F. Supp. 1172, 1180 n.4 (D. Kan. 1992) (distinguishing
"substantive federal law" from "procedural and jurisdictional law"). One set of issues that would
almost certainly fall into this nonjurisdictional, nonsubstantive category are the technical requirements of the federal removal statutes, which "[t~he Supreme Court has long treated.., as
procedural, not jurisdictional." Peterson v. BMI Refractories, 124 F.3d 1386, 1391 (11th Cir.
1997).
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The reason that both types of issues have been categorically
placed together is that they arguably have the same functional
significance under Steel Co. This significance is two-fold, concerning
both their bypassability and their reachability. First, they could
theoretically be bypassed en route to the merits as long as Article III
jurisdiction is first verified. Thus, a court could in fact reach the
merits without verifying all aspects of jurisdiction-presumably to
rule against the party alleging jurisdiction-because it would not be
assuming any of the Article III requirements. (The validity of this
technique depends, of course, on whether the Court intended to
repudiate hypothetical jurisdiction as to all jurisdictional issues, or
only as to Article III or perhaps other constitutional requirements.)
Needless to say, this practice would amount to hypothetical
jurisdiction, albeit of a constitutionally less problematic variety.
Second, these issues could also theoretically be reached in the absence
of verifying Article III jurisdiction. Thus, a court could in fact dispose
of a suit without verifying its Article III jurisdiction-presumably
against the party asserting jurisdiction-because it would not be
reaching the merits in the absence of such jurisdiction. This practice
as well would appear to be a form of hypothetical jurisdiction,
although would not run afoul of Steel Co. insofar as the merits
themselves would remain undetermined.
In light of the foregoing, it is obvious that the initial
categorization of an issue-as Article III jurisdictional, as meritsrelated, as non-Article III jurisdictional, or as neither jurisdictional
nor merits-related-is critical to a Steel Co. analysis. In turn, courts
seeking to recapture the utility of the hypothetical jurisdiction
doctrine will clearly have to consider the consequences of such
categorization when making these threshold determinations. And lest
one think that courts enjoy little or no flexibility in this regard, thus
precluding consideration of the effect of such categorization under
Steel Co., nothing could be further from the truth. Well before Steel
Co., for example, courts expressed uncertainty and even disagreement
as to whether, or to what extent, various issues were or were not
jurisdictional.3 65
Such uncertainty and disagreement are not

365. See, e.g., Monsky v. Moraghan, 127 F.3d 243, 245 (2d Cir. 1997) (noting a circuit split

over whether "a deficient allegation of the color-of-law-element" of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is "a jurisdictional deficiency," and thus analyzed under FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), or a nonjurisdictional,
merits-related deficiency, and thus analyzed under FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)), cert. denied, 119 S.
Ct. 66 (1998); Flores v. Long, 110 F.3d 730, 732 (10th Cir. 1997) (noting that "[wihether the
Eleventh Amendment is an affirmative defense or a jurisdictional bar which can nonetheless be
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surprising, moreover, given that the concept of jurisdiction, although
not beyond definition, 66 has long had several meanings which may
vary from context to context. 367 Likewise, there has been-and will
continue to be-disagreement over whether or not particular issues
are merits-related. As the Court itself noted in Steel Co., for example:
The question whether this plaintiff has a cause of action under the statute,
and the question whether any plaintiff has a cause of action under the statute
are closely connected-indeed, depending upon the asserted basis for lack of

waived is not clear" and observing that it had previously "noted the split in the circuit cases on
whether a court was requireed to raise the issue sua sponte").
366. At a general level, an issue is 'jurisdictional" when "it affects... a court's constitutional or statutory power to adjudicate a case." United States v. Martin, 147 F.3d 529, 532 (7th
Cir. 1998). Specific characteristics that may render a doctrine or issue jurisdictional include the
following- (1) "it... speak[s] in jurisdictional terms or refer[s]... to the jurisdiction of
the... courts," Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 394 (1982); (2) "its commands
are addressed to courts rather than to individuals," Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S. Ct.
2059, 2071 (1997) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (calling this "the most salient characteristic of
jurisdictional statutes"); (3) it normally cannot, if ever, be waived by the consent or inaction of
litigants, see Sanchez v. Pacific Powder Co., 147 F.3d 1097, 1101 (9th Cir. 1998) ("[Uinder Title
VII, the requirement that a plaintiff name a defendant in the charge is not jurisdictional, but is
merely a condition precedent to filing an action, which a defendant may waive or be estopped
from asserting."); Norton v. Sam's Club, 145 F.3d 114, 118 (2d Cir. 1998) ("While the making of
a renewed JNOV motion is mandatory, it is not jurisdictional. As a result, it can be
waived .... ."), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 511 (1998); (4) noncompliance with its terms generally
cannot be excused by the court, see Neuman v. Rivers, 125 F.3d 315, 323 (6th Cir. 1997) (noting
that because a particular requirement "is not jurisdictional... failure to comply may be excused
in the interest of justice"), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 631 (1997); (5) it generally can, and often
must, be raised sua sponte by courts, see Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 389 (1994) (noting
that 'the nonretroactivity principle [of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989),] Is not
jurisdictional' in the sense that [federal courts]... must raise and decide the issue sua sponte'
") (quoting Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 41 (1990)), or may be raised by the parties at any
time, see United States v. Cordova, 157 F.3d 587, 597 n.3 (8th Cir. 1998); and (6) it is most likely
congressional in origin, not prudentially imposed by the courts themselves, see Taylor v. United
States Treasury Dep't, 127 F.3d 470, 475 (5th Cir. 1997) (noting that the exhaustion-ofadministrative-remedies requirement, if not statutorily mandated, is judicially imposed and
nonjurisdictional); Ochran v. United States, 117 F.3d 495, 502 (11th Cir. 1997) (noting the rule
against addressing arguments not considered in the district court is judicially imposed and
nonjurisdictional), or promulgated by an executive agency, see Comet Enters. Ltd. v. Air-APlane Corp., 128 F.3d 855, 859 (4th Cir. 1997) (noting that a "requirement, promulgated by an
executive agency, that limits federal court jurisdiction would raise serious constitutional
concerns").
367. See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 520 U.S. 83, 118 S. Ct. 1003, 1010
(1998) (" 'Jurisdiction,' it has been observed, 'is a word of many, too many, meanings .... ' ")
(quoting United States v. Vanness, 85 F.3d 661, 663 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1996)); Martin, 147 F.3d at
531-33 (distinguishing the term "jurisdictional element" as used in Commerce Clause cases such
as United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561-62 (1995), from "jurisdictional in the sense that it
affects a court's subject matter jurisdiction"); In re Minister Papandreou, 139 F.3d 247, 254
(D.C. Cir. 1998) ("Whether a defense is jurisdictional' is a question of some difficulty, given the
'woolliness of the concept.'") (quoting Cross-Sound Ferry Servs. v. ICC, 934 F.2d 327, 341 (D.C.
Cir. 1991) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the denial of the petition for
review)).
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statutory standing, they are sometimes identical, so 3that
it would be
68
exceedingly artificial to draw a distinction between the two.

To date, the lower federal courts have been all over the map in
their interpretation and implementation of Steel Co.'s repudiation of
hypothetical jurisdiction. Illustrative in this regard is the conflicting
treatment of personal jurisdiction, post-Steel Co., by the Courts of
Appeals for the Fifth and District of Columbia Circuits. In one case,
the Fifth Circuit confronted the question of whether, under Steel Co.,
a federal court in the removal context may reach and decide the issue
of personal jurisdiction before it determines that there is subjectmatter jurisdiction, on the theory that personal jurisdiction is
"jurisdictional" and thus, like subject-matter jurisdiction, can be
reached at the outset.369 Sitting en banc, the court held that it may
not.
Rejecting the notion that "jurisdiction is jurisdiction is
jurisdiction,'"370 the court observed that personal and subject-matter
jurisdiction are vastly different requirements; while the former is
heavily informed by the guarantee of due process and the protection of
individual liberty, the latter is concerned exclusively with judicial
power. 371 According to the court, it was the latter, and the latter
alone, that provided the focus of the Steel Co. decision.3 72 The Fifth
Circuit also noted that a contrary rule would pose federalism and
separation of powers concerns, 373 "may... create incentives for
defendants to subvert the orderly scheme for removing cases by acting
opportunistically,"374 and, in all events, is not necessarily conducive to
judicial economy.375

368. Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1013-14 n.2 (noting that "the merits inquiry and the statutory
standing inquiry often 'overlap'") (quoting National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of
R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453,456 (1974)).
369. See Marathon Oil Co. v. A.G. Ruhrgas, 145 F.3d 211, 215 (5th Cir. 1998) (en banc),
(concluding that "the court should proceed to consider the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction

(even if that is the more legally difficult issue) before proceeding to address whether it (or, for
that matter, the state court) would have personal jurisdiction over the protesting defendant"),
cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 589 (1998) (No. 98-470). The original three-judge panel also so held.
See Marathon Oil Co. v. Ruhrgas, A.G., 115 F.3d 315 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 413
(1997).
370. Marathon Oil Co., 145 F.3d at 217; cf Hanover Ins. Co. v. United States, 880 F.2d
1503, 1504 (1st Cir. 1989) (cautioning against the notion that "a word is a word is a word").
371. See Marathon Oil Co., 145 F.3d at 217-18.
372. See id. at 218 ("The Steel Co. majority opinion plainly contemplates Article III jurisdiction in its use of the term Jurisdiction.' ").
373. See id. at 218-19.
374 Id. at. 219; see also id. at 224.
375. See id. at 219-20. The Fifth Circuit also devoted a substantial portion of its analysis to
reconciling this holding with its prior case law. See id. at 220-22.
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In sharp contrast to the Fifth Circuit, the District of Columbia
Circuit held that a court may undertake either a personal jurisdiction
or a forum non conveniens analysis, and that a dismissal may rest on
76
either basis, without first verifying subject-matter jurisdiction.
Faced with potential dismissal on several grounds-standing, the act
of state doctrine, personal jurisdiction, forum non conveniens, and the
jurisdictional bar of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976
("FSIA")77-the court properly noted that the threshold question in a
Steel Co. analysis is whether the issue to be reached at the outset is
"Whether a defense is
jurisdictional or nonjurisdictional.
'jurisdictional' is a [difficult] question ....But the question is
important, since resolving a merits issue while jurisdiction is in doubt
'carries the courts beyond the bounds of authorized judicial action'
and violates the principle that 'the first and fundamental question is
Though recognizing that "[s]tanding, of
that of jurisdiction.'"378
course, is jurisdictional,"379 the court then seemed to hold that
personal jurisdiction and forum non conveniens are neither
jurisdictional nor merits-related (and, as such, would fall under this
Article's third category as described above). "Forum non conveniens,"
according to the court, "does not raise a jurisdictional bar but instead
involves a deliberate abstention from the exercise of jurisdiction.
While such abstention may appear logically to rest on an assumption
of jurisdiction, it is as merits-free as a finding of no jurisdiction."31°
Thus, "it would be proper to dismiss on such grounds (if meritorious)
without reaching the FSIA issue."38' "Similarly, dismissal for want of
376. See In re Minister Papandreou, 139 F.3d 247, 255-56 (D.C. Cir. 1998). The D.C.
Circuit reaffirmed its stance in Pace v. Bureau of Prisons, No. 98-5025, 1998 WL 545414, at *1
(D.C. Cir. July 17, 1998) (per curiam) ("The district court was not required to resolve the issue of
personal jurisdiction prior to ruling on the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim because
personal jurisdiction exists to protect the liberty interests of defendants, unlike subject-matter
jurisdiction, which serves as a limitation on judicial competence."). At least one other court,
pre-Steel Co., had reached a similar conclusion. See, e.g., Cantor Fitzgerald, L.P. v. Peaslee, 88
F.3d 152, 155 (2d Cir. 1996) (adopting such a rule, though relating it to the now-repudiated
doctrine of hypothetical jurisdiction); cf Allen v. Ferguson, 791 F.2d 611, 615 (7th Cir. 1986)
(expressing "no opinion as to the correctness" of the proposition that courts, when faced with
motions to dismiss for personal and subject-matter jurisdiction, may decide the former and
forego the latter if the former is more convenient).
377. See In re Papandreou,139 F.3d at 249.
378. Id. at 254-55 (quoting Cross-Sound Ferry Servs. v. ICC, 934 F.2d 327, 341 (D.C. Cir.
1991) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the denial of the petition for review);
Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1012; Mansfield, Coldwater & Lake Mich. Ry.Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379,
382 (1884)).
379. In re Papandreou,139 F.3d at 255. In actuality, the court expressed "no opinion as to
whether th[e] defense [asserted] can properly be classified as standing," id., apparently leaving
it for the district court on remand. See id. at 256.
380. Id. at 255 (citations omitted).
381. Id. at 256.
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personal jurisdiction is independent of the merits and does not
require subject-matter jurisdiction."32
In short, "a court that
dismisses on other non-merits grounds such as forum non conveniens
and personal jurisdiction, before finding subject-matter jurisdiction,
makes no assumption of law-declaring power that violates the
"3
separation of powers principles underlying... Steel Co. 83
Another issue, the proper categorization and functional
significance of which have similarly divided the lower federal courts,
is Eleventh Amendment immunity. In particular, they differ over
whether it can be bypassed as long as Article III jurisdiction is
verified-which does seem permissible given that the Court
distinguished and preserved the doctrine of National Railroad
Passenger Corp.38--or whether Eleventh Amendment immunity, like
Article III jurisdiction, must be verified prior to reaching the merits.
A number of federal courts, for example, have opted for the latter
view, holding that an Eleventh Amendment issue must be verified
prior to reaching the merits. 38 As one circuit court explained, "[ain
assertion of Eleventh Amendment immunity essentially challenges a
court's subject matter jurisdiction" and therefore "must be resolved
3 86
before a court may address the merits of the underlying claim(s)."
By contrast, at least one federal court has held that it is permissible,
after otherwise verifying subject-matter jurisdiction, to bypass an
issue of Eleventh Amendment abrogation and proceed to the merits
387
(in that case, of an antitrust claim, which it ultimately dismissed).
According to this court, "[diespite the fact that sovereign immunity
382. Id.
383. Id. at 255. As part of its analysis, the court also noted Steel Co.'s reaffirmation of prior
case law in which the Supreme Court declined pendent jurisdiction and abstained from exercising jurisdiction without first verifying that jurisdiction actually existed. See id. (discussing Ellis
v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426, 436 (1975); Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 715-16 (1973)).
These reaffirmations are summarized supra at notes 290-300 and accompanying text.
384. National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453
(1974); see also supraPart III.D.3.
385. See, e.g., Johnson v. State Tech. Center, 24 F. Supp. 2d 833, 938 (W.D. Tenn. 1998)
(holding that "[ajn assertion of Eleventh Amendment immunity... challenges the court's
jurisdiction" and, under Steel Co., "must be resolved before a court can determine the merits of
the underlying claim"); McGregor v. Goord, 18 F. Supp. 2d 204, 206 (N.D.N.Y. 1998) (treating
the Eleventh Amendment as a jurisdictional bar to which the rule of Steel Co. should be applied,
and ultimately dismissing for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction) (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for
a Better Env't, 520 U.S. 83, 118 S. Ct. 1003, 1012 (1998)).
386. Seaborn v. Florida, 143 F.3d 1405, 1407 & n.2 (11th Cir. 1998) (citing Steel Co., 118 S.
Ct. at 1012-16), petitionfor cert. filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3409 (U.S. Sept. 14, 1998) (No. 98-998).
387. See, e.g., Bowers v. NCAA, 9 F. Supp. 2d 460, 498 n.15 (D.N.J. 1998); cf. Palmer v.
Arkansas Council on Econ. Educ., 154 F.3d 892, 895 n.3 (8th Cir. 1998) (avoiding the question of
Eleventh Amendment abrogation and instead disposing of the case on the merits, though not
characterizing its decision as an assumption of jurisdiction).
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'partakes of the nature of a jurisdictional bar,' the Eleventh
Amendment 'enacts a sovereign immunity from suit, rather than a
nonwaivable limit on the federal judiciary's subject-matter
jurisdiction.',3" Thus, it stated, "all [that the court has] done is
choose one among potentially numerous bases upon which to dismiss
the Sherman Act claim on the merits."389 In other words, because the
Eleventh Amendment (in the court's view) did not genuinely pose an
issue of subject-matter jurisdiction strictly conceived, under Steel Co.
it did not need to be determined before the court proceeded to the
undisputed merits of the case. 390
Unfortunately, personal jurisdiction and Eleventh Amendment
immunity are but two of countless issues the status of
which-especially their bypassability-remains uncertain in the wake
of Steel Co. Among other jurisdictional issues that have been held to
be nonbypassable are the amount-in-controversy element of diversity
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a),391 supplemental jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1367,392 the reviewability under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 of

388. Bowers, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 498 n.15 (quoting Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261,
117 S. Ct. 2028, 2033 (1997); College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense
Bd., 131 F.3d 353, 365 (3d Cir. 1997)).
389. Bowers, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 498 n.15.
390. Whether or not the district court correctly characterized the Eleventh Amendment
issue as nonjurisdictional for purposes of verifying subject-matter jurisdiction is unclear. The
Supreme Court, in a recent decision in which it explicitly declined to address an Eleventh
Amendment issue until after it had verified the existence of a case or controversy, remarked
that "[wihile the Eleventh Amendment is jurisdictional in the sense that it is a limitation on the
federal court's judicial power, and therefore can be raised at any stage of the proceedings, we
have recognized that it is not co-extensive with the limitations on judicial power in Article III."
Calderon v. Ashmus, 523 U.S. 740, 118 S. Ct. 1694, 1697 n.2 (1998). This passage is rather
vague, however, and its significance in terms of the situation raised in the text is uncertain. Cf.
Marathon Oil Co. v. A-G. Ruhrgas, 145 F.3d 211, 218 n.8 (5th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (citing this
passage as a reminder by the Supreme Court "of the distinction between restrictions on subjectmatter jurisdiction inherent in Article III and those that operate as an external limitation on an
Article III court's adjudication"), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 589 (1998) (No. 98-470).
391. See, e.g., Iglesias v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 156 F.3d 237,242-43 (1st Cir. 1998).
392. See, e.g., Gold v. Local 7 United Food & Commercial Workers Union, 159 F.3d 1307,
1309-11 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that, under Steel Co., a district court must verify its supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 before assessing the merits of supplemental
state law claims). The court noted that "[a]lthough Steel addresses standing in the context of a
federal question claim, its rationale must certainly apply-with even greater force-to questions
of supplemental jurisdiction, which implicate additional concerns of federalism and comity." Id.
at 1310 (citing Iglesias, 156 F.3d at 240-41). "The proper course of conduct when declining
supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) is to dismiss the state law claims
without prejudice, in order to permit them to be brought in state court." Id. at 1311. "Because a
refusal to exercise supplemental jurisdiction means the district court is without subject matter
jurisdiction, there can be no res judicata effect in state court when the district court has recourse to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). Accordingly, such a refusal is not contrary to the reasoning of
Marathon Oil...." Id. at 1311 n.5 (citing MarathonOil, 145 F.3d at 218).
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deportation-related detention decisions,3 93 and-though rather far394
removed from Article I-the procedural requirements of Rules 3(c)
By
and 4(b)395 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.
the
include
comparison, issues that have been held to be bypassable
96
exhaustion of administrative remedies under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a),
7
the quantitative employee element of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), 39 the
398
certificate-of-appealability requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2),
and (possibly) Younger abstention.3 99 Typical of this latter category of
393. See, e.g., Ncube v. INS Dist. Dirs. & Agents, No. 98 Civ. 0282 HB AJP, 1998 WL
842349, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 1998).
394. See, e.g., United States v. Webb, 157 F.3d 451, 452-53 (6th Cir. 1998) (per curiam)
(dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the appellant's notice of appeal "fails to
designate the name of the court to which his appeal is taken" as required by FED. R. APP. P. 3(c),
insofar as "the requirements of Rule 3(c) are jurisdictional in nature" and, under Steel Co., the
court cannot reach the merits of the appeal without such jurisdiction); see also United States v.
Olds, No. 97-5436, 1998 WL 833699, at *1-2 (6th Cir. Nov. 20, 1998) (per curiam) (same). The
Webb court indicated that its prior decision, Brooks v. Toyotomi Co., 86 F.3d 582, 586 (6th Cir.
1996), which "assume[d] the existence of appellate jurisdiction arguendo"despite noncompliance
with Rule 3(c), was effectively abrogated by Steel Co. See Webb, 157 F.3d at 452 (citing Steel Co.
v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 118 S. Ct. 1003, 1012 (1998)).
395. See, e.g., United States v. Rapoport, 159 F.3d 1, 2-3 (1st Cir. 1998) (applying the rule of
Steel Co. to a determination of whether a notice of appeal under FED. R. APP. P. 4(b) was timely
filed and ultimately dismissing for lack of appellate jurisdiction).
396. See, e.g., White v. Fauver, 19 F. Supp. 2d 305, 318 n.16 (D.N.J. 1998) ("Failure to
exhaust administrative remedies under [42 U.S.C.] § 1997e(a) is not a jurisdictional bar to
bringing suit in federal court. Therefore, this Court is not engaging in the improper practice of
'assuming'jurisdiction.") (citing Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1012). For a contrary holding in a different context, see Stelco Holding Co. v. United States, 42 Fed. Cl. 101, 103-06 (Fed. Cl. 1998)
(holding that filing an administrative refund claim is a jurisdictional prerequisite of the court in
various refund actions, and that the merits of the actions cannot be reached in the absence of
such a filing).
397. See, e.g., Sharpe v. Jefferson Distrib. Co., 148 F.3d 676, 677-78 (7th Cir. 1998) ("A
plaintiffs inability to demonstrate that the defendant has 15 employees is just like any other
failure to meet a statutory requirement.... Surely the number of employees is not the sort of
question a court (including appellate court) must raise on its own, which a Jurisdictional' characterization would entail.") (citations omitted).
398. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 158 F.3d 736, 741-42 (3d Cir. 1998). In Williams,
the Third Circuit was faced with a habeas petitioner who had not first applied to the district
court for a certificate of appealability under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(cX2), which requires "a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right." The court was uncertain whether application to
the district court was a jurisdictional prerequisite. Rather than resolving that issue, however,
the court proceeded to determine that the showing had not been made and thus denied the appeal. It reasoned that this approach was consistent with Steel Co.:
[I]f we were to determine that we will not issue a certificate of appealability because [the
petitioner] has not demonstrated that he is entitled to one under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(3),
then we would find that this court does not have jurisdiction to go forward in this
appeal. On the other hand, if we were to find that we cannot issue a certificate of
appealability because Williams did not apply for a certificate to the district court, we
also would determine that we do not have jurisdiction to go forward.
Id. at 742. But the court obviously had already decided the merits issue, because it omitted a
third possibility, namely, that it might find that the petitioner did demonstrate an entitlement
to the certificate of appealability.
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cases is the Second Circuit's holding that it may bypass the issue of
whether or not a party is proper when service of process is not
effectuated. 4°° Deeming this failure "excusable" and thus "not an
exercise of hypothetical jurisdiction of the sort disapproved of by the
Supreme Court in Steel Co.,"401 the court held-in terms obviously
derived from the hypothetical jurisdiction lineage-that "[blecause the
merits of the case... are easily resolved, we assume, without
deciding, that [the party in question] is a proper party to this
action."4o2
Among other things, this rampant confusion in the application
of Steel Co. raises several secondary issues regarding the interpretive
responsibilities of lower federal courts in the face of an opaque
jurisdictional ruling. Given the Court's ambiguity as to the reach of
the repudiation beyond Article IH requirements, for example, should
these lower courts err on the side of overapplication or
underapplication?
Or, assuming it does reach non-Article III
requirements, should a court, when confronted with an issue that may
or may not be jurisdictional, err on the side of inclusion or exclusion?
Unfortunately, neither principled analysis nor even expediency may
yield clear answers to such questions. As a matter of principle, one
might be tempted to err on the side of overapplication and inclusion,
with the result being that all arguably jurisdictional questions are
ultimately deemed jurisdictional, and that all or most questions
deemed jurisdictional must be decided at the outset. Taking this
approach, courts would effectively be immune from allegations that

399. The Eleventh Circuit held, post-Steel Co., that Younger abstention is similarly bypassable, though it did not explicitly mention the Steel Co. decision. See Falanga v. State Bar., 150
F.3d 1333, 1335 n.2 (11th Cir. 1998) ("assum[ing] without deciding" that the district court's
abstention decision was proper "[blecause it appears that 'Younger abstention is not jurisdictional'") (quoting Benavidez v. Eu, 34 F.3d 825, 829 (9th Cir. 1994)).
400. See United States v. Vazquez, 145 F.3d 74, 80 & n.3 (2d Cir. 1998).
40L Id. at 80 n.3 (citing Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1012-16). The court based its conclusion
that a failure to effectuate service of process is excusable on FED. R. CIv. P. 4(m), which
authorizes a court to extend the statutory service period "if the plaintiff shows good cause for
the failure." See id. at 80.
402. Id. at 80 & n.3. The Seventh Circuit as well has already invoked this technique, twice
in one case in fact. See Kauthar SDN BHD v. Sternberg, 149 F.3d 659, 672 (7th Cir. 1998)
(bypassing the issue of extraterritorial jurisdiction under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act ("RICO"), "[b]ecause this is a statutory standing question" and therefore
deciding that the court "need not resolve it definitively before addressing merits questions"
(citing Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1013 & n.2)), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 890 (1999); id. at 669 n.13
(bypassing the issue of purchaser standing under 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) and 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
because it "appears to us to be a statutory standing issue directly analogous to the 'zone of
interests' doctrine, one of the 'set of prudential principles that bear on the question of
standing,'" and therefore may be sidestepped) (quoting Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 117 S.
Ct. 1154, 1161-62 (1997)).
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they were ever engaging in hypothetical jurisdiction, exercising power
that the Congress (let alone the Constitution) had not in fact provided
for them. This appears to have been the posture of a panel of the
District of Columbia Circuit when confronted by an issue that was
both complex and only arguably jurisdictional, precisely the sort of
issue that a court might be expected to bypass.403 The issue was
whether the waiver of federal sovereign immunity in an
environmental statute extended to the government's regulatory
activities, or whether it was limited to nonregulatory activities such
as contracting-a question that was functionally jurisdictional in the
sense that, if answered in favor of immunity, could bar the suit
entirely. Though acknowledging that "the claim of immunity is
jurisdictional" in a general sense, 4 4 nevertheless the court was
"uncertain whether Steel Co.'s holding requires us to resolve the
government's waiver claim first, when, as here, even the merits
evidence that would be excluded under the government's waiver
theory comes nowhere near establishing liability, and when we are
certain of our jurisdiction over the suit itself."40 5 Taking "the more
cautious approach," the court eventually decided to resolve the
jurisdictional question first, and only then proceeded to the merits40 6
based question of liability.
But was this panel correct?
Is this approach, though
seemingly "the more cautious," truly justifiable? Depending on the
circumstances, one could in fact argue that such an approach may
actually defy the Court's intentions in Steel Co., may undermine the
separation of powers by overapplying various statutory jurisdictional
devices enacted by Congress, and may result in a needlessly excessive
and inefficient use of judicial resources. In addition, the treatment of
all arguably jurisdictional issues as jurisdictional in the Steel Co.
context will inevitably create friction with the dissimilar treatment of
identical issues in other contexts, thus necessitating a justification for
the differential treatment and, at the very least, spawning confusion
among litigants and judges. Finally, the route of inclusion and
overapplication may not always be so principled and cautious after

403. See East Bay Mun. Util. Dist. v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 142 F.3d 479, 482
(D.C. Cir. 1998).

404- Id.
405. Id.
406. Id.
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all, given that some courts may be eager to deem an issue
jurisdictional in order to avoid the option of bypassing it.407
Of course, the ultimate responsibility for properly interpreting
the scope of Steel Co. must be assumed by each court or judge, acting
in good faith, in the context of individual cases. Although several
courts to date have extended the repudiation of hypothetical
jurisdiction well beyond Article III requirements-an ironic
development given the judiciary's prior overuse of hypothetical
jurisdiction-a reasonable case can be made that these rulings, or at
least some of them, are mistaken. Accordingly, the court or judge who
does not believe that the Supreme Court intended to prohibit the
practice of hypothetical jurisdiction outside of the strictures of Article
III should feel free to employ this practice in the treatment of issues
falling within this third category-that is, jurisdictional issues
independent of Article III and issues that are neither jurisdictional
nor merits-related. This is not to say that all such issues will lend
themselves to the practice, or that various prudential considerations
might not counsel against its invocation. But courts should not
necessarily assume, despite a number of early rulings to the contrary,
that the Steel Co. decision itself precludes this course of action.
4. Address the Merits in Dictum
A fourth method for sidestepping hypothetical jurisdiction's
repudiation focuses less on what the case governs and more on what it
does not. Steel Co. generally teaches that a court cannot proceed to
the merits of a dispute without first verifying its Article III
jurisdiction, no matter how difficult the jurisdictional question may
appear. The constitutional reason for this rule is not, however, that

407. See, e.g., Nagel v. ADM Inv. Servs., Inc., No. 96 CV 2675, 1998 WL 381978, at *4 (N.D.
IlM. July 6, 1998) (holding that failure to fall within the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283
(1994 & Supp. 1996), meant that the court "lack[ed] jurisdiction" and that, under Steel Co.,
"[flurther consideration" of the merits "would, therefore, be inappropriate"); see also Broad v.
DKP Corp., No. 97 Civ. 2029, 1998 WL 516113, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 1998) (refusing to
entertain a cross-motion alleging a new basis for jurisdiction (RICO) once the original basis
(diversity) had been successfully challenged, because entertaining the cross-motion "would
require [the court] to assume jurisdiction and resolve, in the context of [the defendant's]
opposition to [the plaintiffs] cross-motion, a merits issue, i.e., whether the RICO claim is
timely" and because "the broader teachings of Steel Co. counsel against such a
result-jurisdiction is a threshold matter, without which I do not have the authority to
entertain plaintiffs cross-motion to amend"). Importantly, the court also noted that its court of
appeals, the Second Circuit, "has explicitly rejected the practice of retroactive jurisdiction, i.e.,
permitting a plaintiff belatedly to attempt to assert subject matter jurisdiction by amendment."
Id. at *5 (citing Pressroom Unions-Printers League Income Sec. Fund v. Continental Assurance
Co., 700 F.2d 889, 893-94 (2d Cir. 1983)).
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"the merits" as such are forbidden ground, but rather that the court's
issuance of a judgment on the merits without jurisdiction would
transgress the authority and limits of Article III. "What is beyond the
power of courts lacking jurisdiction," in other words, "is adjudication
on the merits, the act of deciding the case." 408 Thus, short of actually

adjudicating the dispute and issuing a judgment-which is to say,
short of making a difference to the parties-a court probably does not
violate Steel Co. merely by commenting on the merits in the absence
of verified subject-matter jurisdiction. 4 9 Needless to say, such
behavior may violate a host of prudential or quasi-constitutional,
judge-made rules, such as those cautioning against the excessive use
of dictum 410 or the formulation of a holding that is broader than
necessary to dispose of the case,41' but it would not offend Article Ill
and, presumably, would therefore not offend the rule of Steel Co.
Given this premise, one option for courts faced with a difficult
jurisdictional question is to find that jurisdiction is lacking (if that is
a justifiable finding), but nevertheless in dictum to express its view of
the merits. Such undertakings-which certainly can be found prior to
Steel Co. 4 2 -are often called alternative holdings, although after Steel
Co. the word "holding" may be problematic insofar as it implies that

408. In re Minister Papandreou, 139 F.3d 247, 255 (D.C. Cir. 1998); see also The Fair v.
Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913) ("Jurisdiction is authority to decide the case

either way.").
409. See In re Papandreou, 139 F.3d at 255 (noting that it is the "assumption of law-

declaring power" in the absence of subject-matter jurisdiction "that violates the separation of
powers principles underlying... Steel Co.").
410. See, e.g., David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor,100 HARV. L. REV. 731, 736
(1987) (observing that "the prevailing view of the judicial function... would support the judge
who, as an individual, does not go so far as he might be willing to go if the case before him does
not require it").
411 See, e.g., Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 569 (1947) (stating that
"constitutional issues affecting legislation will not be determined... in broader terms than are
required by the precise facts to which the ruling is to be applied) (citing Ashwander v.
Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)).
412. See, e.g., New York v. Reebok Int'l Ltd., 96 F.3d 44, 48 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that the
appellants lacked standing but then stating that "[oln the basis of this holding, we could conclude our review of the challenged settlement approval. However, in view of the differences in
the circuits on the issue ofthe appellate standing of unidentified class action members, we deem
it advisable also to review the merits of appellants' claims . . . ."); Doyle v. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n,

998 F.2d 1559, 1567 (10th Cir. 1993) ("to eliminate any doubt.., we elect to proceed to an alternate holding on the merits"); Halperin v. CIA, 629 F.2d 144, 154 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (holding
that the plaintiff lacked standing but then, in light of the "possibility" that the Supreme Court
could narrow its precedent such that plaintiff would have standing "and considering that judicial economy is best served by our resolving all relevant issues at this stage, we proceed to consider the merits of plaintiffs constitutional claim as an equal alternative ground of our decision").
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the judgment actually rests, even in part, on that basis. 413 Instead,
courts will simply have to engage in dictum outright, explaining that
even if jurisdiction did exist, the suit would likely have been
dismissed in any event.414 Some judges have apparently adopted this
milder practice in the wake of Steel Co.,415 while others had already
employed it well before the repudiation of hypothetical jurisdiction.416

In one post-repudiation diversity case, the First Circuit refused
pursuant to Steel Co. to bypass the amount-in-controversy issue, 4 7
only then to offer its "initial impressions" on a merits issue because,
though "non-binding," they "would be helpful."41s Likewise, in another
post-repudiation case, the Second Circuit, also noting the rule of Steel
413. See, e.g., Schurr v. Resorts Inl Hotel, Inc., 16 F. Supp. 2d 537, 551 n.5 (D.N.J. 1998)
(dismissing a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for lack of standing, specifically lack of injury and causation, and refusing pursuant to Steel Co. to consider an alternative but related basis for dismissal-namely, a lack of causation under section 1983-because, "not hav[ing] jurisdiction to
consider [the plaintiffs] constitutional claims, the Court has no power to announce, even as an
alternative basis, a decision on the question of whether Schurr could satisfy the causation
aspect of a section 1983 claim") (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 118
S. Ct. 1003, 1012 (1998)).
414. For an assessment of this technique, see Phillip M. Kannan, Advisory Opinions by
FederalCourts, 32 U. RICH. L. REv. 769, 785-96 (1998).
415. See, e.g., Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth. Profl Firefighters Local 3217 v.
Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth., 159 F.3d 630, 631 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Henderson, J., concurring) (explaining that "[the holding in [Steel Co.] compels me to concur on the jurisdictional
ground set forth in the majority opinion" but nevertheless commenting that "the Union's sole
surviving claim is plainly res judicata"); City of Chicago v. Shalala, No. 97 C 4884, 1998 WL
164889, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 1998) (deliberating on forgoing hypothetical jurisdiction in light
of Steel Co., deciding instead to "describe the parties' claims and sort out the various bars to the
plaintiffs and plaintiffs-intervenors' claims before reaching the merits of the few claims that are
ultimately left," but then noting that "its merits analysis would have applied equally to all of the
constitutional challenges" to the statute in question); cf Starr v. Mandanici, 152 F.3d 741, 75152 (8th Cir. 1998) (Beam, J., concurring in part) (agreeing with "those portions of [the majority]
opinion holding that [the plaintiff] ha[d] insufficient Article I standing... and with those
portions holding that we do not have jurisdiction to reach the merits" but then, citing Steel Co.,
criticizing the court for addressing matters not strictly necessary to the jurisdictional analysis).
416. See, e.g., Wind River Multiple Use Advocates v. Espy, No. 94-8031, 1996 WL 223925,
at *1 n.2 (10th Cir. May 3, 1996) ("Courts routinely make alternative decisions on the merits
while simultaneousy holding that a plaintiff lacks standing to sue. This practice is in the best
interest of judicial economy and does not violate the case and controversy requirement of Article
III of the United States Constitution.") (citing Sierra Club v. Robertson, 28 F.3d 753 (8th Cir.
1994); Idaho Conservation League v. Mumma, 956 F.2d 1508 (9th Cir. 1992)); Garingalao v.
Office of Personnel Management, No. 91-3233, 1991 WL 181435, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 18, 1991)
(per curiam) (dismissing for lack of jurisdiction but nevertheless concluding that "[elven
assuming jurisdiction existed, we see no error in the [Administrative Judge]'s decision on the
merits"); Oro v. Office of Personnel Management, No. 91-3225, 1991 WL 181436, at *1 (Fed. Cir.
Sept. 18, 1991) (per curiam) (same); Holz v. INS, 309 F.2d 452, 454 (9th Cir. 1962) (proclaiming
that "ours is a court of limited jurisdiction" and concluding that in the case at bar "we are
required to dismiss the petition on the ground that this court is without jurisdiction," and then
noting that "were we to assume this court has jurisdiction, we would reach an equivalent result
on the merits").
417. See Iglesias v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 156 F.3d 237,242-43 (1st Cir. 1998).
418. Id. at 243 (citing Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1012).
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Co., vacated the judgment below and remanded for a more informed
determination of subject-matter jurisdiction, but could not resist
commenting to a "limited extent" on the district court's treatment of
the merits. 419 And in another such case, one judge even dissented
from the majority's reaching of the merits based on his conclusion
that jurisdiction did not exist and that dismissal was thus warranted
under Steel Co., only then to remark: "I regret my inability to join in
the majority's discussion and analysis (though I should add that if my
view on the jurisdictional issue were different, I would be pleased to
sign onto that persuasive opinion on the merits)."420 Despite his
outward fidelity to the rule of Steel Co., in other words, the judge
nonetheless effectively sidestepped the rule by stating his view of the
merits in the form of a postscript.
Of course, because this technique generates dictum rather
than a holding, whereas hypothetical jurisdiction would generate the
latter, there would be no res judicata on the merits and the
precedential or stare decisis effect of a court's view of the merits
would be lessened. To be sure, even a true alternative holding,
outside the Steel Co. context, does not necessarily enjoy the same
weight as the primary holding.421 But this hardly renders such dictum
inefficacious. In terms of precedential effect, for example, it was
earlier noted that so-called considered dictum may indeed carry
substantial weight.422 Moreover, even if this weight is not formally
acknowledged, it is quite likely that legal decision making will still be
shaped by such dictum. For example, lawyers will not press a claim
that appears to have been flatly rejected, "[plrivate agreements
among the parties or between the parties and their attorneys or
indemnitors may also be affected," 423 and lower court judges may
decide more readily against such a claim when it is subsequently
confronted on the merits.44 All in all, then, this technique may prove
419. Filetech S-A. v. France Telecom S., 157 F.3d 922,930, 932 (2d Cir. 1998).
420. Tara M. v. City of Phila., 145 F.3d 625, 629 (3d Cir. 1998) (Shadur, J., dissenting).
42L See Kent Greenawalt, Reflections on Holding and Dictum, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 431,437
(1989) (speculating that courts do not "typically treat alternative holdings as dictum, though
perhaps the authority of an alternative holding is less forceful than the authority of a single
holding").
422. See supra notes 343-45 and accompanying text.

423. Clow v. United States Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 948 F.2d 614, 627 n.4 (9th Cir.
1991) (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting). Although Judge O'Scannlain was referring to the possible
effect of a merits-based decision resting on hypothetical jurisdiction, as opposed to a pure

jurisdictional dismissal, his point applies with equal force to a jurisdictional dismissal
accompanied by a dictal discussion of the merits.
424. See Greenawalt, supra note 421, at 432-33 (discussing predictive capacities of attorneys and lower court judges confronted with apparent dictum).
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both quite useful and increasingly common as a means of sidestepping
the Steel Co. rule.
5. Deem the Merits Insubstantial
Finally, courts may turn to the substantiality doctrine, which
was expressly preserved by Steel Co., as a proxy for hypothetical
jurisdiction. This doctrine, as noted earlier, allows a court to dismiss
an insubstantial or frivolous claim for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1). Such dismissals may prove a useful
substitute in certain cases where subject-matter jurisdiction may be
otherwise complicated but where the merits are so manifestly against
the party seeking jurisdiction that a court could justifiably deem the
claim insubstantial. Some courts, in fact, even formulated their

doctrines of hypothetical jurisdiction to require, among other things,
that "the merits of the appeal be insubstantial,"425 although in all
likelihood they were not using the term "insubstantial" precisely as it
is used in the 12(b)(1) setting.426
Naturally there would be important differences between a
12(b)(1) dismissal and a dismissal based on hypothetical jurisdiction,
both for the plaintiff and for the court. Most obviously, a 12(b)(1)
dismissal for insubstantiality, though essentially declaring the claim
meritless, nevertheless would not be prejudicial and would not
possess res judicata effect beyond the specific issue of subject-matter
jurisdiction in federal court. 427 Accordingly, a plaintiff subject to such
a dismissal could theoretically refile in state court, absent exclusive
federal court jurisdiction or other impediment.428 From the court's
425. E.g., United States v. Troescher, 99 F.3d 933, 934 n.1 (9th Cir. 1996).
426. Cf. Comment, The Significance of Dismissals "ForWant of a Substantial Federal
Question": OriginalSin in the Federal Courts, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 785, 786-89 (1968) (observing
that the meaning of substantiality can differ among jurisdictional doctrines); see also Thomason
v. Norman E. Lehrer, P.C., 182 F.R.D. 121, 127 & n.1 (D.N.J. 1998) (noting difference between
frivolousness for purposes of sanctions under FED. R. Civ. P. 11 and insubstantiality for purposes of 12(b)(1)).
427. But cf supra text accompanying notes 286-89 (noting that the Court's opinion in
Norton could be read as legitimizing dismissals for insubstantiality that are nevertheless
prejudicial).
428. Refiling in federal court would be barred by res judicata on the issue of jurisdiction,
see supra note 238 and accompanying text, and could trigger sanctions under FED. R. Civ. P.
11(c), which authorizes sanctions against attorneys or parties who, among other things, advance
unwarranted or frivolous legal claims in their signed pleadings, as provided in Rule 11(b). See
Gutierrez v. Fox, 141 F.3d 425, 427 (2d Cir. 1998) ("If an attorney alleges jurisdiction when
reasonable inquiry would show that it did not exist, he may be held liable for sanctions substantial in amount."); Weisman v. Rivlin, 598 F. Supp. 724, 726 (D.D.C. 1984) (imposing a Rule
11 sanction for asserting diversity jurisdiction where reasonable inquiry would reveal its plain
absence); cf. Ricketts v. Midwest Nat'l Bank, 874 F.2d 1177, 1182 n.4 (7th Cir. 1989) (noting
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perspective, moreover, a dismissal for insubstantiality may give rise
to at least two concerns. First, "the standard for [an insubstantiality]
dismissal is a rigorous one" and such a dismissal "should be applied
only in extraordinary circumstances." 4 9 If only for fear of reversal,
courts may thus be wary of pushing the substantiality doctrine too far
simply to achieve indirectly what they can no longer achieve following
the demise of hypothetical jurisdiction. Second, the finding of no
jurisdiction would not only have res judicata effect within its own
sphere, but, unlike hypothetical jurisdiction, would create
jurisdictional precedent within the deciding district or circuit.
Because jurisdictional doctrines can apply across the docket, the effect
of such precedent could be significant, especially if courts noticeably
distort the concept of insubstantiality in the process of foreclosing
meritless suits. As long as courts remain aware of these risks,
however, and especially where they are or can be minimized, the use
of insubstantiality dismissals in lieu of hypothetical jurisdiction may
very well turn out to be a serviceable technique.

V. THE DEEPER SIGNIFICANCE OF STEEL CO.
Having surveyed in full the doctrine of hypothetical
jurisdiction-its emergence, its growth, its repudiation, and the
means of its possible persistence-this Article would not be complete
without some discussion of the deeper significance of both the
existence of the doctrine and the Court's effort to eliminate it. That
the doctrine of hypothetical jurisdiction emerged and thrived among
the lower federal courts despite its patent illegitimacy is itself a
significant revelation about the propensities and susceptibilities of the
federal bench. Perhaps even more important, however, are that the

that "the district court is authorized to impose sanctions against a pro se plaintiff who successively seeks to press a wholly frivolous claim"). Additional discipline may also result if the federal court incorporates a state or model ethical rule prohibiting frivolous pleadings, such as Rule
3.1 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which provides in part that "[a] lawyer shall not
bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis for
doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCT Rule 3.1 (1983); see
also 6TH CM. R. 32(b) (incorporating the Model Rules of Professional Conduct); 11TH CR. addendum VIII, Rule 1(1)A (same).
429. Ricketts, 874 F.2d at 1182; see also Thomason, 182 F.R.D. at 127 (noting that
"dismissal of a claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), rather than for
failure to state a claim under Rule 12(bX6), is reserved for the truly extreme case"); Bryant v.
New Jersey Dep't of Transp., 998 F. Supp. 438, 443 n.4 (D.N.J. 1998) (calling it a "narrow and
rarely invoked rule").
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doctrine grew out of the Supreme Court's own decisions, that the
Court-though "acknowledg[ing]" that these decisions "diluted the
absolute purity of the rule that Article III jurisdiction is always an
antecedent question"430-otherwise assumed no responsibility for the
doctrine, and that the Court, even while denouncing hypothetical
jurisdiction, seemed unable to repudiate it in an unconditional or
unambiguous manner. This final Part will consider what these and
related circumstances reveal both about the nature and accountability
of the Court's jurisdictional decision making and about the
jurisprudential debates that animate the Justices' conception of the
Constitution and of the Article III judiciary.
A. JudicialAccountability
Despite the tenor of the Steel Co. majority opinion, it is this
author's contention that the emergence and growth of hypothetical
jurisdiction should ultimately be attributed to the Supreme Court
itself-to its extant jurisdictional rulings and to its overall disposition
towards Article III power. Among other things, these phenomena
reflect the Court's chronic inability to adhere to its own formalist
framework under Article III, its constant crafting of exceptions to
rules and the transformation of such rules into standards and even
guidelines, and its incorrect and arguably self-serving assumption
that the lower federal courts would not follow suit, whether in
doctrine or in attitude. Often it is said that actions speak louder than
words, and the Court's own behavior (despite its accompanying
rhetoric) did little to forestall, and plenty to encourage, the emergence
and spread of the doctrine. From one perspective, of course, the long
list of Supreme Court opinions that the lower courts invoked to justify
the doctrine is simply an indication of the boundless resourcefulness,
even the lawlessness, of these courts. That is not an inappropriate
conception, and much of this Article either assumes or confirms its
validity. From another perspective, however, it is a testament to the
Court's recurrent jurisdictional untidiness and is a necessary
byproduct of the Court's opportunistic handiwork when confronted
with apparent constraints on its own adjudicatory power. 43 '
430. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 118 S. Ct. 1003, 1016 (1998).
431. For a strong critique of the Court's jurisdictional opinions, particularly in the area of
personal jurisdiction, see Friedrich K. Juenger, American Jurisdiction:A Story of Comparative
Neglect, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 2-4 (1993):
The Court's never-ending opinions, larded with linguistic refinements that are intended
to fill empty phrases with meaning and adorned with copious citations, inspire little
confidence....
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This latter perspective is only confirmed, not contradicted, by
the Court's opinion in Steel Co. Despite denouncing hypothetical
jurisdiction, the Court left in its wake a mesmerizing jumble of
related doctrines and new questions, the uncertain dimensions of
which are magnified both by its failure to explain with any precision
the boundaries of the repudiation and by a landslide of separate
opinions that have already prompted one circuit court to conclude that
only a "plurality" backed the repudiation and that it is "not entirely
clear as to whether (or to what extent) Steel Co. undermines our
earlier practice [of assuming jurisdiction]."432 This inability to cleanly
repudiate hypothetical jurisdiction, in turn, reflects a continuing
tension between, on the one hand, the Court's self-recognized
constitutional mandate to delineate and respect the limits of its own
power and, on the other hand, its prudential, rather human desire to
retain substantial discretion over its adjudicatory domain-the very
same tension that allowed all thirteen circuit courts to employ the
aberrant device of hypothetical jurisdiction while concomitantly
expounding the virtues of restraint and the importance of adhering to
the textual and doctrinal limitations of Article III.
Viewed from this perspective, Steel Co. is as much a tale about
the federal bench, and the Supreme Court in particular, as it is a
chronicle of the life and death of hypothetical jurisdiction. Doctrines
come and go, but the institutional and psychological forces that
create, animate, and legitimize them remain more or less constant
over time.
To appreciate fully the emergence and demise of
hypothetical jurisdiction, one must therefore enter the psyche, if you
will, of the federal judicial mind. By highlighting the prudential and
strategic dimensions of jurisdictional decision making, this Article has
attempted to do just that, and in so doing has demonstrated both the
likelihood that the essence of hypothetical jurisdiction will endure

The befuddled case law and the disagreements in the Supreme Court suggest that
the Justices themselves do not fully grasp the purport of the doctrines they propound.
At any rate, they seem either unable or disinclined to make some order out of the chaos
they have created. Indeed, in some of their opinions one senses a definite smugness
about the confusion the Court has sown ....
The confusion prevailing in the Supreme Court is mirrored and hypertrophied in
countless lower court opinions. State and federal judges, exploring the mysteries of
jurisdiction ad nauseam in endless pages of learned discourse embellished with myriad
citations, fill the case reports with a fog of inconsistent and often obtuse majority,
concurring and dissenting opinions.
Id. at 3-4 (footnote omitted).
432. Hardemon v. City of Boston, 144 F.3d 24, 26 (1st Cir. 1998).
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among the lower federal courts and the several alternative techniques
by which this possibility may become reality.
B. JurisprudentialDiscord
Steel Co. and the history of hypothetical jurisdiction are
important not only for what they reveal about the Court's role in
fostering and perpetuating the doctrine, but also for what they reveal
about the current Justices' discordant jurisprudential perspectives.
Underlying the Court's inability to speak with a united and coherent
voice is essentially a clash of opposing methodological or conceptual
approaches to jurisdictional decision making and, more
fundamentally, to the very enterprise of constitutional interpretation.
Addressed here will be two of the more prominent conflicts: first,
whether constitutional doctrine should be judicially promulgated in
the form of rules or of standards; and second, whether the
jurisdictional elements of Article HI should be interpreted in a
formalistic or a functionalistic manner.
1. Rules and Standards
The rules-versus-standards debate, as Professor Kathleen
Sullivan has observed, is not an unprecedented source of division
within the Court, 433 and the relative propriety of rules or standards
tends to vary according to one's premises, to the purposes of one's
endeavor, to the constraints of one's institutional circumstances, and
to the political context of one's decision making.43 A rule, to borrow
Sullivan's definition, "binds a decisionmaker to respond in a
determinate way to the presence of delimited triggering facts" and
"aim[s] to confine the decisionmaker to facts, leaving irreducibly
arbitrary and subjective value choices to be worked out elsewhere." 435
"A rule captures the background principle or policy in a form that
from then on operates independently" but "necessarily captures the
background principle or policy incompletely and so produces errors of
over- or under-inclusiveness."46 A standard, by comparison, "tends to
collapse decisionmaking back into the direct application of the
3 7 and "allow[s] for
background principle or policy to a fact situation"4
433.
Justices
434.
435.

See Sullivan, supranote 333, at 26, 122-23 (noting the rules-standards debate betwden
Black and Frankfurter).
See, e.g., id. at 123.
Id. at 58.

436. Id.
437. Id.
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the decrease of errors of under- and over-inclusiveness by giving the
decisionmaker more discretion than do rules."438 The hallmark of a
standard is that the decisionmaker is permitted to exercise judgment
(often modified with "reasoned" or "informed")439 and to "take into
account all relevant factors or the totality of the circumstances.""O
In Steel Co., Justice Scalia's approach for the majority clearly
comes down on the rules side of the debate. By eliminating the option
of bypassing Article III subject-matter jurisdiction en route to the
merits, Scalia confirms that such jurisdiction is an absolute
requirement, with no exceptions and no discretion on the part of
judges to consider, among other things, the difficulty of the
jurisdictional question, the ease of the merits, the condition of the
record or pleadings, or the efficiency of the alternatives.4 1 Needless
to say, Scalia's effort in this regard is somewhat undermined by the
ambiguous boundaries of the resulting rule and, relatedly, by the
number and complexity of the doctrines that the Court chose to
distinguish and reaffirm. Not only do these characteristics render the
Court's treatment of hypothetical jurisdiction less rule-like in
appearance and operation,44 2 they also tend to subvert several of the
rationales for formulating rules in the first place, such as legal
certainty and decisional economy.4 43 Be that as it may, the orientation
of Justice Scalia clearly is towards rules rather than standards.
On the standards side of the debate in Steel Co. are Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy, and possibly Justice Breyer as well (but
arguably not Justice Stevens, even though his common law
methodology would normally situate him there).
Justices

438. Id. at 58-59 (footnote omitted).
439. For an earlier example of a jurisdictional doctrine expressed in the form of a
'judgment7-based standard, see Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 574 (1947)
(stating that the applicability of the policy of not deciding constitutional questions unnecessarily
"can be determined only by an exercise of judgment relative to the particular presentation,
though relative also to the policy generally and to the degree in which the specific factors
rendering it applicable are exemplified in the particular case").
440. Sullivan, supranote 333, at 59.
441. Justice Scalia's focus is on the rule-like or standard-like quality of the resulting doctrine which is intended to direct the conduct of lower courts. As Professor Sullivan has observed, however, the choice between rules and standards can relate to more than one aspect of
constitutional decision making, including the treatment of precedent, the interpretation of text,
and the formulation of doctrine. See id. at 26, 69-95.
442. See id at 61 ("A rule may be corrupted by exceptions to the point where it resembles a
standard .... ").
443. See, e.g., id. at 62-66 (discussing such rationales).
444. See id. at 88 ("If Justice Scalia leads the charge for rules on the current Court, Justice
Stevens is his most consistent, standard-bearing antagonist. Justice Stevens has long favored
sliding-scale approaches over categorical rule-bound approaches."); see also William D. Popkin,
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O'Connor's and Kennedy's disposition in this regard is plainly
evidenced by refusing to sign onto the majority's attempt to repudiate
hypothetical jurisdiction in toto, and instead contending that "the
Court's opinion should not be read as cataloging an exhaustive list of
circumstances under which federal courts may exercise judgment in
'reserv[ing] difficult questions of... jurisdiction when the case
alternatively could be resolved on the merits in favor of the same
party.' "45 While this stance does not position O'Connor and Kennedy
too far on the standards side of the debate (just as Scalia's exceptionridden stance does not place him too far on the rules side), their
hesitation to foreclose future exceptions and their invocation of
"judgment"as a methodological principle unmistakably distance them
from the rule-orientation of the other members of the majority. 46
As for Justice Breyer, his positioning on the standards side of
the debate would appear, at first blush, to be even more manifest. In
his view, "federal courts often and typically should decide standing
questions at the outset of a case"" 7 but "[tihe Constitution... does
not require us to replace those words with the word 'always.' The
Constitution does not impose a rigid judicial 'order of operations,'
when doing so would cause serious practical problems.""4
What
makes Breyer's position difficult to classify is that while it is
superficially quite standard-like, it does nevertheless articulate an
alternative doctrine-namely, that jurisdiction must first be
confirmed unless the jurisdictional question is difficult and the merits
are easily resolved against the party asserting jurisdiction49-that is
arguably more rule-like than the position of Justices O'Connor and
Kennedy. Indeed, in contrast to these Justices, he does not advocate
A Common Law Lawyer on the Supreme Court: The Opinions of JusticeStevens, 1989 DUKE L.J.

1087.
445. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 118 S. Ct. 1003, 1020 (1998)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (quoting Norton v. Mathews, 427 U.S. 524, 532
(1976)).
446. The rules-standards divide between Justice Scalia and often Justice Thomas, on the
one hand, and Justices O'Connor and Kennedy and often Justice Stevens and possibly Justice
Breyer, on the other hand, can also be found in other decisions of the Court's 1997 term. See,
e.g., NEA v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 118 S. Ct. 2168, 2184 (1998) (Scalia & Thomas, J.J.,
concurring in the judgment) (arguing for a bright-line rule under which the First Amendment
"has no application to fimding" at all, and criticizing the majority opinion-which was authored
by O'Connor and joined by Rehnquist, Stevens, Kennedy, and Breyer-for interpreting the First
Amendment as having "some ineffable effect upon funding, imposing constraints of an
indeterminate nature").
447. Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1020 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
448. Id. at 1021.
449. See id. (embracing the formulation of hypothetical jurisdiction as articulated in
Norton, 427 U.S. at 532).
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leaving the door open for future exceptions and does not leave the
decision making to the undefined realm of "judgment," but rather to
the somewhat objective determination of the difficulty and simplicity
of the jurisdictional and merits questions, respectively.
Having mapped out the relative positions of the Steel Co.
protagonists along the rules-standards continuum, it is important to
consider the theoretical significance of adopting either a rule-oriented
or a standard-oriented approach to questions of federal jurisdictional
law. Justice Scalia's rule-orientation appears largely to reflect the
position that what legitimizes the federal judiciary is strict respect for
the limits of its Article III power and, when consistent with these
limits, for the constitutional prerogatives of the legislative and
executive branches. Rules are thus a medium of legitimacy, and they
are made all the more necessary by the fact that human beings-with
all their susceptibilities-sit on the federal bench. In turn, federal
jurisdictional law must be rule-based, lest its expositors might yield to
these susceptibilities and engage in practices, like hypothetical
jurisdiction, that "carr[y] the courts beyond the bounds of authorized
judicial action and thus offend[] fundamental principles of separation
of powers."450 "For a court to pronounce upon the meaning or the
constitutionality of a state or federal law when it has no jurisdiction
to do so is, by very definition, for a court to act ultra vires"45 -- and,
from Scalia's perspective, there can be no more illegitimate judicial
transgression than that.
Justice O'Connor's standard-orientation, by comparison,
appears largely to reflect the position that what legitimizes the
federal judiciary is not simply observance of its power and, perhaps to
a lesser extent, the prerogatives of the other branches, but also the
exercise of informed discretion or reasoned judgment as an essential
part of its decision-making process. For O'Connor, then, standards
are equally a medium of legitimacy, precisely because human
beings-with all their deliberative powers-sit on the federal bench.
In turn, federal jurisdictional law should (at least sometimes) be
standard-based, lest its expositors might be unable to produce
reflective judgments in light of the often-unforeseen complexities and
circumstances of each case. 452

450. Id. at 1012.
451. Id. at 1016.
452. See Sullivan, supra note 333, at 92 (discussing Justices O'Connor's and Kennedy's
reliance in one case on "all the kinds of considerations that Justice Scalia would deplore as a
devolution into open-ended fact-finding rather than law").
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2. Formalism and Functionalism
In addition to dividing on the use of rules versus standards,
the current Court is somewhat divided over whether the elements and
limits of Article III jurisdiction should be conceptualized in a
formalistic or a functionalistic manner. Like the rules-standards
debate, the formalism-functionalism debate is also deeply rooted in
the

Court's

jurisprudential

history,453

and

the

presence

or

reemergence of formalism in the Court's decision making has been
critically noted in such areas as federalism, 454 personal jurisdiction, 455
and, of course, the separation of powers. 456 In Steel Co., this debate

centered on the determination of constitutional subject-matter
jurisdiction itself, in particular whether it always had to precede an
analysis of the merits. As will be demonstrated below, Justice
Scalia's position for the majority that it did have to be determined as
a threshold matter essentially represents a formalistic approach to
Article III jurisdiction, which for the most part also describes the
position of Justices O'Connor and Kennedy in the former's
concurrence.
By contrast, Justice Breyer's position that such
jurisdiction could be bypassed if warranted by judicial economy
essentially represents a functionalistic approach.
Formalism in the jurisdictional context describes a perspective
on Article III power that is both exclusively structural in emphasis
and heavily categorical in analysis. First, it is concerned entirely
with the limits of judicial power as they are enumerated in Article III
and confined by the corresponding enumerations of legislative and
executive power in Articles I and II, respectively. Nonstructural
considerations such as judicial economy, fairness to litigants, and the
like are simply irrelevant to the task of determining the scope of
federal judicial power. 457 Second, a formalist approach to Article IlI
453. See Evan H. Caminker, Printz, State Sovereignty, and the Limits of Formalism, 1997
SUP. CT. REV. 199, 201 (observing that "[s]cholars and jurists have engaged in a long-standing
debate concerning the general propriety of formalist and functionalist approaches to constitutional interpretation").
454. See, e.g., id. See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Formalism and Functionalism in
FederalismAnalysis, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 959 (1997).
455. See generally Hayward D. Reynolds, The Concept of Jurisdiction: Conflicting Legal
Ideologies and PersistentFormalistSubversion, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 819 (1991).
456. See generally Lee S. Liberman, Morrison v. Olson: A Formalistic Perspective on Why
the Court Was Wrong, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 313 (1989); Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional
Approaches to Separation-of-PowersQuestions-A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV.
488 (1987).
457. Cf.Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 537 (1988) ("What makes formal-

ism formal is this very feature: the fact that taking rules seriously involves taking their mandates as reasons for decision independent of the reasons for decision lying behind the rule.").
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deductively yields either an absolutely positive or an absolutely
negative conclusion: either the judiciary has the power or it does not.
There is no balancing of interests, no contextualization, and no middle
ground.458
Functionalism, as its name implies, takes a more
instrumental approach to the question of judicial power. In contrast
to formalism, it is pragmatic in emphasis and circumstantial in
analysis. Thus, for example, while the Article III enumerations are
important, as is the separation of powers, also open to consideration
are factors such as judicial economy or the efficacy or utility of the
doctrine or scheme in question. At the same time, a functionalist
approach will not always yield a clearly positive or clearly negative
conclusion; often, the outcome or holding will be conditional or
qualified, and the predictability of future outcomes may be
proportionately diminished.
In Steel Co., Justice Scalia's majority opinion (even including
Justice O'Connor's concurrence) basically reflects a formalistic
approach to Article Ill. Federal courts either do have or do not have
the power to assume jurisdiction hypothetically (and they do not, end
of analysis); this determination should be based solely on their
enumerated power under Article III and in light of the separation of
powers (the two rationales invoked by the majority); and other
considerations, such as judicial economy, are simply irrelevant (and,
in fact, played no express role in the majority opinion). In sharp
contrast to the majority's analysis is Justice Breyer's separate
concurring opinion, which is absolutely functionalist in its approach.
According to Justice Breyer, whether federal courts have the power to
assume jurisdiction hypothetically is not an either/or question 59 (and,
in his view, they should under some circumstances); and this
determination can be based on the acknowledgment of "serious
practical problems" 4 0 such as considerations of judicial economy and

458. See Caminker, supra note 453, at 200 (labeling as "doctrinal formalism" the articulation of a rule that is "not subject to any case-by-case balancing of interests or measurement of
burden"). This categorical nature of formalism both entails and is reinforced by a reliance on
deduction as the overall mode of analysis. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 454, at 960
(describing as formalistic a process by which a court "reason[s] deductively from assumed major
premises and.., largely ignore[s] functional considerations").
459. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 118 S. Ct. 1003, 1020-21
(1998) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("[Flederal courts often
and typically should decide standing questions at the outset of a case .... But my qualifying
words 'often' and 'typically' are important. The Constitution, in my view, does not require us to
replace those words with the word 'always.' ").
460. Id. at 1021.
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fairness to litigants. 461 For Scalia, then, "[mluch more than legal
niceties are at stake"462-- the question is fundamentally and
exclusively one of judicial power. For Breyer, what is at stake are
"unnecessary delay and consequent added cost"463-and the question
is thus one of efficient and efficacious judicial administration in
"today's world of federal court caseloads."464
Several observations about the formalism-functionalism split
are worth noting. First, the methodological division in Steel Co.
between Justice Scalia and Justice Breyer is actually quite
representative of their respective approaches to legal interpretation in
general.4 5 Indeed, even when these two Justices find themselves on
the same side of a decision-as with the recent invalidation of the
Line Item Veto Act, which they both would have upheld 466-their
rationales do not deviate from the formalist and functionalist
conceptions, respectively. Justice Scalia in Clinton v. City of New
York simply did not find that the nation's "history and traditions"
forbade a spending cancellation device of the sort at issue, 467 and he
did not bolster his position with inquiries into its efficacy or
soundness.468 Either the Constitution forbids it or allows it, and here,
in his view, the Constitution allows it. Justice Breyer, by contrast,
46L See id. (discussing such factors as "unnecessary delay and consequent added cost" and
alleging that the resulting "cumbersome system... increases, to at least a small degree, the
risk of the justice delayed' that means Justice denied' ").
462. Id. at 1016.
463. Id. at 1021.
464. Id.
465. Their differing views on the propriety of using legislative history to construe statutory
language is illustrative. Justice Scalia is a strict textualist and almost entirely rejects the use of
legislative history, see NEA v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 118 S. Ct. 2168, 2182 (1998) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (criticizing the majority's use of legislative history, asserting that
"all this legislative history has no valid claim upon our attention at all"); Antonin Scalia,
Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in
Interpretingthe Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE LAW 3, 29-37 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). Conversely, Justice Breyer considers
legislative history to be a useful interpretive tool, see Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative
History in InterpretingStatutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845 (1992). For a general exposition of their
respective views, see Kenneth R. Dortzbach, Legislative History: The Philosophies of Justices
Scalia and Breyer and the Use of Legislative History by the Wisconsin State Courts, 80 MARQ. L.
REv.161, 169-93 (1996).
466. See Clinton v. City of New York, - U.S. -, 118 S. Ct. 2091, 2110, 2118 (1998). Justice
Scalia filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Justice Breyer joined
in part, while Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Scalia joined in part.
467. Id. at 2116 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Scalia also
argued that several appellees lacked standing. See id. at 2111-15.
468. Even Justice Scalia's argument that "there is not a dime's worth of difference between
Congress's authorizing the President to cancel a spending item, and Congress's authorizing
money to be spent on a particular item at the President's discretion," id. at 2116, is not a
pragmatic one. He notes that "the latter has been done since the Founding of the Nation," id.,
and therefore the former is equally legitimate as a matter of logic. .
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469
viewed the separation of powers question as one of relative degree
and explicitly took note of several functionalist considerations: "the
Framers' pragmatic vision,"470 the need for "institutional
innovation,"47' and the authority "to interpret nonliteral Separation of
Powers principles in light of the need for 'workable government.'"472
According to Breyer, the means employed by the Line Item Veto Act
"represent an experiment that may, or may not, help representative
government work better," and "[t]he Constitution... authorizes
473
Congress and the President to try novel methods in this way."
Second, the formalism versus functionalism debate is by no
means coextensive with the rules versus standards debate, and there
is certainly no logical mandate that a formalist be an advocate of rules
or that a functionalist be an advocate of standards. While it is true
that formalists may generally find greater utility in the expression of
legal doctrine through rules, 474 and functionalists may find the same
of standards, 475 the correlation is certainly not a necessary one, as

469. See, e.g., id. at 2125 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("The delegation of those powers to the
President may strengthen the Presidency, but any such change in Executive Branch authority
seems minute when compared with the changes worked by delegations of other kinds of authority that the Court in the past has upheld.").
470. Id. at 2119.
47L Id.
472. Id. at 2120 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring)).
473. Id. at 2131 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Yet another illustration of the methodological
difference between Justices Scalia and Breyer can be found in Printz v. United States, 521 U.S.
98, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997). Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia concluded that a federal requirement that state law enforcement officers conduct background checks on prospective handgun purchasers categorically violated the Tenth Amendment because it "conscript[ed] the
State's officers directly." Id. at 2384. According to Scalia's opinion:
The Federal Government may neither issue directives requiring the States to address
particular problems, nor command the States' officers, or those of their political
subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program. It matters not
whether policymaking is involved, and no case-by-case weighing of the burdens or
benefits is necessary; such commands are fundamentally incompatible with our
constitutional system of dual sovereignty.
Id. (emphasis added). In dissent, Justice Breyer expressed dissatisfation with the majority's
categorical or absolutist approach, arguing that it should have taken account of the practical
justifiability and actual effects of the requirement. From his perspective, "Ithere is neither
need nor reason to find in the Constitution an absolute principle, the inflexibility of which poses
a surprising and technical obstacle to the enactment of a law that Congress believed necessary
to solve an important national problem." Id. at 2405 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
474. See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 457, at 538 (noting the close relationship between formalism and rules).
475. See, e.g., id. at 537 ("Functionalism focuses on... the outcome the decisionmaker
deems optimal. Rules get in the way.., and thus functionalism can be perceived as a view of
decisionmaking that seeks to minimize the space between what a particular decisionmaker
concludes ... should be done and what some rule says should be done."); see also T. Alexander
Aleinikoff, ConstitutionalLaw in the Age of Balancing,96 YALE L.J. 943, 958 (1987) ("Balancing
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evidenced by Justice Breyer's promulgation of a functionalist rule for
hypothetical jurisdiction. Third and finally, it is interesting to note
that Justice Breyer, though writing only for himself, was essentially
speaking both on behalf of the lower federal courts, many of which
had similarly defended the doctrine in terms of judicial economy, and
on behalf of "a long academic tradition of criticizing certain
jurisdictional doctrines for adhering too formalistically or rigidly or
blindly to certain classical conceptions of jurisdictionality, and
ignoring 'policy' concerns such as efficiency, fairness, or the integrity
of the political or judicial system."476 Like those before him, however,
what Breyer did not do-and this may partly explain why no other
Justice joined his opinion-is to account for the judicial corruption of
hypothetical jurisdiction prior to Steel Co., and to give the reader a
reason to believe that the doctrine would not continue to be overused
and misused by lower courts. As noted earlier, even the critics of
hypothetical jurisdiction recognized its capacity to promote judicial
But no one to date, -including Justice Breyer, has
economy.
adequately delineated a principle or method by which the doctrine's
use can be meaningfully circumscribed, and functionalism is certainly
not a license for the abdication of such limits.
VI. CONCLUSION

The life and death of hypothetical jurisdiction are not simply
milestones in the genealogy of a doctrine. They are chapters in a
story about the propensities, dynamics, and self-conceptions of the
Such, in fact, is generally true of the
Article III judiciary.
jurisprudence of federal jurisdiction. More than just another corpus
of related doctrines and principles, it is an expression, a projection
both conscious and unconscious, of the nature and character of the
federal bench-of the presidentially nominated and senatorially
confirmed members who wear its robes; of the delicately configured
influences of federalism and the separation of powers, and the tension
between excess and restraint, that delineate the scope of its authority;
of the rich aggregate of judicial traditions that inform its language, its
habits, and even its reasoning; and of the particular history of its
conflicts, failures, and triumphs as the least dangerous yet least
democratic branch of the federal government. No doctrine or decision
openly embraced a view of the law as purposeful, as a means to an end; and it demanded a particularized, contextual scrutiny of the social interests at stake in a constitutional controversy.").
476. Dane, supra note 6, at 9 n.18.
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involving the scope of federal judicial power-hypothetical jurisdiction
and Steel Co. included-can exist apart from these institutional
factors, and no analysis of any such doctrine or decision can be
undertaken without their consideration.
From a formalistic standpoint, of course, the repudiation of
hypothetical jurisdiction was an easy call for the Court. Article III
having no Necessary and Proper Clause, the tribunals that exercise
its power either have jurisdiction or they do not, and only if they do
can they reach the merits of a given dispute. But the fact that the
doctrine became so widespread and found its apparent warrant in
many of the Court's own decisions suggests that the problem of
hypothetical jurisdiction ran much deeper than the need for doctrinal
clarification, and that its eradication may necessitate more than a
formalistic pronouncement. As this Article has argued, much of the
responsibility for the doctrine's emergence and growth must be
shouldered by the Supreme Court itself, both because it provided the
doctrine with precedential foundation and because its own ad hoc
decision making legitimized the expedient dilution of principle, which
in turn facilitated the doctrine's proliferation.
Through its formalistic reading of Article III, the Court has for
the most part rejected the practice of hypothetical jurisdiction. But
unless this orthodoxy of formalism is accompanied by an orthopraxy
of consistency, especially by its chief expositor, there is little reason to
believe that the repudiation will prove meaningful in the long term.
Even as it now stands, the repudiation's boundaries and the scope of
several related but unrepudiated doctrines remain murky. In turn,
for reasons discussed in Part IV, courts will likely continue to
gravitate to the concept of hypothetical jurisdiction and, using the
techniques set forth in Part IV, will attempt to approximate its utility
as closely as possible without running afoul of the Steel Co. decision.
While the outward form and even the doctrinal core of hypothetical
jurisdiction may have been eliminated by the Court's formalist decree,
its value and thus its essence will long persist in the deliberations,
and quite possibly the decisions, of the lower federal bench.

